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877 lines
29 KiB
Rust
877 lines
29 KiB
Rust
//! End-to-end actor tests for the MCP "always allow" persistence path.
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//!
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//! Spawns a real `spawn_permission_manager` actor with a fake gateway whose
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//! `request_permission` returns canned responses. Drives the actor through
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//! the request → prompt → grant → re-request flow and verifies that the
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//! state file on disk reflects the grant.
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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use std::sync::{Arc, OnceLock};
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use agent_client_protocol as acp;
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use kigi_acp_lib::{AcpAgentGatewaySender, AcpClientMessage};
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use kigi_paths::AbsPathBuf;
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use kigi_workspace::permission::types::{
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PatternMode, PermissionConfig, PermissionRule, RuleAction, ToolFilter,
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};
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use kigi_workspace::permission::{
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AccessKind, ClientType, Decision, PermissionCommand, PermissionHandle, PermissionState,
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spawn_permission_manager,
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};
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use serial_test::serial;
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use tokio::sync::{mpsc, oneshot};
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/// Shared `KIGI_SHARE_DIR` for the entire test binary. The `OnceLock` in
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/// `kigi-config` only allows one value per process, so all tests share
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/// this temp directory and `#[serial]` keeps them from clobbering each
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/// other's state files.
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fn test_home() -> &'static PathBuf {
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static HOME: OnceLock<PathBuf> = OnceLock::new();
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HOME.get_or_init(|| {
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let dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().unwrap();
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let path = dir.keep();
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// SAFETY: called once at init before other threads touch this var.
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unsafe { std::env::set_var("KIGI_SHARE_DIR", &path) };
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path
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})
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}
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fn fresh_cwd() -> AbsPathBuf {
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let home = test_home();
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let unique = format!(
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"test-{}-{}",
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std::process::id(),
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std::time::SystemTime::now()
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.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
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.unwrap()
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.as_nanos()
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);
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let cwd = home.join(unique);
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std::fs::create_dir_all(&cwd).unwrap();
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AbsPathBuf::new(cwd).unwrap()
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}
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fn permission_state_path(cwd: &AbsPathBuf) -> PathBuf {
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test_home()
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.join("sessions")
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.join(urlencoding::encode(cwd.as_str()).into_owned())
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.join("permission.toml")
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}
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fn load_state(cwd: &AbsPathBuf) -> PermissionState {
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let path = permission_state_path(cwd);
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let contents = std::fs::read_to_string(&path)
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.unwrap_or_else(|_| panic!("permission state not yet written at {:?}", path));
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toml::from_str(&contents).unwrap()
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}
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fn tool_call_update(id: &str, name: &str) -> acp::ToolCallUpdate {
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acp::ToolCallUpdate::new(
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acp::ToolCallId::new(Arc::from(id)),
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acp::ToolCallUpdateFields::new()
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.kind(Some(acp::ToolKind::Other))
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.title(Some(name.to_owned())),
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)
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}
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fn make_session_id() -> acp::SessionId {
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acp::SessionId::new(Arc::from("test-session"))
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}
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/// Build a fake gateway plus a handle to enqueue scripted responses.
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///
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/// Each `expect_*` call queues one response; the gateway task pops them in
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/// FIFO order as `RequestPermission` messages arrive.
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struct FakeGateway {
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sender: AcpAgentGatewaySender,
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/// Queue of (option_id, optional response meta) pairs.
