docs(agents): stored subscription-OAuth sessions are catalog fetch sources

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2026-07-22 17:38:44 -04:00
parent 63ff114f71
commit 0e4356c34e
+11
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@@ -269,6 +269,17 @@ edges stay deterministic Rust. The harness appends a terminal
token (`resolve_generic_oauth_tokens`, refreshed on expiry) and routes token (`resolve_generic_oauth_tokens`, refreshed on expiry) and routes
`platform.oauth().is_some()` → `platform.base_url()` (kimi-code alone → `platform.oauth().is_some()` → `platform.base_url()` (kimi-code alone →
`proxy_url()`). Tokens/codes/verifiers are NEVER logged. `proxy_url()`). Tokens/codes/verifiers are NEVER logged.
- A stored subscription-OAuth session IS a catalog fetch source. Every
fetch-PLAN decision that cannot afford real token resolution — the startup
prefetch arming gate, `on_auth_changed`'s wipe guard
(`should_wipe_catalog_on_auth_change`), and cache-origin computation — uses
the sync presence probes `models_fetch::stored_oauth_platforms` /
`stored_oauth_token_stubs` (auth.json scope scan; names only, no bearers).
All three must see the SAME enabled-platform set the real fetch enables, or
a claude-pro-max-only user boots onto the bundled Kimi table with an empty
picker. Managed catalog entries stamp `meta.provider` (platform display
name) for the client's `/model` picker; the picker itself lists the fetched
catalog, which is by construction the credentialed providers' models.
- INFERENCE-AUTH CHOKEPOINT (security): `auth::credential_authority::CredentialAuthority` - INFERENCE-AUTH CHOKEPOINT (security): `auth::credential_authority::CredentialAuthority`
is the ONE authority answering "WHICH credential — if any — may ride this is the ONE authority answering "WHICH credential — if any — may ride this
request?". It holds the session's effective `EndpointsConfig` and request?". It holds the session's effective `EndpointsConfig` and