[platforms.<name>] with base_url and api (openai or anthropic) declares a provider.
Its key lives in auth.json under the name or in the table; /models is fetched per
provider, entries are keyed <name>/<model>, and the key is stamped in memory only.
The full-workspace gates had never run on this platform: collapsible
ifs in the Windows shell probe, a same-type cast in the crash handler,
an unused AsRawHandle import, and the sandbox smoke-test example
building its unix-only body (libc, kernel enforcement) unconditionally.
The example now stubs main off-unix; formatting reflow from cargo fmt.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KSy9S31pZNWXtRZNVJ1sDf
Port of upstream grok-build 0.2.113-window fixes:
- write_auth_json_atomic tmp path gains a monotonic sequence next to the
pid, so two concurrent in-process writers (background mint + proactive
refresher) cannot share one tmp path and tear each other's bytes; a tmp
write that fails partway is reclaimed instead of orphaned.
- New secure_file::ensure_owner_only_permissions (0o600 / Windows ACL)
tightens pre-existing world-readable credential files on read, backup,
write, replace, and restore. Best-effort with warns after durable
content — a chmod-only failure must not masquerade as a failed write —
and propagating in restore_prior_bytes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KSy9S31pZNWXtRZNVJ1sDf
`MemoryBackendParams` carried the primary session `AuthManager` and the
session api-key provider unconditionally, while `embed_base_url` is the
CURRENT MODEL's endpoint and `AuthRetryMiddleware` stamps `Authorization`
on every request it wraps. A user who enables `[memory.embedding] model`
while running a BYOK or subscription-OAuth model therefore sent the Kimi
session bearer to that third party.
`EndpointScopedCredentials` binds the credential to the one endpoint it
may reach: `for_endpoint` drops the handle unless the caller vouches for
the URL, and `approved_for` re-checks at provider-build time in release
too, because `MemoryBackendParams` is `Clone` and callers rewrite fields
on the copy.
The shell decides through `CredentialAuthority::manager_for` rather than
a second URL predicate — it answers both whether a credential may ride
and which manager governs it, so a subscription-OAuth platform gets its
own pooled manager. The session's `SharedApiKeyProvider` is not
forwarded at all: it is hard-wired to the primary manager, so at a
pooled platform's host it would resolve the wrong bearer. A platform's
own `embed_api_key` is untouched and keeps serving its own endpoint.
The background reindex built a second provider straight from
`ApiEmbeddingProvider::from_session`, outside the chokepoint and without
401 refresh; it now embeds through the session's own params.
Test strength verified by mutation: with the guard reverted, exactly
`session_credentials_are_withheld_from_a_foreign_endpoint` and
`a_cloned_param_set_cannot_redirect_scoped_credentials` fail.
Sweep every first-party crate source (1956 .rs files) to the project comment
guidelines: delete redundant restatements, decorative banners, change
narration, and end-of-line comments; keep and tighten the crucial ones
(invariants, bug rationale, SAFETY blocks, ported-source attribution).
No functional code changed. Every edit is proven comment-only against the
prior tree by a comment-stripping lexer (string/char/raw-string aware) plus a
separate doctest-fence check. Where removing a comment made rustfmt or clippy
want to re-lay-out adjacent code, the minimal triggering comment is restored so
code tokens stay byte-identical.
Gates green: cargo fmt --all --check (0 diffs), cargo check and cargo clippy
--workspace --all-targets (0 warnings).
Adds scripts/check_codegen_comment_guidelines.py — the enforcement gate for
these guidelines (flags banners, end-of-line comments, change narration, and
commented-out code).
Root cause of 'model+effort switch works on Mac, not on Windows': the
switch APPLIES in-session (the dispatch/apply chain is platform-identical,
verified adversarially) but its persistence never sticks on Windows.
Every tmp+rename atomic write except auth/storage.rs committed with a
bare fs::rename, and Windows MoveFileExW(REPLACE_EXISTING) fails with a
sharing violation whenever AV/search-indexer/cloud-sync transiently holds
the destination open. Consequences: [models].default never persisted
(next launch = original model), the session summary's current model never
persisted (resume = original model), and the models cache went silently
stale (all its write errors were swallowed).