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expected: tokio::sync::mpsc::UnboundedSender<(String, Option<serde_json::Value>)>,
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}
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fn fake_gateway() -> (FakeGateway, tokio::task::JoinHandle<()>) {
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let (gw_tx, mut gw_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel::<AcpClientMessage>();
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let (script_tx, mut script_rx) =
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mpsc::unbounded_channel::<(String, Option<serde_json::Value>)>();
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let join = tokio::task::spawn_local(async move {
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while let Some(msg) = gw_rx.recv().await {
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if let AcpClientMessage::RequestPermission(args) = msg {
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let (option_id, meta) = script_rx
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.recv()
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.await
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.expect("test ran out of scripted responses");
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let mut response = acp::RequestPermissionResponse::new(
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acp::RequestPermissionOutcome::Selected(acp::SelectedPermissionOutcome::new(
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acp::PermissionOptionId::new(Arc::from(option_id.as_str())),
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)),
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);
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if let Some(m) = meta.and_then(|v| v.as_object().cloned()) {
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response = response.meta(m);
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}
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let _ = args.response_tx.send(Ok(response));
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}
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}
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});
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let sender = AcpAgentGatewaySender::new(gw_tx);
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(
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FakeGateway {
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sender,
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expected: script_tx,
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},
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join,
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)
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}
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impl FakeGateway {
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fn expect_allow_always_mcp_tool(&self, tool_name: &str) {
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let meta = serde_json::json!({
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"kind": "tool",
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"tool_name": tool_name,
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});
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self.expected
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.send(("allow-always-mcp".to_string(), Some(meta)))
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.unwrap();
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}
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fn expect_allow_always_mcp_server(&self, server: &str) {
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let meta = serde_json::json!({
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"kind": "server",
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"server": server,
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});
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self.expected
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.send(("allow-always-mcp".to_string(), Some(meta)))
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.unwrap();
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}
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fn expect_plain_allow_always(&self) {
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// Legacy `"always-allow"` option id from `fallback_options`.
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self.expected
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.send(("always-allow".to_string(), None))
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.unwrap();
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}
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}
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async fn request(handle: &PermissionHandle, access: AccessKind, id: &str) -> Decision {
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let (tx, rx) = oneshot::channel();
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let cmd = PermissionCommand::Request {
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access,
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tool_call_update: tool_call_update(id, "mcp"),
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respond_to: tx,
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session_id: None,
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subagent_type: None,
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subagent_description: None,
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};
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let PermissionHandle::Actor { cmd_tx, .. } = handle else {
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panic!("expected actor handle");
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};
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cmd_tx.send(cmd).unwrap();
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rx.await.unwrap()
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}
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/// Build an MCP access kind from a tool name; these persistence tests only
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/// exercise the name, so args are empty.
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fn mcp(name: &str) -> AccessKind {
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AccessKind::MCPTool {
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name: name.to_string(),
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input: serde_json::Value::Null,
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}
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}
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async fn run_actor_test<F, Fut>(client_type: ClientType, body: F)
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where
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F: FnOnce(PermissionHandle, FakeGateway, AbsPathBuf) -> Fut,
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Fut: std::future::Future<Output = ()>,
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{
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run_actor_test_with_policy(client_type, None, body).await;
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}
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async fn run_actor_test_with_policy<F, Fut>(
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client_type: ClientType,
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policy: Option<PermissionConfig>,
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body: F,
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) where
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F: FnOnce(PermissionHandle, FakeGateway, AbsPathBuf) -> Fut,
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Fut: std::future::Future<Output = ()>,
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{
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run_actor_test_full(client_type, policy, false, body).await;
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}
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async fn run_actor_test_full<F, Fut>(
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client_type: ClientType,
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policy: Option<PermissionConfig>,
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initial_yolo: bool,
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body: F,
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) where
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F: FnOnce(PermissionHandle, FakeGateway, AbsPathBuf) -> Fut,
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Fut: std::future::Future<Output = ()>,
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{
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let local = tokio::task::LocalSet::new();
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local
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.run_until(async move {
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let cwd = fresh_cwd();
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let (gw, _gw_task) = fake_gateway();
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let (handle, _events) = spawn_permission_manager(
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make_session_id(),
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gw.sender.clone(),
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cwd.clone(),
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client_type,
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policy,
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// deny_read_globs
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vec![],
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vec![],
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initial_yolo,
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None,
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true,
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);
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body(handle, gw, cwd).await;
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})
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.await;
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}
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fn rule(action: RuleAction, pattern: &str) -> PermissionRule {
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PermissionRule {
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action,
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tool: ToolFilter::Mcp,
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pattern: Some(pattern.to_owned()),
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pattern_mode: PatternMode::Glob,
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}
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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#[serial]
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async fn mcp_tool_grant_persists_and_short_circuits_next_request() {
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run_actor_test(ClientType::KigiPager, |handle, gw, cwd| async move {
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// First request prompts; user picks tool-scope.
