//! Shared URL-opening and scheme validation utilities.
//!
//! Extracted from the `OpenSubscriptionUrl` dispatch handler so that any
//! code path (keyboard navigation, mouse click, action dispatch) can
//! open a link safely without duplicating platform-specific logic.

use crate::terminal::hyperlinks::SchemeFilter;

/// Open a URL in the system's default browser/handler.
///
/// Spawns the platform-native opener (`open` on macOS, `xdg-open` on
/// Linux, `cmd /c start` on Windows) with fully detached stdio so it
/// cannot block the pager.
///
/// **Callers handling untrusted input** should call [`is_safe_to_open`]
/// first, or use [`open_url_if_safe`] which combines both steps.
pub fn open_url(url: &str) {
    // Test seam: PTY e2e must observe the open without launching a real
    // browser. When set, append the URL to the file and skip the OS opener.
    if let Ok(path) = std::env::var("KIGI_TEST_OPEN_URL_FILE") {
        use std::io::Write;
        // Surface misconfiguration: a swallowed write leaves the PTY test
        // failing with a generic timeout and no clue why.
        if let Err(e) = std::fs::OpenOptions::new()
            .create(true)
            .append(true)
            .open(&path)
            .and_then(|mut f| writeln!(f, "{url}"))
        {
            tracing::warn!(error = %e, path, "KIGI_TEST_OPEN_URL_FILE write failed");
        }
        return;
    }

    #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
    let cmd = "open";
    #[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
    let cmd = "cmd";
    #[cfg(not(any(target_os = "macos", target_os = "windows")))]
    let cmd = "xdg-open";

    let mut command = std::process::Command::new(cmd);
    #[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
    command.args(["/c", "start", ""]);
    command
        .arg(url)
        .stdin(std::process::Stdio::null())
        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null());
    kigi_tools::util::detach_std_command(&mut command);
    if let Err(e) = command.spawn() {
        // Redact URL to avoid leaking sensitive query params to logs.
        let redacted = url::Url::parse(url)
            .map(|mut u| {
                u.set_query(None);
                u.set_fragment(None);
                u.to_string()
            })
            .unwrap_or_else(|_| "<unparseable>".to_string());
        tracing::warn!(url = %redacted, error = %e, "failed to open URL");
    }
}

/// Build the `open`/`xdg-open` opener command (macOS / Linux / BSD).
///
/// The returned command is TTY-guarded via [`kigi_tty_utils::detach_std_command`]
/// (`setsid`/`setpgid`) so the spawned GUI helper and its children can't grab
/// the TUI's `/dev/tty`, with stdio fully redirected to null. Split from
/// [`open_path`] so it can be unit-tested without spawning. The path is a single
/// argument, never interpolated into a shell string. Windows uses
/// [`reveal_in_explorer`] instead.
#[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
fn build_open_path_command(path: &std::path::Path) -> std::process::Command {
    #[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
    let mut command = std::process::Command::new("open");
    #[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
    let mut command = std::process::Command::new("xdg-open");
    command
        .arg(path)
        .stdin(std::process::Stdio::null())
        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null());
    kigi_tty_utils::detach_std_command(&mut command);
    command
}

/// Reveal/open a local file in the OS file manager or default application.
///
/// Returns `true` on success. Takes a trusted filesystem path (no scheme
/// validation, unlike [`open_url`]).
///
/// - **Windows**: `explorer.exe /select,<path>` reveals + highlights the file
///   in Explorer. We deliberately avoid `cmd /c start`, whose `%VAR%`
///   expansion corrupts the percent-encoded session-directory segment in
///   media paths (e.g. `…\C%3A%5CUsers…`).
/// - **macOS / Linux**: `open` / `xdg-open` open the file in its default app.
pub fn open_path(path: &std::path::Path) -> bool {
    // Never launch a real GUI app in tests.
    #[cfg(test)]
    {
        !path.as_os_str().is_empty()
    }
    #[cfg(all(not(test), target_os = "windows"))]
    {
        reveal_in_explorer(path)
    }
    #[cfg(all(not(test), not(target_os = "windows")))]
    {
        match build_open_path_command(path).spawn() {
            Ok(_) => true,
            Err(e) => {
                tracing::warn!(path = %path.display(), error = %e, "failed to open file natively");
                false
            }
        }
    }
}

