Land the crash-recoverable managed-file transaction engine (journal, staging, commit, restart recovery, opaque snapshots, private artifacts, Windows DACL hardening) and the Kiro IDE 1.0 workspace hook plugin with legacy migration. Repair five defects that kept the suite red (426 failures to zero): - Anchor the transaction state directory at ~/.elydora/transactions instead of the shared system temp directory. The recovery journal now shares fate with the runtimes it repairs, survives temp cleaners, and isolates naturally under per-test fake homes. - Skip pending-transaction recovery when no state directory exists so rejected installs never create runtime directories. - Create the runtime root's parent before hardening it, matching the Go SDK's expand behavior for fresh homes. - Stop using file timestamps as identity evidence: Windows exposes mtime/ctime with delayed cross-handle visibility. Reads now prove stability through a verification re-read; snapshots compare device, inode, size, and SHA-256. - Stop comparing synthetic Windows permission bits across stat boundaries: path stats derive execute bits from file extensions while handle stats do not, which falsely flagged every managed .cmd wrapper. Snapshots store raw modes for restoration and compare portable bits. Reservation cleanup now verifies content before discarding so a concurrent writer's file at a rollback path is preserved, and the install-failure tests assert the precise contract: no agent runtime residue, with the durable state directory allowed to remain. Gates: pytest 807 passed, mypy clean, pip check clean, wheel builds.
342 lines
12 KiB
Python
342 lines
12 KiB
Python
"""Generate self-contained audit hook scripts."""
|
|
|
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
|
|
|
import sys
|
|
|
|
from .error_log_template import ERROR_LOG_RUNTIME
|
|
from .guard_template import generate_guard_script
|
|
from .runtime_reader_template import PROTECTED_RUNTIME_READER
|
|
|
|
__all__ = ["generate_guard_script", "generate_hook_script"]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def generate_hook_script(
|
|
*,
|
|
org_id: str,
|
|
agent_id: str,
|
|
kid: str,
|
|
base_url: str,
|
|
success_output: str = "",
|
|
fail_closed: bool = False,
|
|
native_payload: bool = False,
|
|
agent_name: str = "",
|
|
) -> str:
|
|
"""Return a self-contained signed audit hook."""
|
|
return f'''#!{sys.executable}
|
|
"""Elydora audit hook. Generated by elydora-sdk."""
|
|
|
|
import base64
|
|
import hashlib
|
|
import json
|
|
import math
|
|
import os
|
|
import re
|
|
import stat
|
|
import struct
|
|
import sys
|
|
import time
|
|
import urllib.error
|
|
import urllib.parse
|
|
import urllib.request
|
|
|
|
AGENT_ID = {agent_id!r}
|
|
AGENT_NAME = {agent_name!r}
|
|
SUCCESS_OUTPUT = {success_output!r}
|
|
FAIL_CLOSED = {fail_closed!r}
|
|
NATIVE_PAYLOAD = {native_payload!r}
|
|
ELYDORA_DIR = os.path.join(os.path.expanduser("~"), ".elydora")
|
|
CONFIG_PATH = os.path.join(ELYDORA_DIR, AGENT_ID, "config.json")
|
|
PRIVATE_KEY_PATH = os.path.join(ELYDORA_DIR, AGENT_ID, "private.key")
|
|
CHAIN_STATE_PATH = os.path.join(ELYDORA_DIR, AGENT_ID, "chain-state.json")
|
|
ERROR_LOG_PATH = os.path.join(ELYDORA_DIR, AGENT_ID, "error.log")
|
|
ZERO_CHAIN_HASH = "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
|
|
|
|
{PROTECTED_RUNTIME_READER}
|
|
|
|
{ERROR_LOG_RUNTIME}
|
|
|
|
|
|
def base64url_encode(data):
|
|
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def base64url_decode(value):
|
|
encoded = value.replace("-", "+").replace("_", "/")
|
|
encoded += "=" * ((4 - len(encoded) % 4) % 4)
|
|
return base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def sha256_base64url(data):
|
|
if isinstance(data, str):
|
|
data = data.encode("utf-8")
|
|
return base64url_encode(hashlib.sha256(data).digest())
|
|
|
|
|
|
def jcs_number(value):
|
|
if isinstance(value, bool):
|
|
return "true" if value else "false"
|
|
if isinstance(value, int):
|
|
return str(value)
|
|
if math.isnan(value) or math.isinf(value):
|
|
return "null"
|
|
if value == 0.0:
|
|
return "0"
|
|
return json.dumps(value)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def jcs_canonicalize(value):
|
|
if value is None:
|
|
return "null"
|
|
if isinstance(value, bool):
|
|
return "true" if value else "false"
|
|
if isinstance(value, (int, float)):
|
|
return jcs_number(value)
|
|
if isinstance(value, str):
|
|
return json.dumps(value, ensure_ascii=False)
|
|
if isinstance(value, list):
|
|
return "[" + ",".join(jcs_canonicalize(item) for item in value) + "]"