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gw.expect_allow_always_mcp_tool("linear__list");
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let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__list"), "1").await;
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assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
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// Allow disk write to land.
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for _ in 0..50 {
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if permission_state_path(&cwd).exists() {
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break;
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}
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tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
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}
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let state = load_state(&cwd);
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assert!(state.allowed_mcp_tools.contains("linear__list"));
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assert!(state.allowed_mcp_servers.is_empty());
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// Second request for the same tool must NOT prompt — actor returns
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// Allow without consuming a scripted response. If it tried to
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// prompt, the gateway task would block forever, and the request
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// call below would hang; we assert by simply receiving an Allow
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// synchronously.
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let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__list"), "2").await;
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assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
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// A different tool from the same server still prompts (tool-scope
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// is exact). We script a server-scope grant for "linear" next.
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gw.expect_allow_always_mcp_server("linear");
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let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__create"), "3").await;
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assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
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// Wait for the new write.
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for _ in 0..50 {
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let s = load_state(&cwd);
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if s.allowed_mcp_servers.contains("linear") {
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break;
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}
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tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
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}
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let state = load_state(&cwd);
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assert!(state.allowed_mcp_servers.contains("linear"));
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// Now any other linear__* tool short-circuits via server-scope.
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let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__update"), "4").await;
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assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
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// A different server still prompts.
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gw.expect_allow_always_mcp_tool("notion__fetch");
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let d = request(&handle, mcp("notion__fetch"), "5").await;
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assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
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})
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.await;
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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#[serial]
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async fn fallback_client_plain_allow_always_persists_mcp_tool() {
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// Regression: Generic / KigiWeb / Extension clients
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// submit the legacy `"always-allow"` option id. The prompter maps that
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// to plain `PromptOutcome::AllowAlways`, and the manager's plain arm
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// must persist tool-scope into `allowed_mcp_tools`.
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run_actor_test(ClientType::Generic, |handle, gw, cwd| async move {
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gw.expect_plain_allow_always();
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let d = request(&handle, mcp("notion__fetch"), "1").await;
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assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
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for _ in 0..50 {
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if permission_state_path(&cwd).exists() {
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break;
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}
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tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
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}
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let state = load_state(&cwd);
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assert!(
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state.allowed_mcp_tools.contains("notion__fetch"),
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"fallback client AllowAlways must persist tool-scope, got state={state:?}"
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);
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// Re-request the same tool — must short-circuit without prompting.
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let d = request(&handle, mcp("notion__fetch"), "2").await;
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assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
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})
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.await;
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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#[serial]
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async fn policy_ask_suppresses_mcp_tool_allowlist() {
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// With `remember_tool_approvals` OFF (the default), a policy `Ask` rule on an
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// MCP tool overrides a session tool-scope grant: the actor must prompt rather
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// than auto-allow. (The gate-ON "grant satisfies ask" path is covered by the
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// `mcp_pre_decision` unit tests in `manager.rs`.)
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let policy = PermissionConfig::new(vec![rule(RuleAction::Ask, "linear__*")]);
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let local = tokio::task::LocalSet::new();
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local
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.run_until(async move {
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let cwd = fresh_cwd();
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// Pre-seed the state file with a tool-scope grant.
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let mut state = PermissionState::default();
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state.allowed_mcp_tools.insert("linear__list".to_owned());
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let dir = test_home()
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.join("sessions")
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.join(urlencoding::encode(cwd.as_str()).into_owned());
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std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
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std::fs::write(
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dir.join("permission.toml"),
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toml::to_string_pretty(&state).unwrap(),
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)
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.unwrap();
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let (gw, _gw_task) = fake_gateway();
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// Gate OFF so the `ask` rule stays a hard floor over the grant.