- New kigi_shell_base::util::fs::replace_file — THE commit step for
tmp+rename: plain rename on Unix; on Windows delete-first + two short
backoffs (the pattern auth/storage.rs shipped first), tmp cleaned on
failure, error always returned. Windows branch type-checked against
x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.
- Adopted at every replace site: config.toml (save_config /
atomic_write_string / mcp saves), models cache (plus unique tmp
suffixes and tracing::warn on failure — writes were fully silent),
session storage (summary/current-model, jsonl, plan/signals/
announcement/goal/graph state), auth.json, active-sessions registry,
prompt history, claude/kimi import, campaigns state, goal artifacts.
Directory-move renames (worktree pool, corrupt-file backups) keep
plain rename — their destinations don't pre-exist.
Verified: kigi-shell + kigi-shell-base 5318 tests green, clippy clean,
msvc-target check of the new cfg(windows) code clean.
One authority answers 'which credential may ride this request':
credential_class / manager_for / credential_for / bearer_resolver_for,
keyed by (platform, base_url). SessionCredential is an opaque type with
no production constructor, so a new call site cannot re-introduce the
session-bearer leak. Platform-scoped tests extended across all bearer
channels (session, aux, summary, subagent override).
Verified: cargo check --workspace --all-targets clean; kigi-shell and
kigi-tui suites green (6611+ tests).
29th platform `openai-codex` (uses_oauth, Responses wire). PKCE-localhost login at
auth.openai.com (client app_EMoamEEZ73f0CkXaXp7hrann, redirect localhost:1455/auth/
callback, form token exchange, fresh-random state) reusing the claude-pro-max flow;
OAuthFlow::PkceLocalhost gained a redirect_path and OAuthConfig an authorize_extra
(empty elsewhere, so claude/xai/copilot authorize URLs stay byte-identical).
Codex-specific: the access token is a JWT carrying chatgpt_account_id, which becomes
the `chatgpt-account-id` inference header. It is derived STATELESSLY from whichever
bearer rides each request (so a rotated token needs no persisted field), and BOTH
login and refresh fail fast when the claim is absent — gated on the explicit
OAuthConfig.requires_chatgpt_account_id fact, never inferred from the token-body
encoding (a plain form endpoint is the OAuth norm and must not inherit this).
Inference rides the existing Responses wire at chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex →
/responses, with codex headers (chatgpt-account-id, originator, OpenAI-Beta
responses=experimental, codex UA) gated on SamplerConfig.openai_codex so API-key
`openai` stays byte-identical; store:false was already the global Responses default.
Catalog is HARDCODED (no live endpoint exists for this backend; read from the
official Codex CLI's model cache): gpt-5.6-sol/terra/luna + gpt-5.5, ctx 272000,
each with its real reasoning levels (low..ultra — ReasoningEffort gained Ultra).
Excluded: gpt-5.3-codex-spark (supported_in_api=false), gpt-5.4/-mini and
codex-auto-review (hidden) — they would list but fail at inference. The fetch
short-circuits before any HTTP; Kigi never shells out to the codex CLI or reads
~/.codex.
Security review fixes: redact any `account-id` header from request logs (it was
reaching debug logs), strict 3-segment JWT check (fail closed), refresh no longer
fails open on a missing claim. Inherits leak-safe pooled routing (scope
oauth/openai-codex) — never the Kimi token. Full gate green (234 suites, 0 warnings).
28th platform `github-copilot` (uses_oauth, ChatCompletions wire). Two-stage auth:
RFC-8628 GitHub device flow (client Iv1.b507a08c87ecfe98, scope read:user, errors
in a 200 body) mints the DURABLE github token; a GET api.github.com/copilot_internal/
v2/token exchange re-mints the SHORT-LIVED copilot token. Persisted as key=copilot
token, refresh_token=github token, expires_at=copilot expiry; the "refresh" is a
copilot-token re-mint (not a refresh_token grant), dispatched via
OAuthTokenBody::GithubCopilotExchange in the generic refresher.
