Files
Kigi-CLI/crates/codegen/kigi-shell/src/auth/oauth_pkce.rs
T
ZacharyZhang-NY 422e241e13 feat(providers): add ChatGPT/Codex subscription OAuth (PKCE + account-id, hardcoded catalog)
29th platform `openai-codex` (uses_oauth, Responses wire). PKCE-localhost login at
auth.openai.com (client app_EMoamEEZ73f0CkXaXp7hrann, redirect localhost:1455/auth/
callback, form token exchange, fresh-random state) reusing the claude-pro-max flow;
OAuthFlow::PkceLocalhost gained a redirect_path and OAuthConfig an authorize_extra
(empty elsewhere, so claude/xai/copilot authorize URLs stay byte-identical).

Codex-specific: the access token is a JWT carrying chatgpt_account_id, which becomes
the `chatgpt-account-id` inference header. It is derived STATELESSLY from whichever
bearer rides each request (so a rotated token needs no persisted field), and BOTH
login and refresh fail fast when the claim is absent — gated on the explicit
OAuthConfig.requires_chatgpt_account_id fact, never inferred from the token-body
encoding (a plain form endpoint is the OAuth norm and must not inherit this).

Inference rides the existing Responses wire at chatgpt.com/backend-api/codex →
/responses, with codex headers (chatgpt-account-id, originator, OpenAI-Beta
responses=experimental, codex UA) gated on SamplerConfig.openai_codex so API-key
`openai` stays byte-identical; store:false was already the global Responses default.

Catalog is HARDCODED (no live endpoint exists for this backend; read from the
official Codex CLI's model cache): gpt-5.6-sol/terra/luna + gpt-5.5, ctx 272000,
each with its real reasoning levels (low..ultra — ReasoningEffort gained Ultra).
Excluded: gpt-5.3-codex-spark (supported_in_api=false), gpt-5.4/-mini and
codex-auto-review (hidden) — they would list but fail at inference. The fetch
short-circuits before any HTTP; Kigi never shells out to the codex CLI or reads
~/.codex.

Security review fixes: redact any `account-id` header from request logs (it was
reaching debug logs), strict 3-segment JWT check (fail closed), refresh no longer
fails open on a missing claim. Inherits leak-safe pooled routing (scope
oauth/openai-codex) — never the Kimi token. Full gate green (234 suites, 0 warnings).
2026-07-22 08:28:03 -04:00

905 lines
35 KiB
Rust

//! Generic authorization-code + PKCE (S256) OAuth wire with a `127.0.0.1`
//! loopback callback, driven by a registry [`kigi_models::OAuthConfig`] whose
//! `flow` is [`OAuthFlow::PkceLocalhost`] (claude-pro-max JSON + openai-codex
//! FORM).
//!
//! Shape (Pi `earendil-works/pi` `auth/oauth/{anthropic,openai-codex}.ts`):
//! - `verifier = base64url(32 random bytes)`; `challenge = base64url(SHA-256(
//! verifier))`. `state` is `verifier` for claude ([`generate_pkce`]) or a
//! fresh-random value for codex ([`generate_pkce_random_state`]).
//! - Browser opens `{auth_host}{device_path}?client_id&response_type=code&
//! scope&redirect_uri&state&code_challenge&code_challenge_method=S256` plus any
//! `authorize_extra` params (codex only).
//! - The code returns to a loopback listener on `127.0.0.1:{redirect_port}`
//! answering ONLY `{redirect_path}` (claude `/callback`, codex
//! `/auth/callback`), with STRICT `state` validation (a mismatch is rejected —
//! CSRF guard). A manual paste (redirect URL / `code#state` / bare code) is
//! accepted as a headless fallback.
//! - Code → token exchange POSTs `{token_host}{token_path}` as JSON
//! ([`exchange_code`], claude) or FORM ([`exchange_code_form`], codex; NO
//! `state` field). Refresh: claude JSON here ([`refresh_token`], rotating);
//! codex takes the generic device refresher's FORM path.
//!