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let (handle, _events) = spawn_permission_manager(
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make_session_id(),
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gw.sender.clone(),
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cwd.clone(),
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ClientType::KigiPager,
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Some(policy),
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// deny_read_globs
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vec![],
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vec![],
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false,
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None,
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// remember_tool_approvals
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false,
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);
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// Script an outright reject so we can confirm the prompt fires.
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gw.expected.send(("reject-once".to_string(), None)).unwrap();
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let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__list"), "1").await;
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// If the allowlist had won, the actor would have returned Allow
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// without consuming the scripted response; the gateway's reject
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// proves the prompt path executed.
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assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Reject(_)));
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})
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.await;
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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#[serial]
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async fn policy_ask_suppresses_mcp_server_allowlist() {
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// Gate-OFF floor over a server-scope grant (see the tool-scope test above).
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let policy = PermissionConfig::new(vec![rule(RuleAction::Ask, "linear__*")]);
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let local = tokio::task::LocalSet::new();
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local
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.run_until(async move {
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let cwd = fresh_cwd();
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let mut state = PermissionState::default();
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state.allowed_mcp_servers.insert("linear".to_owned());
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let dir = test_home()
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.join("sessions")
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.join(urlencoding::encode(cwd.as_str()).into_owned());
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std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
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std::fs::write(
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dir.join("permission.toml"),
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toml::to_string_pretty(&state).unwrap(),
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)
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.unwrap();
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let (gw, _gw_task) = fake_gateway();
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// Gate OFF so the `ask` rule stays a hard floor over the grant.
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let (handle, _events) = spawn_permission_manager(
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make_session_id(),
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gw.sender.clone(),
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cwd.clone(),
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ClientType::KigiPager,
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Some(policy),
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// deny_read_globs
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vec![],
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vec![],
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false,
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None,
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// remember_tool_approvals
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false,
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);
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gw.expected.send(("reject-once".to_string(), None)).unwrap();
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let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__create"), "1").await;
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assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Reject(_)));
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})
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.await;
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}
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|
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#[tokio::test]
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#[serial]
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async fn policy_deny_takes_precedence_over_mcp_allowlist() {
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let policy = PermissionConfig::new(vec![rule(RuleAction::Deny, "linear__*")]);
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let local = tokio::task::LocalSet::new();
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local
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.run_until(async move {
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let cwd = fresh_cwd();
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let mut state = PermissionState::default();
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state.allowed_mcp_tools.insert("linear__list".to_owned());
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let dir = test_home()
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.join("sessions")
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.join(urlencoding::encode(cwd.as_str()).into_owned());
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std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
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std::fs::write(
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dir.join("permission.toml"),
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toml::to_string_pretty(&state).unwrap(),
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)
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.unwrap();
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let (gw, _gw_task) = fake_gateway();
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let (handle, _events) = spawn_permission_manager(
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make_session_id(),
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gw.sender.clone(),
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cwd.clone(),
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ClientType::KigiPager,
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Some(policy),
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// deny_read_globs
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vec![],
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vec![],
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false,
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None,
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true,
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);
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// Do NOT script a response: a policy Deny must short-circuit
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// before the prompt path is reached, so the gateway must never
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// be invoked.
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let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__list"), "1").await;
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assert!(matches!(d, Decision::PolicyDeny(_)));
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})
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.await;
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}
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#[tokio::test]
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#[serial]
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async fn policy_allow_short_circuits_before_mcp_allowlist() {
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// Sanity: a policy Allow returns Allow immediately and never touches
|
|
// the pre-decision lookup.
|
|
let policy = PermissionConfig::new(vec![rule(RuleAction::Allow, "linear__*")]);
|
|
|
|
run_actor_test_with_policy(
|
|
ClientType::KigiPager,
|
|
Some(policy),
|
|
|handle, _gw, _cwd| async move {
|
|
let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__list"), "1").await;
|
|
assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
#[serial]
|
|
async fn empty_server_prefix_falls_back_to_tool_scope() {
|
|
// Defense-in-depth: even if a malformed `McpScopeSelection::Server { server: "" }`
|
|
// somehow makes it through, the prompter must downgrade to tool-scope
|
|
// and persist via `AllowAlwaysMcpTool` — never write an empty server
|
|
// prefix into `allowed_mcp_servers`.