VS Code editor-identity headers on /models + /chat/completions, gated on
SamplerConfig.github_copilot / PlatformId::sends_copilot_editor_headers() so every
other ChatCompletions provider stays byte-identical. Live /models filtered
(parse_github_copilot_listing) to the openai-completions-served models: keep iff
model_picker_enabled && policy.state!="disabled" && tool_calls!=false AND not a
claude-4.x/5.x (messages) or gpt-5/oswe/mai- (responses-only) id — those need
per-model wire routing (documented debt), excluded rather than mis-routed.
Inherits the leak-safe pooled routing (scope oauth/github-copilot); its bearer/
refresh/api_key never touch the Kimi token (regression test added). Fail-fast on
an out-of-range copilot expires_at (would otherwise silently 401 mid-session).
Adversarial security review: GO, no CRITICAL/HIGH. Known limitation: Pi's
per-model policy-enablement POST is not ported (documented in AGENTS.md).
27th registry variant, 2nd subscription-OAuth provider. Log in with a Claude
Pro/Max subscription via PKCE authorization-code + S256 (loopback callback on
127.0.0.1:53692, with a manual code-paste fallback), then use it against
api.anthropic.com — reusing the existing Anthropic Messages wire + Anthropic
listing + the multi-provider OAuth foundation (dbce6bf). Sourced from Pi
(earendil-works/pi auth/oauth/anthropic.ts): client 9d1c250a..., authorize
claude.ai/oauth/authorize, token platform.claude.com/v1/oauth/token, scope
'…user:inference user:sessions:claude_code…'.
New machinery (foundation handles token routing — claude-pro-max is a
uses_oauth platform so its bearer/refresh/api_key already route to its own
pooled manager, never Kimi):
- OAuthConfig gains flow{DeviceCode|PkceLocalhost} + token_host + token_body
{Form|JSON}; xai/kimi rows unchanged (DeviceCode/Form).
- auth/oauth_pkce.rs: PKCE S256 wire — loopback listener with STRICT state
validation (CSRF, fail-closed), manual-paste fallback, JSON code→token
exchange + rotating-refresh. Never logs code/verifier/tokens.
- Messages OAuth adaptation gated on SamplerConfig.anthropic_oauth (true only
for a claude-pro-max managed key): Authorization: Bearer + anthropic-beta
oauth + user-agent claude-cli + x-app cli, and the required 'You are Claude
Code' system prefix. API-key anthropic/minimax Messages requests are
BYTE-IDENTICAL (regression-guarded).
- Live /models under the OAuth Bearer + oauth-beta headers (Anthropic listing,
enriched from models.dev anthropic); persistent 401 → 0 models + WARN, NO
hardcoded fallback list (honest failure).
Adversarial review: no blocking findings (secret handling, CSRF/state, the
anthropic_oauth gate, token routing, non-regression all CONFIRMED). Full gate
green. Registry at 27; picker updated. Residual (unverifiable without a real
Claude Pro/Max account): whether GET /v1/models accepts the OAuth bearer, and
the real endpoint's acceptance of the OAuth Messages request.
First subscription-OAuth provider beyond Kimi Code (26th registry variant).
Log in with a Grok/SuperGrok/X subscription via RFC-8628 device-code OAuth
(auth.x.ai), then use it against api.x.ai/v1 — reusing the existing xai wire
(ChatCompletions + OpenAI listing + Passthrough + restrict + models_dev_id
xai). Sourced from Pi (earendil-works/pi auth/oauth/xai.ts): client
b1a00492..., scope 'openid profile email offline_access grok-cli:access
api:access', standard Bearer (no x-xai-token-auth).
Foundation (generalizes Kigi's Kimi-singleton OAuth to per-provider, root
cause, not a patch):
- Registry: OAuthConfig on PlatformSpec (client_id/host/device+token
paths/scope/scope_key); XAI_OAUTH_CONFIG + XAI_GROK_SPEC (uses_oauth, method
id 'xai-grok', an interactive login after kimi-code).