//! SECURITY: the verifier, authorization code, access token, and refresh token
//! are NEVER logged (only non-secret events: authorize URL requested, callback
//! received, token issued, token refreshed).
use anyhow::Context;
use base64::Engine;
use kigi_models::{OAuthConfig, OAuthTokenBody};
use serde::Deserialize;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use super::kimi_oauth::{RefreshError, TokenResponse};
use super::model::KimiAuth;
const CODE_GRANT_TYPE: &str = "authorization_code";
const REFRESH_GRANT_TYPE: &str = "refresh_token";
/// Refresh retry budget over the retryable statuses / network blips.
const MAX_REFRESH_RETRIES: u32 = 3;
/// HTTP statuses worth retrying a refresh for (parity with the device wire).
const RETRYABLE_REFRESH_STATUSES: [u16; 5] = [429, 500, 502, 503, 504];
/// PKCE secrets for one login attempt. Two `state` conventions ship:
/// [`generate_pkce`] sets `state == verifier` (Pi's/Claude's convention), while
/// [`generate_pkce_random_state`] mints an INDEPENDENT random state (the OAuth
/// standard, used by ChatGPT/Codex). Either way the state is validated on the
/// callback as the CSRF guard.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub(crate) struct PkceCodes {
/// `code_verifier` — the 43-char base64url secret, sent at token exchange.
pub verifier: String,
/// `code_challenge = base64url(SHA-256(verifier))`, sent at authorize.
pub challenge: String,
/// `state` — the verifier itself, or an independent random value depending
/// on the provider's dialect; validated on the callback (CSRF guard).
pub state: String,
}
/// Generate PKCE S256 codes: `verifier = base64url(32 random bytes)`,
/// `challenge = base64url(SHA-256(verifier))`, `state = verifier`.
pub(crate) fn generate_pkce() -> PkceCodes {
use rand::RngCore;
let mut raw = [0u8; 32];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut raw);
let verifier = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(raw);
let digest = Sha256::digest(verifier.as_bytes());
let challenge = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(digest);
PkceCodes {
state: verifier.clone(),
verifier,
challenge,
}
}
/// Like [`generate_pkce`] but with an INDEPENDENT fresh-random `state` (16
/// random bytes) instead of `state == verifier`. The ChatGPT/Codex flow uses a
/// distinct state (the verifier never doubles as the CSRF token there), so the
/// verifier stays out of the state carried on the loopback callback.
pub(crate) fn generate_pkce_random_state() -> PkceCodes {
use rand::RngCore;
let mut raw = [0u8; 16];
rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut raw);
let state = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(raw);
PkceCodes {
state,
..generate_pkce()
}
}
/// The loopback redirect URI for a PKCE-localhost provider (claude `/callback`,
/// codex `/auth/callback`).
pub(crate) fn redirect_uri(redirect_port: u16, redirect_path: &str) -> String {
format!("http://localhost:{redirect_port}{redirect_path}")
}
/// Build the browser authorize URL:
/// `{auth_host}{device_path}?client_id&response_type=code&scope&redirect_uri&
/// state&code_challenge&code_challenge_method=S256` plus any config
/// `authorize_extra` params (empty for every config but codex, so their URLs
/// stay byte-identical).
pub(crate) fn build_authorize_url(
cfg: &OAuthConfig,
redirect_uri: &str,
pkce: &PkceCodes,
) -> String {
let base = format!("{}{}", cfg.auth_host.trim_end_matches('/'), cfg.device_path);
let mut serializer = url::form_urlencoded::Serializer::new(String::new());
serializer
.append_pair("client_id", cfg.client_id)
.append_pair("response_type", "code")
.append_pair("scope", cfg.scope)
.append_pair("redirect_uri", redirect_uri)
.append_pair("state", &pkce.state)
.append_pair("code_challenge", &pkce.challenge)
.append_pair("code_challenge_method", "S256");
for (key, value) in cfg.authorize_extra {
serializer.append_pair(key, value);
}
format!("{base}?{}", serializer.finish())
}
/// `code` + `state` extracted from a callback (loopback query OR manual paste).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct CallbackParams {
pub code: String,
pub state: Option<String>,
}
/// Parse `code`/`state` from the raw query string of a `/callback?…` request
/// (e.g. `code=abc&state=xyz`). An `error=` param surfaces as an `Err`.