|
|
if isinstance(value, dict):
|
|
pairs = [
|
|
json.dumps(key, ensure_ascii=False) + ":" + jcs_canonicalize(value[key])
|
|
for key in sorted(value)
|
|
]
|
|
return "{{" + ",".join(pairs) + "}}"
|
|
return json.dumps(value)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def compute_payload_hash(payload):
|
|
return sha256_base64url(jcs_canonicalize(payload))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def compute_chain_hash(previous, payload_hash, operation_id, issued_at):
|
|
value = f"{{previous}}|{{payload_hash}}|{{operation_id}}|{{issued_at}}"
|
|
return sha256_base64url(value)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def read_private_key():
|
|
encoded = read_protected_file(PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, "Private key").decode("utf-8")
|
|
if not encoded or "\\r" in encoded or "\\n" in encoded or "\\0" in encoded:
|
|
raise ValueError("Private key file must contain exactly one line")
|
|
seed = base64url_decode(encoded)
|
|
if len(seed) != 32 or base64url_encode(seed) != encoded:
|
|
raise ValueError("Private key must be a canonical 32-byte base64url value")
|
|
return seed
|
|
|
|
|
|
def sign_ed25519(seed, data):
|
|
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519 import Ed25519PrivateKey
|
|
return base64url_encode(Ed25519PrivateKey.from_private_bytes(seed).sign(data))
|
|
|
|
|
|
def generate_uuidv7():
|
|
timestamp = struct.pack(">Q", int(time.time() * 1000))[2:]
|
|
random_a = (struct.unpack(">H", os.urandom(2))[0] & 0x0FFF) | 0x7000
|
|
random_b = bytearray(os.urandom(8))
|
|
random_b[0] = (random_b[0] & 0x3F) | 0x80
|
|
value = (timestamp + struct.pack(">H", random_a) + bytes(random_b)).hex()
|
|
return f"{{value[0:8]}}-{{value[8:12]}}-{{value[12:16]}}-{{value[16:20]}}-{{value[20:32]}}"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def log_error(error):
|
|
try:
|
|
append_bounded_error_log(
|
|
ERROR_LOG_PATH,
|
|
"Error log",
|
|
bounded_error_message(error),
|
|
MAX_PROTECTED_LOG_BYTES,
|
|
)
|
|
except Exception as log_failure:
|
|
sys.stderr.write(
|
|
"[Elydora audit] Failed to write error log: "
|
|
+ str(log_failure)
|
|
+ "\\n"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def read_chain_state():
|
|
try:
|
|
raw = read_protected_file(
|
|
CHAIN_STATE_PATH,
|
|
"Chain state",
|
|
MAX_PROTECTED_CONFIG_BYTES,
|
|
).decode("utf-8")
|
|
except FileNotFoundError:
|
|
return ZERO_CHAIN_HASH
|
|
except Exception as error:
|
|
raise RuntimeError("Failed to read chain state: " + str(error)) from error
|
|
try:
|
|
state = json.loads(raw)
|
|
except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as error:
|
|
raise RuntimeError("Chain state is invalid JSON: " + str(error)) from error
|
|
previous = state.get("prev_chain_hash") if isinstance(state, dict) else None
|
|
if not isinstance(previous, str) or re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]{{43}}", previous) is None:
|
|
raise ValueError("Chain state contains an invalid prev_chain_hash")
|
|
return previous
|
|
|
|
|
|
def write_chain_state(chain_hash):
|
|
write_protected_json(
|
|
CHAIN_STATE_PATH,
|
|
"Chain state",
|
|
{{"prev_chain_hash": chain_hash}},
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def read_runtime_config():
|
|
try:
|
|
raw = read_protected_file(
|
|
CONFIG_PATH,
|
|
"Agent config",
|
|
MAX_PROTECTED_CONFIG_BYTES,
|
|
).decode("utf-8")
|
|
config = json.loads(raw)
|
|
except Exception as error:
|
|
raise RuntimeError("Failed to read agent config: " + str(error)) from error
|
|
if not isinstance(config, dict):
|
|
raise ValueError("Agent config must contain a JSON object")
|
|
if config.get("agent_id") != AGENT_ID:
|
|
raise ValueError("Agent config identity does not match the generated audit hook")
|
|
if AGENT_NAME and config.get("agent_name") != AGENT_NAME:
|
|
raise ValueError("Agent config identity does not match the generated audit hook")
|
|
for field in ("org_id", "agent_id", "kid"):
|
|
if not isinstance(config.get(field), str) or not config[field]:
|
|
raise ValueError("Agent config is missing " + field)
|
|
base_url = config.get("base_url", "https://api.elydora.com")
|
|
if not isinstance(base_url, str):
|
|
raise ValueError("Agent config base_url must be a string")
|
|
try:
|
|
parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(base_url)
|
|
hostname = parsed.hostname
|
|
parsed.port
|
|
except ValueError as error:
|
|
raise ValueError(
|
|
"Agent config base_url must be an absolute HTTP or HTTPS URL"
|
|
) from error
|
|
invalid_character = "\\\\" in base_url or any(
|