- Generic device-code wire (auth/oauth_device.rs) + GenericDeviceRefresher,
sharing the RFC-8628 core with Kimi; Kimi's bespoke flow is byte-identical
(X-Msh headers, KIMI_CODE_OAUTH_SCOPE, keyring gating unchanged).
- Per-provider AuthManager via a process-global pool (auth/oauth_registry.rs):
build-on-demand with start_proactive_refresh, keyed by scope. The session
resolves the AuthManager for the ACTIVE model's platform for bearer/refresh/
401-recovery/api_key — an oauth-platform model always uses its OWN token,
never the primary.
- Live /models under OAuth; base routes oauth().is_some() -> platform.base_url()
(kimi-code stays on proxy_url).
Security: adversarial review + a systematic token-leak audit found and closed
FIVE channels where the primary Kimi token could reach api.x.ai (bearer
resolver, api_key stamping, aux summary/classifier/image-describe models, and
subagent model-override). Each fix routes through the platform-aware resolver
(the oauth model's pooled token or None, NEVER the primary) and is revert-to-red
verified. No access/refresh token is ever logged.
Registry at 26; picker updated (xai-grok interactive login row); TUI
context-window already auto-updates per model. Full gate green (234 suites,
fmt, clippy -D warnings, deny). GPT/Claude/Grok officially permit third-party
subscription use.
Platform API keys now live in auth.json under the platform-id scope (the
per-provider auth.json key contract), resolved env > auth.json > legacy
[platforms.*] config.toml (read-only fallback). The TUI login picker,
paste box, auth-method advertising, and authenticate handler are all
registry-generic: a new PlatformSpec row appears in the login UI and
authenticates with zero UI changes. Spec rows gained vendor/console_host/
login_label display fields (moonshot strings byte-identical, pinned by
tests).
Adversarial review caught that auth.json keys were validated at login but
never stamped onto catalog entries (completions would 401; restart lost
eager auth). Fixed red-green: resolve_model_list/resolve_model_catalog now
take a resolved PlatformApiKeys snapshot consumed by the credential-
stamping layer (auth.json beats stale config.toml, matching the login
validator), with production callers resolving fresh per catalog build.
Also from review: the new auth.json writer takes the manager's cross-
process flock (bounded retry — an unlocked RMW racing a token refresh
could revert a rotated refresh token); the oauth-401 wiremock test is
hermetic (KIGI_SHARE_DIR tempdir; it could read a dev's real auth.json
and hit live moonshot); cli_models resolves real keys; auth.json is read
once per registry sweep; caller-less lock_config_writes deleted; catalog
resolvers tightened to pub(crate); stale config.toml doc comments and the
no-credentials error copy updated.
The PRD's first acceptance gate now holds: grep -RinE '\bx\.ai\b|grok'
crates/ --include='*.rs' → 0 matches (exempt: NOTICE and third-party
license archives, README provenance, and the required 'Based on Grok
Build Open Source' attribution, now sourced from version_attribution.txt).
Wire-visible renames (both sides in this repo, changed in lockstep):
- Auth method id 'grok.com' → 'kimi-code' (AuthMethodKind::KimiCode).
- Every x.ai/* and _x.ai/* ACP ext method and meta key → kigi/* /
_kigi/* (~200 names; grokShell → kigiShell). Session-file replay keeps
a read-side alias for the legacy '_x.ai/session/update' method so
existing updates.jsonl histories load; writes emit only the new name
(both directions test-pinned).
- Agent types grok-build* → kigi* with a documented legacy-prefix alias
at resolution time so persisted sessions keep resolving.
- ToolNamespace/BuiltinAgentName GrokBuild* → Kigi* (wire snake_case
kigi/kigi_concise/kigi_hashline; schema regenerated); grok_build
implementation dirs renamed to kigi*.