pub(crate) fn parse_callback_query(query: &str) -> anyhow::Result<CallbackParams> {
let mut code = None;
let mut state = None;
let mut error = None;
for (k, v) in url::form_urlencoded::parse(query.as_bytes()) {
match k.as_ref() {
"code" => code = Some(v.into_owned()),
"state" => state = Some(v.into_owned()),
"error" => error = Some(v.into_owned()),
_ => {}
}
}
if let Some(error) = error {
anyhow::bail!("Authorization server returned an error: {error}");
}
let code = code.context("callback missing authorization code")?;
if code.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("callback authorization code was empty");
}
Ok(CallbackParams { code, state })
}
/// Parse a MANUAL paste (headless fallback). Accepts, in order:
/// - a full redirect URL (`http://localhost:…/callback?code=…&state=…`),
/// - a `code#state` pair (Anthropic's console shows this form),
/// - a bare `code` (state then unknown → `None`, caller validation applies).
pub(crate) fn parse_manual_paste(input: &str) -> anyhow::Result<CallbackParams> {
let trimmed = input.trim();
if trimmed.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("empty paste");
}
// Full redirect URL.
if trimmed.starts_with("http://") || trimmed.starts_with("https://") {
let url = url::Url::parse(trimmed).context("pasted value is not a valid URL")?;
return parse_callback_query(url.query().unwrap_or_default());
}
// `code#state`.
if let Some((code, state)) = trimmed.split_once('#') {
if code.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("pasted code was empty");
}
return Ok(CallbackParams {
code: code.to_owned(),
state: (!state.is_empty()).then(|| state.to_owned()),
});
}
// Bare code.
Ok(CallbackParams {
code: trimmed.to_owned(),
state: None,
})
}
/// STRICT state validation (CSRF guard): the callback `state` MUST be present
/// AND equal to the expected value. A mismatch (or absence, when a paste has no
/// state) is rejected — the flow NEVER proceeds on an unverified callback.
pub(crate) fn validate_state(params: &CallbackParams, expected_state: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
match params.state.as_deref() {
Some(state) if state == expected_state => Ok(()),
Some(_) => anyhow::bail!("OAuth state mismatch — rejecting callback (CSRF guard)"),
None => anyhow::bail!("OAuth callback carried no state — rejecting (CSRF guard)"),
}
}
/// State validation for a MANUAL paste (headless fallback): a present state
/// MUST match (mismatch rejected — CSRF guard), but an ABSENT state is allowed
/// — a bare-code paste is user-initiated (not a network-reachable callback), so
/// there is no state to check. The loopback path uses the stricter
/// [`validate_state`] (an absent state there IS rejected).
pub(crate) fn validate_pasted_state(
params: &CallbackParams,
expected_state: &str,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
match params.state.as_deref() {
Some(state) if state == expected_state => Ok(()),
Some(_) => anyhow::bail!("OAuth state mismatch — rejecting pasted code (CSRF guard)"),
None => Ok(()),
}
}
/// The token-endpoint URL (`{token_host}{token_path}`).
fn token_url(cfg: &OAuthConfig) -> String {
format!("{}{}", cfg.token_host.trim_end_matches('/'), cfg.token_path)
}
/// POST the token endpoint with a JSON body, honoring `cfg.token_body`. Claude
/// is JSON; a `Form`-bodied config would be handled by the device wire, so the
/// PKCE path asserts JSON (never silently mis-encodes).
async fn post_token_json(
cfg: &OAuthConfig,
body: serde_json::Value,
) -> reqwest::Result<reqwest::Response> {
debug_assert!(
matches!(cfg.token_body, OAuthTokenBody::Json),
"PKCE token exchange expects a JSON token body"
);
crate::http::shared_client()
.post(token_url(cfg))
.header("Accept", "application/json")
.json(&body)
.send()
.await
}
/// Exchange an authorization `code` for a token set (JSON body):
/// `{grant_type:"authorization_code", code, state, client_id, redirect_uri,
/// code_verifier}`. Returns the materialized [`KimiAuth`].
