docs(comments): rewrite comments across all crates to the guidelines

Sweep every first-party crate source (1956 .rs files) to the project comment
guidelines: delete redundant restatements, decorative banners, change
narration, and end-of-line comments; keep and tighten the crucial ones
(invariants, bug rationale, SAFETY blocks, ported-source attribution).

No functional code changed. Every edit is proven comment-only against the
prior tree by a comment-stripping lexer (string/char/raw-string aware) plus a
separate doctest-fence check. Where removing a comment made rustfmt or clippy
want to re-lay-out adjacent code, the minimal triggering comment is restored so
code tokens stay byte-identical.

Gates green: cargo fmt --all --check (0 diffs), cargo check and cargo clippy
--workspace --all-targets (0 warnings).

Adds scripts/check_codegen_comment_guidelines.py — the enforcement gate for
these guidelines (flags banners, end-of-line comments, change narration, and
commented-out code).
This commit is contained in:
ZacharyZhang-NY committed 2026-07-23 16:55:39 -04:00
1 parent ff0fb56c67
commit a02b555e66
1458 files changed
+10729 -21750

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@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ pub unsafe fn install_child_network_filter() -> std::io::Result<()> {
const SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW: u32 = 0x7fff_0000;
const SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO: u32 = 0x0005_0000;
const EPERM_VAL: u32 = 1; // libc::EPERM
// libc::EPERM
const EPERM_VAL: u32 = 1;
macro_rules! bpf_stmt {
($code:expr, $k:expr) => {
@@ -39,7 +40,8 @@ pub unsafe fn install_child_network_filter() -> std::io::Result<()> {
};
}
const NR_OFFSET: u32 = 0; // seccomp_data.nr offset
// seccomp_data.nr offset
const NR_OFFSET: u32 = 0;
let blocked_syscalls: &[i64] = &[
SYS_connect,
@@ -54,24 +56,22 @@ pub unsafe fn install_child_network_filter() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let mut filter: Vec<sock_filter> = Vec::new();
let total_checks = blocked_syscalls.len();
// 1. Load syscall number
filter.push(bpf_stmt!(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS, NR_OFFSET));
// 2. Check each blocked syscall
for (i, &syscall) in blocked_syscalls.iter().enumerate() {
let remaining = total_checks - i - 1;
filter.push(bpf_jump!(
BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K,
syscall,
remaining as u8 + 1, // match: jump to ERRNO
0 // no match: check next
// match: jump to ERRNO
remaining as u8 + 1,
// no match: check next
0
));
}
// 3. Default: ALLOW
filter.push(bpf_stmt!(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW));
// 4. Blocked: ERRNO(EPERM)
filter.push(bpf_stmt!(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | EPERM_VAL));
let prog = sock_fprog {