|
|
run_actor_test(ClientType::KigiPager, |handle, gw, cwd| async move {
|
|
let meta = serde_json::json!({
|
|
"kind": "server",
|
|
"server": "",
|
|
});
|
|
gw.expected
|
|
.send(("allow-always-mcp".to_string(), Some(meta)))
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__list"), "1").await;
|
|
assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
|
|
|
|
for _ in 0..50 {
|
|
if permission_state_path(&cwd).exists() {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
|
|
}
|
|
let state = load_state(&cwd);
|
|
assert!(state.allowed_mcp_servers.is_empty());
|
|
assert!(state.allowed_mcp_tools.contains("linear__list"));
|
|
})
|
|
.await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
#[serial]
|
|
async fn allow_always_mcp_tool_ignores_client_supplied_tool_name() {
|
|
// Security regression: the response meta `tool_name` is informational
|
|
// only. The manager MUST persist the name from `AccessKind::MCPTool`
|
|
// so a buggy or malicious client cannot whitelist a different tool
|
|
// than the one the user saw in the prompt.
|
|
run_actor_test(ClientType::KigiPager, |handle, gw, cwd| async move {
|
|
// Request approves `linear__list`, but the response claims a
|
|
// different tool name (e.g. `notion__fetch`).
|
|
let meta = serde_json::json!({
|
|
"kind": "tool",
|
|
"tool_name": "notion__fetch",
|
|
});
|
|
gw.expected
|
|
.send(("allow-always-mcp".to_string(), Some(meta)))
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__list"), "1").await;
|
|
assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
|
|
|
|
for _ in 0..50 {
|
|
if permission_state_path(&cwd).exists() {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
|
|
}
|
|
let state = load_state(&cwd);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
state.allowed_mcp_tools.contains("linear__list"),
|
|
"must persist the access-kind name"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!state.allowed_mcp_tools.contains("notion__fetch"),
|
|
"must NOT persist the client-supplied name"
|
|
);
|
|
})
|
|
.await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
#[serial]
|
|
async fn allow_always_mcp_server_rejects_mismatched_prefix() {
|
|
// Security regression: the response meta `server` must match the
|
|
// canonical server prefix derived from the access kind. On mismatch,
|
|
// the manager downgrades to tool-scope on the access-kind name -- the
|
|
// smallest blast radius the user actually approved.
|
|
run_actor_test(ClientType::KigiPager, |handle, gw, cwd| async move {
|
|
// Approve `linear__list` (canonical server prefix is `linear`),
|
|
// but the client claims `notion` as the server.
|
|
let meta = serde_json::json!({
|
|
"kind": "server",
|
|
"server": "notion",
|
|
});
|
|
gw.expected
|
|
.send(("allow-always-mcp".to_string(), Some(meta)))
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__list"), "1").await;
|
|
assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
|
|
|
|
for _ in 0..50 {
|
|
if permission_state_path(&cwd).exists() {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
|
|
}
|
|
let state = load_state(&cwd);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
state.allowed_mcp_servers.is_empty(),
|
|
"must NOT persist any server-scope grant on mismatch"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
!state.allowed_mcp_servers.contains("notion"),
|
|
"must NOT trust the client-supplied server prefix"
|
|
);
|
|
assert!(
|
|
state.allowed_mcp_tools.contains("linear__list"),
|
|
"must downgrade to tool-scope using the access-kind name"
|
|
);
|
|
})
|
|
.await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
#[serial]
|
|
async fn allow_always_mcp_server_persists_canonical_prefix_on_match() {
|
|
// Sanity: a client that supplies the correct canonical prefix
|
|
// succeeds (this is the common case post-fix).