pub(crate) async fn exchange_code(
cfg: &OAuthConfig,
code: &str,
pkce: &PkceCodes,
redirect_uri: &str,
) -> anyhow::Result<KimiAuth> {
let body = serde_json::json!({
"grant_type": CODE_GRANT_TYPE,
"code": code,
"state": pkce.state,
"client_id": cfg.client_id,
"redirect_uri": redirect_uri,
"code_verifier": pkce.verifier,
});
tracing::info!(
scope_key = cfg.scope_key,
"auth: exchanging code for token (pkce)"
);
let resp = post_token_json(cfg, body)
.await
.context("token exchange request failed")?;
let status = resp.status();
if !status.is_success() {
let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
tracing::warn!(%status, scope_key = cfg.scope_key, "auth: code exchange failed (pkce)");
anyhow::bail!("Token exchange failed (HTTP {status}): {body}");
}
let tokens: TokenResponse = resp.json().await.context("malformed token payload")?;
tracing::info!(
scope_key = cfg.scope_key,
"auth: pkce code exchange succeeded"
);
Ok(tokens.into_auth())
}
/// Exchange an authorization `code` for a token set with a FORM body (codex):
/// `{grant_type=authorization_code, client_id, code, code_verifier,
/// redirect_uri}`. Unlike [`exchange_code`], the `state` is NOT sent in the
/// token body (the ChatGPT/Codex token endpoint does not expect it). Asserts a
/// `Form` config so a JSON provider can never silently mis-encode.
pub(crate) async fn exchange_code_form(
cfg: &OAuthConfig,
code: &str,
pkce: &PkceCodes,
redirect_uri: &str,
) -> anyhow::Result<KimiAuth> {
debug_assert!(
matches!(cfg.token_body, OAuthTokenBody::Form),
"PKCE form exchange expects a Form token body"
);
tracing::info!(
scope_key = cfg.scope_key,
"auth: exchanging code for token (pkce form)"
);
let resp = crate::http::shared_client()
.post(token_url(cfg))
.header("Accept", "application/json")
.form(&[
("grant_type", CODE_GRANT_TYPE),
("client_id", cfg.client_id),
("code", code),
("code_verifier", pkce.verifier.as_str()),
("redirect_uri", redirect_uri),
])
.send()
.await
.context("token exchange request failed")?;
let status = resp.status();
if !status.is_success() {
let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
tracing::warn!(%status, scope_key = cfg.scope_key, "auth: code exchange failed (pkce form)");
anyhow::bail!("Token exchange failed (HTTP {status}): {body}");
}
let tokens: TokenResponse = resp.json().await.context("malformed token payload")?;
tracing::info!(
scope_key = cfg.scope_key,
"auth: pkce form code exchange succeeded"
);
Ok(tokens.into_auth())
}
/// `POST {token_host}{token_path}` with `grant_type=refresh_token` (JSON body).
/// Claude ROTATES the refresh token, so the caller MUST persist the returned
/// one. Retries the retryable statuses / network errors with exponential
/// backoff; 401/403 returns immediately as [`RefreshError::Unauthorized`].
pub(crate) async fn refresh_token(
cfg: &OAuthConfig,
refresh_token: &str,
) -> Result<KimiAuth, RefreshError> {
let mut last_error = String::from("no attempt made");
for attempt in 0..MAX_REFRESH_RETRIES {
if attempt > 0 {
let backoff = std::time::Duration::from_secs(1 << (attempt - 1));
tracing::warn!(
attempt,
backoff_secs = backoff.as_secs(),
last_error = %last_error,
"auth: retrying token refresh (pkce)"
);
tokio::time::sleep(backoff).await;
}
tracing::info!(
attempt,
scope_key = cfg.scope_key,
"auth: token refresh attempt (pkce)"
);
let body = serde_json::json!({
"grant_type": REFRESH_GRANT_TYPE,
"client_id": cfg.client_id,
"refresh_token": refresh_token,
});
let resp = match post_token_json(cfg, body).await {
Ok(resp) => resp,
Err(e) => {
last_error = format!("network error: {e}");
continue;
}
};
let status = resp.status().as_u16();
let bytes = resp.bytes().await.unwrap_or_default();
if status == 401 || status == 403 {
let err: OAuthErrorBody = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).unwrap_or_default();
return Err(RefreshError::Unauthorized {
status,
description: err
.error_description
.unwrap_or_else(|| "Token refresh unauthorized.".to_owned()),
});
}
if status == 200 {
return match serde_json::from_slice::<TokenResponse>(&bytes) {
Ok(tokens) => Ok(tokens.into_auth()),
Err(e) => Err(RefreshError::Fatal {
status,
description: format!("malformed token payload: {e}"),
}),
};
}
let err: OAuthErrorBody = serde_json::from_slice(&bytes).unwrap_or_default();
let description = err
.error_description
.unwrap_or_else(|| format!("Token refresh failed (HTTP {status})."));
if RETRYABLE_REFRESH_STATUSES.contains(&status) {
last_error = description;
continue;
}
return Err(RefreshError::Fatal {
status,
description,
});
}
Err(RefreshError::Exhausted { last_error })
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Default)]
struct OAuthErrorBody {
#[serde(default)]
error_description: Option<String>,
}
/// Bind a loopback HTTP listener on `127.0.0.1:{redirect_port}` and wait for a
/// single `GET {redirect_path}?code=…&state=…`, validating `state` STRICTLY
/// against `expected_state` (mismatch → rejected). Returns the authorization
/// code.