/// Reveal `path` in a new Explorer window with the file selected.
///
/// Uses `raw_arg` so Explorer's required `/select,"<path>"` quoting is passed
/// verbatim — the default arg quoting wraps the whole token and breaks the
/// switch. Launched directly (not via `cmd`), so percent characters in the
/// path are not expanded by the shell. Session dirs embed a urlencoded cwd
/// segment (`C%3A%5CUsers…`); those `%` chars must reach Explorer intact.
///
/// Prefer the on-disk path as-is. When the file is missing, open the parent
/// folder (no `/select`) so the user lands near the media instead of Home.
#[cfg(all(not(test), target_os = "windows"))]
fn reveal_in_explorer(path: &std::path::Path) -> bool {
    use std::os::windows::process::CommandExt;

    // Prefer the real on-disk location (absolute). Fall back to parent when
    // the file was deleted so Explorer does not dump the user in Home.
    let target = if path.is_file() || path.is_dir() {
        path.to_path_buf()
    } else if let Some(parent) = path.parent().filter(|p| p.is_dir()) {
        tracing::debug!(
            path = %path.display(),
            parent = %parent.display(),
            "media path missing; opening parent folder in Explorer"
        );
        parent.to_path_buf()
    } else {
        path.to_path_buf()
    };

    let select_file = target.is_file();
    let mut command = std::process::Command::new("explorer");
    // Escape embedded double-quotes in the path so the `/select,"<path>"`
    // quoting does not break. Windows file-system paths cannot legally contain
    // `"`, but percent-decoded display paths or future user-chosen filenames
    // could, so be defensive.
    let escaped = target.display().to_string().replace('"', "\"\"");
    if select_file {
        command.raw_arg(format!("/select,\"{}\"", escaped));
    } else {
        // Open the folder itself (no /select) — works for dirs and as a
        // fallback when we only have a parent path.
        command.raw_arg(format!("\"{}\"", escaped));
    }
    command
        .stdin(std::process::Stdio::null())
        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null());
    kigi_tty_utils::detach_std_command(&mut command);
    // explorer.exe returns exit code 1 even on success, so a successful spawn
    // is the best signal we have.
    match command.spawn() {
        Ok(_) => true,
        Err(e) => {
            tracing::warn!(path = %target.display(), error = %e, "failed to reveal file in Explorer");
            false
        }
    }
}

/// Check if a URL's scheme is safe to open.
///
/// Uses the `url` crate for robust scheme extraction. Falls back to
/// prefix matching for non-standard URLs that `url::Url::parse` rejects.
pub fn is_safe_to_open(url: &str, filter: SchemeFilter) -> bool {
    let url = url.trim();
    if let Ok(parsed) = url::Url::parse(url) {
        return filter.allows(parsed.scheme());
    }
    // Fallback: check for scheme via "://" prefix, lowercasing for
    // case-insensitive comparison (SchemeFilter matches lowercase literals).
    if let Some((scheme, _)) = url.split_once("://") {
        return filter.allows(&scheme.to_ascii_lowercase());
    }
    // Defensive: url::Url::parse handles well-formed mailto, but guard
    // against edge cases where the parser rejects a mailto-like string.
    if let Some((scheme, _)) = url.split_once(':')
        && scheme.eq_ignore_ascii_case("mailto")
    {
        return filter.allows(&scheme.to_ascii_lowercase());
    }
    false
}