|
|
run_actor_test(ClientType::KigiPager, |handle, gw, cwd| async move {
|
|
let meta = serde_json::json!({
|
|
"kind": "server",
|
|
"server": "linear",
|
|
});
|
|
gw.expected
|
|
.send(("allow-always-mcp".to_string(), Some(meta)))
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__list"), "1").await;
|
|
assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
|
|
|
|
for _ in 0..50 {
|
|
if permission_state_path(&cwd).exists() {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
|
|
}
|
|
let state = load_state(&cwd);
|
|
assert!(state.allowed_mcp_servers.contains("linear"));
|
|
assert!(state.allowed_mcp_tools.is_empty());
|
|
})
|
|
.await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
#[serial]
|
|
async fn allow_always_mcp_server_downgrades_when_access_has_no_separator() {
|
|
// Defensive: if the access name itself has no `__` (e.g. via a
|
|
// malformed `ToolInput::MCPTool`), the canonical prefix is None and
|
|
// server-scope is unreachable. The manager downgrades to tool-scope
|
|
// on the raw access name rather than persisting the client prefix.
|
|
run_actor_test(ClientType::KigiPager, |handle, gw, cwd| async move {
|
|
let meta = serde_json::json!({
|
|
"kind": "server",
|
|
"server": "linear",
|
|
});
|
|
gw.expected
|
|
.send(("allow-always-mcp".to_string(), Some(meta)))
|
|
.unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let d = request(&handle, mcp("standalone"), "1").await;
|
|
assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
|
|
|
|
for _ in 0..50 {
|
|
if permission_state_path(&cwd).exists() {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
|
|
}
|
|
let state = load_state(&cwd);
|
|
assert!(state.allowed_mcp_servers.is_empty());
|
|
assert!(state.allowed_mcp_tools.contains("standalone"));
|
|
})
|
|
.await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
#[serial]
|
|
async fn dont_ask_policy_denies_without_prompting() {
|
|
use kigi_workspace::permission::types::{PermissionConfig, PromptPolicy};
|
|
|
|
let mut policy = PermissionConfig::new(vec![]);
|
|
policy.prompt_policy = PromptPolicy::Deny;
|
|
|
|
// No scripted gateway responses: if the manager tried to prompt,
|
|
// the gateway would block forever, proving dont_ask short-circuits.
|
|
run_actor_test_with_policy(
|
|
ClientType::KigiPager,
|
|
Some(policy),
|
|
|handle, _gw, _cwd| async move {
|
|
let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__list"), "1").await;
|
|
assert!(matches!(d, Decision::PolicyDeny(_)));
|
|
|
|
let d = request(&handle, AccessKind::Bash("npm install".to_string()), "2").await;
|
|
assert!(matches!(d, Decision::PolicyDeny(_)));
|
|
|
|
// Reads still auto-approve (pre-decision, before dont_ask)
|
|
let d = request(
|
|
&handle,
|
|
AccessKind::Read(Some("/tmp/test.txt".to_string())),
|
|
"3",
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
#[serial]
|
|
async fn deny_rule_enforced_in_yolo_mode_bash() {
|
|
let policy = PermissionConfig::new(vec![PermissionRule {
|
|
action: RuleAction::Deny,
|
|
tool: ToolFilter::Bash,
|
|
pattern: Some("rm*".to_owned()),
|
|
pattern_mode: PatternMode::Glob,
|
|
}]);
|
|
|
|
run_actor_test_full(
|
|
ClientType::KigiPager,
|
|
Some(policy),
|
|
true,
|
|
|handle, _gw, _cwd| async move {
|
|
let d = request(
|
|
&handle,
|
|
AccessKind::Bash("rm -rf /tmp/foo".to_string()),
|
|
"1",
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
assert!(
|
|
matches!(d, Decision::PolicyDeny(_)),
|
|
"deny rule must block even in YOLO mode, got {d:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let d = request(&handle, AccessKind::Bash("cargo test".to_string()), "2").await;
|
|
assert!(
|
|
matches!(d, Decision::Allow),
|
|