///
/// The listener answers ONLY `redirect_path` (claude `/callback`, codex
/// `/auth/callback`); any other path gets 404. It binds `127.0.0.1` (never
/// `0.0.0.0`), so no non-loopback host can reach it.
pub(crate) async fn await_loopback_code(
redirect_port: u16,
redirect_path: &str,
expected_state: &str,
) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(("127.0.0.1", redirect_port))
.await
.with_context(|| format!("could not bind loopback 127.0.0.1:{redirect_port}"))?;
tracing::info!(port = redirect_port, "auth: pkce loopback listener bound");
loop {
let (stream, _peer) = listener.accept().await.context("loopback accept failed")?;
match handle_loopback_conn(stream, redirect_path, expected_state).await {
LoopbackOutcome::Code(code) => return Ok(code),
LoopbackOutcome::Rejected(err) => return Err(err),
// Not the callback GET (favicon, health probe): keep listening.
LoopbackOutcome::Ignore => continue,
}
}
}
enum LoopbackOutcome {
Code(String),
Rejected(anyhow::Error),
Ignore,
}
/// Read the request line of one loopback connection, answer with a small HTML
/// page, and classify the outcome. STRICT: a `/callback` with a bad/missing
/// state is [`LoopbackOutcome::Rejected`] (the browser sees an error page).
async fn handle_loopback_conn(
mut stream: tokio::net::TcpStream,
redirect_path: &str,
expected_state: &str,
) -> LoopbackOutcome {
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
// Read only enough for the request line — a GET has no body.
let mut buf = [0u8; 8192];
let n = match stream.read(&mut buf).await {
Ok(0) => return LoopbackOutcome::Ignore,
Ok(n) => n,
Err(_) => return LoopbackOutcome::Ignore,
};
let head = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..n]);
let Some(request_line) = head.lines().next() else {
return LoopbackOutcome::Ignore;
};
// `GET {redirect_path}?code=…&state=… HTTP/1.1`
let mut parts = request_line.split_whitespace();
let (Some(method), Some(target)) = (parts.next(), parts.next()) else {
return LoopbackOutcome::Ignore;
};
if method != "GET" {
let _ = write_http(&mut stream, 405, "Method Not Allowed").await;
return LoopbackOutcome::Ignore;
}
let (path, query) = target.split_once('?').unwrap_or((target, ""));
if path != redirect_path {
let _ = write_http(&mut stream, 404, "Not Found").await;
return LoopbackOutcome::Ignore;
}
let result = parse_callback_query(query)
.and_then(|params| validate_state(&params, expected_state).map(|()| params.code));
match result {
Ok(code) => {
let _ = write_http(
&mut stream,
200,
"Signed in. You can close this window and return to kigi.",
)
.await;
let _ = stream.flush().await;
LoopbackOutcome::Code(code)
}
Err(e) => {
let _ = write_http(&mut stream, 400, "Login failed — return to kigi and retry.").await;
let _ = stream.flush().await;
LoopbackOutcome::Rejected(e)
}
}
}
/// Write a minimal HTTP/1.1 response with an HTML body.
async fn write_http(
stream: &mut tokio::net::TcpStream,
status: u16,
message: &str,
) -> std::io::Result<()> {
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
let reason = match status {
200 => "OK",
400 => "Bad Request",
404 => "Not Found",
405 => "Method Not Allowed",
_ => "Error",
};
let body = format!("<!doctype html><meta charset=utf-8><p>{message}</p>");
let response = format!(
"HTTP/1.1 {status} {reason}\r\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\r\n\
Content-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n{body}",
body.len()
);
stream.write_all(response.as_bytes()).await
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use kigi_models::CLAUDE_OAUTH_CONFIG;
use wiremock::matchers::{body_string_contains, method, path};
use wiremock::{Mock, MockServer, ResponseTemplate};
/// A config pointed at a mock token host (copies Claude's client_id/scope/
/// paths but overrides the token host).
fn mock_cfg(token_host: &'static str) -> OAuthConfig {
OAuthConfig {
token_host,
..CLAUDE_OAUTH_CONFIG
}
}
/// PKCE codes: verifier/challenge are non-empty base64url (no padding), the
/// challenge is the base64url SHA-256 of the verifier, and state == verifier.