/// Validate scheme and open a URL if permitted. Returns `true` if opened.
pub fn open_url_if_safe(url: &str, filter: SchemeFilter) -> bool {
    if is_safe_to_open(url, filter) {
        open_url(url);
        true
    } else {
        tracing::debug!(url, "URL scheme not permitted");
        false
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn open_path_command_passes_path_as_a_single_arg() {
        // Path with spaces must be one argument, never shell-interpolated.
        let path = std::path::Path::new("/tmp/kigi session/image 1.jpg");
        let command = build_open_path_command(path);
        let args: Vec<_> = command.get_args().map(|a| a.to_os_string()).collect();
        assert!(args.contains(&path.as_os_str().to_os_string()));
    }

    #[test]
    fn standard_http_schemes_allowed() {
        assert!(is_safe_to_open(
            "http://example.com",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
        assert!(is_safe_to_open(
            "https://example.com/path?q=1",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn mailto_allowed() {
        assert!(is_safe_to_open(
            "mailto:user@example.com",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn file_scheme_blocked_by_standard() {
        // file:// removed from Standard to prevent local file / SSRF attacks.
        assert!(!is_safe_to_open(
            "file:///home/user/doc.pdf",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
        // But allowed under EditorExtended.
        assert!(is_safe_to_open(
            "file:///home/user/doc.pdf",
            SchemeFilter::EditorExtended
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn javascript_scheme_blocked() {
        assert!(!is_safe_to_open(
            "javascript:alert(1)",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn data_scheme_blocked() {
        assert!(!is_safe_to_open(
            "data:text/html,<h1>hi</h1>",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn empty_and_garbage_rejected() {
        assert!(!is_safe_to_open("", SchemeFilter::Standard));
        assert!(!is_safe_to_open("not-a-url", SchemeFilter::Standard));
        assert!(!is_safe_to_open(
            "://missing-scheme",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn editor_schemes_with_extended_filter() {
        assert!(is_safe_to_open(
            "vscode://file/path",
            SchemeFilter::EditorExtended
        ));
        assert!(is_safe_to_open(
            "cursor://open",
            SchemeFilter::EditorExtended
        ));
        assert!(is_safe_to_open("idea://open", SchemeFilter::EditorExtended));
        assert!(is_safe_to_open("zed://open", SchemeFilter::EditorExtended));
    }

    #[test]
    fn editor_schemes_blocked_by_standard_filter() {
        assert!(!is_safe_to_open(
            "vscode://file/path",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
        assert!(!is_safe_to_open("cursor://open", SchemeFilter::Standard));
    }

    #[test]
    fn scheme_case_sensitivity() {
        // url::Url normalizes to lowercase
        assert!(is_safe_to_open(
            "HTTP://EXAMPLE.COM",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
        assert!(is_safe_to_open(
            "HTTPS://EXAMPLE.COM",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn url_with_fragment_and_query() {
        assert!(is_safe_to_open(
            "https://example.com/page?key=val#section",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn ftp_scheme_blocked() {
        assert!(!is_safe_to_open(
            "ftp://files.example.com/pub",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn fallback_colon_slash_slash_path() {
        // A custom scheme that url::Url may reject but has ://
        assert!(!is_safe_to_open(
            "custom://something",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn non_mailto_colon_without_slashes_rejected() {
        assert!(!is_safe_to_open("tel:+1234567890", SchemeFilter::Standard));
    }

    #[test]
    fn whitespace_trimmed_before_parse() {
        assert!(is_safe_to_open(
            "  https://example.com  ",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
        assert!(is_safe_to_open(
            "\thttps://example.com\n",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn fallback_scheme_case_insensitive() {
        // Uppercase scheme that url::Url::parse rejects triggers fallback path;
        // the fallback must lowercase before matching SchemeFilter.
        assert!(!is_safe_to_open(
            "CUSTOM://something",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
        // Ensure mailto fallback is case-insensitive too.
        assert!(is_safe_to_open(
            "MAILTO:user@example.com",
            SchemeFilter::Standard
        ));
    }
}