"non-denied bash must auto-approve in YOLO mode, got {d:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
#[serial]
|
|
async fn deny_rule_enforced_in_yolo_mode_mcp() {
|
|
let policy = PermissionConfig::new(vec![PermissionRule {
|
|
action: RuleAction::Deny,
|
|
tool: ToolFilter::Mcp,
|
|
pattern: Some("dangerous__*".to_owned()),
|
|
pattern_mode: PatternMode::Glob,
|
|
}]);
|
|
|
|
run_actor_test_full(
|
|
ClientType::KigiPager,
|
|
Some(policy),
|
|
true,
|
|
|handle, _gw, _cwd| async move {
|
|
let d = request(&handle, mcp("dangerous__delete_all"), "1").await;
|
|
assert!(
|
|
matches!(d, Decision::PolicyDeny(_)),
|
|
"deny rule must block MCP tool even in YOLO mode, got {d:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__list"), "2").await;
|
|
assert!(
|
|
matches!(d, Decision::Allow),
|
|
"non-denied MCP tool must auto-approve in YOLO mode, got {d:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
#[serial]
|
|
async fn deny_rule_enforced_in_yolo_mode_edit() {
|
|
let policy = PermissionConfig::new(vec![PermissionRule {
|
|
action: RuleAction::Deny,
|
|
tool: ToolFilter::Edit,
|
|
pattern: Some("/etc/**".to_owned()),
|
|
pattern_mode: PatternMode::Glob,
|
|
}]);
|
|
|
|
run_actor_test_full(
|
|
ClientType::KigiPager,
|
|
Some(policy),
|
|
true,
|
|
|handle, _gw, _cwd| async move {
|
|
let d = request(&handle, AccessKind::Edit("/etc/passwd".to_string()), "1").await;
|
|
assert!(
|
|
matches!(d, Decision::PolicyDeny(_)),
|
|
"deny rule must block edits even in YOLO mode, got {d:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let d = request(&handle, AccessKind::Edit("src/main.rs".to_string()), "2").await;
|
|
assert!(
|
|
matches!(d, Decision::Allow),
|
|
"non-denied edit must auto-approve in YOLO mode, got {d:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
#[serial]
|
|
async fn deny_rule_enforced_in_yolo_mode_web_fetch() {
|
|
let policy = PermissionConfig::new(vec![PermissionRule {
|
|
action: RuleAction::Deny,
|
|
tool: ToolFilter::WebFetch,
|
|
pattern: Some("evil.com".to_owned()),
|
|
pattern_mode: PatternMode::Domain,
|
|
}]);
|
|
|
|
run_actor_test_full(
|
|
ClientType::KigiPager,
|
|
Some(policy),
|
|
true,
|
|
|handle, _gw, _cwd| async move {
|
|
let d = request(
|
|
&handle,
|
|
AccessKind::WebFetch("https://evil.com/exfiltrate".to_string()),
|
|
"1",
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
assert!(
|
|
matches!(d, Decision::PolicyDeny(_)),
|
|
"deny rule must block web_fetch even in YOLO mode, got {d:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
let d = request(
|
|
&handle,
|
|
AccessKind::WebFetch("https://docs.rs/tokio".to_string()),
|
|
"2",
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
assert!(
|
|
matches!(d, Decision::Allow),
|
|
"non-denied web_fetch must auto-approve in YOLO mode, got {d:?}"
|
|
);
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
#[serial]
|
|
async fn yolo_mode_without_deny_rules_approves_everything() {
|
|
run_actor_test_full(
|
|
ClientType::KigiPager,
|
|
None,
|
|
true,
|
|
|handle, _gw, _cwd| async move {
|
|
let d = request(&handle, AccessKind::Bash("rm -rf /".to_string()), "1").await;
|
|
assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
|
|
|
|
let d = request(&handle, mcp("linear__list"), "2").await;
|
|
assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
|
|
|
|
let d = request(&handle, AccessKind::Edit("/etc/passwd".to_string()), "3").await;
|
|
assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
|
|
|
|
let d = request(
|
|
&handle,
|
|
AccessKind::WebFetch("https://evil.com".to_string()),
|
|
"4",
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
assert!(matches!(d, Decision::Allow));
|
|
},
|
|
)
|
|
.await;
|
|
}
|