#[test]
fn generate_pkce_produces_valid_s256_codes() {
let pkce = generate_pkce();
assert_eq!(pkce.state, pkce.verifier, "state must equal the verifier");
assert!(!pkce.verifier.is_empty() && !pkce.challenge.is_empty());
for s in [&pkce.verifier, &pkce.challenge] {
assert!(
s.chars()
.all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '-' || c == '_'),
"base64url (no pad) only: {s}"
);
assert!(!s.contains('='), "no padding: {s}");
}
// challenge == base64url(SHA-256(verifier)).
let expect = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.encode(Sha256::digest(pkce.verifier.as_bytes()));
assert_eq!(pkce.challenge, expect);
// Fresh entropy each call.
assert_ne!(pkce.verifier, generate_pkce().verifier);
}
/// The authorize URL carries the fixed params + the PKCE state and S256
/// challenge, and targets `claude.ai/oauth/authorize`.
#[test]
fn authorize_url_has_state_and_s256_challenge() {
let pkce = generate_pkce();
let redirect = redirect_uri(53692, "/callback");
let url = build_authorize_url(&CLAUDE_OAUTH_CONFIG, &redirect, &pkce);
let parsed = url::Url::parse(&url).expect("valid URL");
assert_eq!(parsed.host_str(), Some("claude.ai"));
assert_eq!(parsed.path(), "/oauth/authorize");
let q: std::collections::HashMap<_, _> = parsed.query_pairs().into_owned().collect();
assert_eq!(q.get("response_type").map(String::as_str), Some("code"));
assert_eq!(
q.get("code_challenge_method").map(String::as_str),
Some("S256")
);
assert_eq!(
q.get("state").map(String::as_str),
Some(pkce.state.as_str())
);
assert_eq!(
q.get("code_challenge").map(String::as_str),
Some(pkce.challenge.as_str())
);
assert_eq!(
q.get("client_id").map(String::as_str),
Some(CLAUDE_OAUTH_CONFIG.client_id)
);
assert_eq!(
q.get("redirect_uri").map(String::as_str),
Some(redirect.as_str())
);
// The verifier itself must NEVER appear in the browser URL.
assert!(
!url.contains("code_verifier"),
"the verifier must not ride the authorize URL"
);
}
/// STRICT state validation: an exact match passes; a mismatch or an absent
/// state is REJECTED (CSRF guard — the flow must never proceed).
#[test]
fn state_validation_is_strict() {
let ok = CallbackParams {
code: "c".into(),
state: Some("expected".into()),
};
assert!(validate_state(&ok, "expected").is_ok());
let mismatch = CallbackParams {
code: "c".into(),
state: Some("attacker".into()),
};
assert!(
validate_state(&mismatch, "expected").is_err(),
"a state mismatch MUST be rejected"
);
let missing = CallbackParams {
code: "c".into(),
state: None,
};
assert!(
validate_state(&missing, "expected").is_err(),
"an absent state MUST be rejected"
);
}
/// A loopback `/callback` with the WRONG state is rejected end-to-end (the
/// listener returns an error, never a code) — the CSRF guard on the wire.
#[tokio::test]
async fn loopback_rejects_state_mismatch() {
// Ephemeral port: bind, learn the port, then drive a client at it.
let probe = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
.await
.unwrap();
let port = probe.local_addr().unwrap().port();
drop(probe);
let server =
tokio::spawn(
async move { await_loopback_code(port, "/callback", "the-real-state").await },
);
// Give the listener a moment to bind.
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
// Attacker callback: valid code, WRONG state.
let _ = reqwest::get(format!(
"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/callback?code=stolen&state=wrong-state"
))
.await;
let outcome = server.await.unwrap();
let err = outcome.expect_err("a state mismatch must be rejected, never yield a code");
assert!(err.to_string().contains("state mismatch"), "{err}");
}
/// A loopback `/callback` with the MATCHING state yields the code.
