fix(worker): invert connector bypass default and gate on packaged build (S-01)
Previously `AGENTCOMPANY_ALLOW_UNSAFE_CONNECTOR_BYPASS !== "false"` meant packaged builds defaulted to passing `dangerouslyBypassApprovalsAndSandbox`, `dangerouslySkipPermissions`, `yolo`, and `--sandbox danger-full-access` to CLI connectors, bypassing ApprovalService entirely. Require both explicit opt-in (`AGENTCOMPANY_ALLOW_UNSAFE_CONNECTOR_BYPASS=true`) and a non-packaged build. Packaged builds hard-refuse regardless of the env var. Main process forks the worker with `AGENTCOMPANY_PACKAGED=<app.isPackaged>` so the worker has an authoritative packaged signal.
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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import { utilityProcess } from "electron";
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import { app, utilityProcess } from "electron";
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import { workerMessageSchema, type WorkerServiceDependencies } from "./worker/worker-types";
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import { handleWorkerExit } from "./worker/worker-crash-recovery";
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import { handleWorkerMessage } from "./worker/worker-message-handler";
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@@ -37,9 +37,15 @@ export function createWorkerService({
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}
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function createWorker() {
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// S-01: Propagate packaged-build signal so the worker can hard-refuse
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// connector bypass flags in production.
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worker = utilityProcess.fork(workerPath, [], {
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stdio: "pipe",
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serviceName: "AgentCompany Orchestrator",
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env: {
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...process.env,
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AGENTCOMPANY_PACKAGED: app.isPackaged ? "true" : "false",
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},
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});
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worker.stdout?.on("data", (chunk) => {
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@@ -80,10 +80,13 @@ const activeByAgent = new Map<string, string>();
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const activeByWorkspace = new Map<string, string>();
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const queue: RunJob[] = [];
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const cancelledRuns = new Set<string>();
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// Agent runs are autonomous by design — they must execute commands without interactive approval.
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// The env-var gate is retained as an emergency kill switch but defaults to enabled.
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// S-01: Bypass is opt-in only. Packaged builds hard-refuse the dangerous CLI
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// flags unless the operator sets BOTH `AGENTCOMPANY_ALLOW_UNSAFE_CONNECTOR_BYPASS=true`
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// AND is running a dev/E2E build (AGENTCOMPANY_PACKAGED !== "true"). Main forks
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// the worker with AGENTCOMPANY_PACKAGED=<app.isPackaged>.
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const isPackaged = process.env.AGENTCOMPANY_PACKAGED === "true";
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const allowUnsafeConnectorBypass =
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process.env.AGENTCOMPANY_ALLOW_UNSAFE_CONNECTOR_BYPASS !== "false";
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!isPackaged && process.env.AGENTCOMPANY_ALLOW_UNSAFE_CONNECTOR_BYPASS === "true";
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function post(message: ChildMessage) {
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parentPort.postMessage(message);
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