- x-grok-* headers → x-kigi-*, __GROK_* sentinels → __KIGI_*, themes
grokday/groknight → kigiday/kiginight (old persisted values fall back
to the default theme), web_fetch allowlist xAI hosts → kimi.com +
moonshot platforms, changelog CDN → this repo, grok-build changelog
archives deleted.
- BYOK default endpoint removed: [endpoints] api_base_url is now truly
optional with NO default — consumers fail fast with the flag name when
unset (no silent x.ai egress). Mock harnesses inject it explicitly.
- System-prompt identity fixed: 'released by xAI' → 'an unofficial
community CLI for Kimi' (template + regenerated encrypted form).
Also repaired pre-existing grok-era test debt found by the sweep: the
stale trace_classify default-model pin, the grok-pager UA label test,
pty-harness stale-binary reuse and non-hermetic moonshot routing (a PTY
test could previously reach the real api.moonshot.cn), and the outdated
oauth fixture scope key.
Gates: §9 grep 0; fmt clean; workspace check/clippy 0/0 (-D warnings);
FULL cargo test --workspace: 234 suites, 21,961 passed, 0 failed;
deny advisories ok.
Root cause of today's repeated logouts: the keyring entry (service kigi /
oauth/kimi-code) is global per OS user, but the enable gate keyed off ENV
VARS while an AuthManager's identity is its constructor path. Integration
test binaries (compiled without cfg(test), no KIGI_SHARE_DIR in env)
constructed managers on tempdirs whose remove_scope() then deleted the
developer's REAL keychain credential — the unified log shows 13 such
wipes in one day, one per test run.
Structural fix: keyring participation is now a property of the manager's
own path. AuthManager captures keyring_path_scoped at construction
(path == default ~/.kigi/auth.json) and every keyring touch — the
constructor read, update()'s write, remove_scope()'s delete — requires it,
with the dynamic keyring_enabled() gate (env kill-switch, cfg(test) mock
toggle) layered on top. A tempdir-rooted manager can no longer read,
write, or delete the global entry no matter what process type it runs in.
Regression test tempdir_manager_never_touches_global_keyring pins the
incident: a foreign manager's logout must leave the (mock) keyring entry
intact. Keyring behavior tests keep constructor-read coverage via a
thread-local path-scope test seam.
Sampler / inference (PRD F3):
- kimi_compat.rs: single adaptation point for the Kimi chat/completions
dialect (thinking-field mapping, model_id stripping, empty-content
tool-call message fix, stream_options.include_usage), with kimi-cli
source citations
- Rate-limit handling reworked for Kimi/Moonshot semantics; UA kigi/{version}
- /models replaces the xAI models-v2 endpoint everywhere; idle model
refresh carries X-Msh-* device headers only (X-XAI-Token-Auth and
x-grok-client-mode/CLIENT_MODE_HEADER machinery deleted)
Cloud-surface excision (PRD §5, zero-egress):
- remote/ conversations lane, cli-chat-proxy-types crate, prod/ dir,
share command, credit bar: deleted (single local session lane;
paginate() replaces merge_and_paginate)
- Subscription/tier gate stack deleted end-to-end: AppView
gate/tier/team/ZDR fields, app/subscription.rs watch loop,
dispatch/billing.rs paywall + SuperGrok upsell, free-usage-exhausted
chain, tier-restricted commands, GateInfo, RemoteSettings gate fields,
SettingsUpdateNotification gate fields
- /privacy + coding-data-sharing setting deleted (backed by a dead xAI
RPC; Kigi is zero-egress — nothing to share or retain remotely)
Auth UX correctness (user-reported):
- Device-flow fixtures now mirror the live Kimi payload shape
(https://www.kimi.com/code/authorize_device?user_code=..., verified
against auth.kimi.com); the fabricated auth.kimi.com/device?code=...
URLs are gone
- open_browser_detached is a no-op under cfg(test): unit tests drove
wiremock fixture URLs into the real browser (root cause of the
"garbage mock link" ABCD-1234 tabs)
- Welcome/pager-minimal rebrand: Grok Build -> Kigi, grok.com ->
kimi.com, "Sign in to Grok" -> "Sign in to Kimi"