|
character.isspace() or ord(character) < 32 for character in base_url
|
|
)
|
|
if (
|
|
parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https")
|
|
or not parsed.netloc
|
|
or hostname is None
|
|
or invalid_character
|
|
):
|
|
raise ValueError("Agent config base_url must be an absolute HTTP or HTTPS URL")
|
|
if parsed.username is not None or parsed.password is not None or parsed.query or parsed.fragment:
|
|
raise ValueError(
|
|
"Agent config base_url must exclude credentials, query parameters, and fragments"
|
|
)
|
|
if not isinstance(config.get("token", ""), str):
|
|
raise ValueError("Agent config token must be a string")
|
|
return config
|
|
|
|
|
|
def read_event():
|
|
raw = sys.stdin.read()
|
|
if not raw.strip():
|
|
raise ValueError("Hook input is empty")
|
|
try:
|
|
event = json.loads(raw)
|
|
except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as error:
|
|
raise ValueError("Hook input is invalid JSON: " + str(error)) from error
|
|
if not isinstance(event, dict):
|
|
raise ValueError("Hook input must contain a JSON object")
|
|
return event
|
|
|
|
|
|
def submit_operation(event, runtime):
|
|
nested = event.get("tool_result")
|
|
if not isinstance(nested, dict):
|
|
nested = event.get("tool_call")
|
|
if not isinstance(nested, dict):
|
|
nested = {{}}
|
|
tool_name = event.get("tool_name", event.get("toolName", event.get("name", nested.get("name", "unknown"))))
|
|
tool_input = event.get("tool_input", event.get("toolInput", event.get("input", nested.get("input", {{}}))))
|
|
session_id = event.get(
|
|
"conversation_id",
|
|
event.get("session_id", event.get("sessionId", event.get("session", event.get("taskId", "unknown")))),
|
|
)
|
|
previous = read_chain_state()
|
|
operation_id = generate_uuidv7()
|
|
issued_at = int(time.time() * 1000)
|
|
payload = event if NATIVE_PAYLOAD else {{
|
|
"tool_name": tool_name,
|
|
"tool_input": tool_input,
|
|
"session_id": session_id,
|
|
}}
|
|
payload_hash = compute_payload_hash(payload)
|
|
chain_hash = compute_chain_hash(previous, payload_hash, operation_id, issued_at)
|
|
unsigned = {{
|
|
"op_version": "1.0",
|
|
"operation_id": operation_id,
|
|
"org_id": runtime["org_id"],
|
|
"agent_id": runtime["agent_id"],
|
|
"issued_at": issued_at,
|
|
"ttl_ms": 30000,
|
|
"nonce": base64url_encode(os.urandom(16)),
|
|
"operation_type": "ai.tool_use",
|
|
"subject": {{"session_id": session_id}},
|
|
"action": {{"tool": tool_name}},
|
|
"payload": payload,
|
|
"payload_hash": payload_hash,
|
|
"prev_chain_hash": previous,
|
|
"agent_pubkey_kid": runtime["kid"],
|
|
}}
|
|
signature = sign_ed25519(
|
|
read_private_key(),
|
|
jcs_canonicalize(unsigned).encode("utf-8"),
|
|
)
|
|
operation = dict(unsigned)
|
|
operation.update({{"chain_hash": chain_hash, "signature": signature}})
|
|
url = runtime.get("base_url", "https://api.elydora.com").rstrip("/") + "/v1/operations"
|
|
headers = {{"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"}}
|
|
if runtime.get("token"):
|
|
headers["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + runtime["token"]
|
|
request = urllib.request.Request(
|
|
url,
|
|
data=json.dumps(operation).encode("utf-8"),
|
|
headers=headers,
|
|
method="POST",
|
|
)
|
|
try:
|
|
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=5):
|
|
write_chain_state(chain_hash)
|
|
except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
|
|
body = error.read().decode("utf-8")
|
|
if error.code == 400 and body:
|
|
try:
|
|
failure = json.loads(body)
|
|
except (json.JSONDecodeError, ValueError) as parse_error:
|
|
raise RuntimeError("Audit API returned invalid error JSON: " + str(parse_error)) from parse_error
|
|
details = failure.get("error", {{}}) if isinstance(failure, dict) else {{}}
|
|
if details.get("code") == "PREV_HASH_MISMATCH":
|
|
match = re.search(
|
|
r'Expected prev_chain_hash "([A-Za-z0-9_-]{{43}})"',
|
|
str(details.get("message", "")),
|
|
)
|
|
if match:
|
|
write_chain_state(match.group(1))
|
|
log_error("Chain hash resynced to server: " + match.group(1))
|
|
raise RuntimeError("Audit API returned HTTP " + str(error.code)) from error
|
|
|
|
|
|
def main():
|
|
try:
|
|
submit_operation(read_event(), read_runtime_config())
|
|
except Exception as error:
|
|
log_error(error)
|
|
if FAIL_CLOSED:
|
|
raise
|
|
|
|
|
|
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
|
try:
|
|
main()
|
|
except Exception as error:
|
|
sys.stderr.write("[Elydora audit] " + repr(error) + "\\n")
|
|
raise SystemExit(1)
|
|
if SUCCESS_OUTPUT:
|
|
sys.stdout.write(SUCCESS_OUTPUT)
|
|
'''
|