AgentCompany/docs/11-security-audit.md

Phase 10: Security Auditor

Security Posture

The desktop app now follows the required Electron baseline:

• contextIsolation: true
• nodeIntegration: false
• sandbox: true
• minimal preload bridge
• no direct renderer access to filesystem, shell, or process APIs

Verified Controls

• IPC channels are explicitly named and typed in src/shared/contracts.ts
• privileged handlers validate payloads with Zod on the main-process side
• IPC invocation is rejected for untrusted sender frames
• window.open and webview attachment are denied
• navigation outside approved content is blocked
• packaged renderer content is served through a controlled app:// protocol handler with path traversal protection
• openPath is restricted to managed workspace, log, artifact, backup, and profile paths
• connector execution commands are pinned to the audited connector binary instead of renderer overrides
• secrets are company-scoped and secret binding resolution is company-aware
• safeStorage is required for production secret writes; the insecure vault fallback is limited to explicit test environments
• worker-to-main messages are validated at runtime before mutating run state
• TODO: Electron binary fuse hardening is NOT yet configured. Before public release, add @electron/fuses to disable runAsNode, NODE_OPTIONS / inspect CLI argument injection, enforce app-from-ASAR loading, and enable ASAR integrity validation

Release Hygiene

• local builds do not auto-discover signing identities unless explicitly configured
• desktop packaging defaults to --publish never to prevent accidental channel publication from local/CI build jobs
• updater configuration remains present but still requires a real trusted update endpoint before public distribution
• notarization and production signing credentials are intentionally external to source control

Open Release Conditions

The app is appropriate for internal alpha and signed beta preparation. Public production release still requires:

• real signing credentials per platform
• notarization on macOS
• trusted update hosting
• platform-native validation for Windows and Linux installers

Re-Verification Notes (2026-03-13)

• reran lint, typecheck, tests, and macOS directory packaging with no security regressions
• static source review confirmed no renderer-side eval / new Function usage
• privileged surface remains preload-bridged through typed IPC channels only
• child_process.spawn usage stays in main process and is constrained to connector command checks