#[tokio::test]
async fn loopback_returns_code_on_valid_state() {
let probe = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
.await
.unwrap();
let port = probe.local_addr().unwrap().port();
drop(probe);
let server =
tokio::spawn(async move { await_loopback_code(port, "/callback", "good-state").await });
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
let _ = reqwest::get(format!(
"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/callback?code=auth-code-123&state=good-state"
))
.await;
let code = server.await.unwrap().expect("valid state yields the code");
assert_eq!(code, "auth-code-123");
}
/// Manual-paste parsing: full redirect URL, `code#state`, and bare code.
#[test]
fn manual_paste_parses_all_three_forms() {
let from_url =
parse_manual_paste("http://localhost:53692/callback?code=abc123&state=st-9").unwrap();
assert_eq!(from_url.code, "abc123");
assert_eq!(from_url.state.as_deref(), Some("st-9"));
let from_hash = parse_manual_paste("abc123#st-9").unwrap();
assert_eq!(from_hash.code, "abc123");
assert_eq!(from_hash.state.as_deref(), Some("st-9"));
let bare = parse_manual_paste(" abc123 ").unwrap();
assert_eq!(bare.code, "abc123");
assert_eq!(bare.state, None);
assert!(parse_manual_paste("").is_err());
// A pasted redirect that carries an error param surfaces the error.
assert!(parse_manual_paste("http://localhost/callback?error=access_denied").is_err());
}
/// Code → token exchange: JSON body carries the grant + verifier, response
/// materializes a `KimiAuth` with the rotating refresh token.
#[tokio::test]
async fn exchange_code_posts_json_and_returns_auth() {
let server = MockServer::start().await;
let host: &'static str = Box::leak(server.uri().into_boxed_str());
Mock::given(method("POST"))
.and(path("/v1/oauth/token"))
.and(body_string_contains(
"\"grant_type\":\"authorization_code\"",
))
.and(body_string_contains("\"code\":\"auth-code-xyz\""))
.and(body_string_contains("\"code_verifier\""))
.respond_with(ResponseTemplate::new(200).set_body_json(serde_json::json!({
"access_token": "sk-ant-oat-new",
"refresh_token": "sk-ant-ort-new",
"expires_in": 3600,
"token_type": "bearer",
})))
.expect(1)
.mount(&server)
.await;
let cfg = mock_cfg(host);
let pkce = generate_pkce();
let auth = exchange_code(
&cfg,
"auth-code-xyz",
&pkce,
&redirect_uri(53692, "/callback"),
)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(auth.key, "sk-ant-oat-new");
assert_eq!(auth.refresh_token.as_deref(), Some("sk-ant-ort-new"));
assert_eq!(auth.expires_in, Some(3600));
}
/// Refresh rotates the refresh token (JSON body, refresh grant).
#[tokio::test]
async fn refresh_rotates_refresh_token() {
let server = MockServer::start().await;
let host: &'static str = Box::leak(server.uri().into_boxed_str());
Mock::given(method("POST"))
.and(path("/v1/oauth/token"))
.and(body_string_contains("\"grant_type\":\"refresh_token\""))
.and(body_string_contains("\"refresh_token\":\"ort-old\""))
.respond_with(ResponseTemplate::new(200).set_body_json(serde_json::json!({
"access_token": "oat-fresh",
"refresh_token": "ort-rotated",
"expires_in": 3600,
})))
.expect(1)
.mount(&server)
.await;
let auth = refresh_token(&mock_cfg(host), "ort-old").await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(auth.key, "oat-fresh");
assert_eq!(
auth.refresh_token.as_deref(),
Some("ort-rotated"),
"the rotated refresh token must be adopted"
);
}
/// A 401 on refresh maps to Unauthorized (drives the permanent-failure path).
#[tokio::test]
async fn refresh_401_maps_to_unauthorized() {
let server = MockServer::start().await;
let host: &'static str = Box::leak(server.uri().into_boxed_str());
Mock::given(method("POST"))
.and(path("/v1/oauth/token"))
.respond_with(
ResponseTemplate::new(401)
.set_body_json(serde_json::json!({ "error_description": "refresh revoked" })),
)
.expect(1)
.mount(&server)
.await;
let err = refresh_token(&mock_cfg(host), "ort-dead")
.await
.unwrap_err();
match err {
RefreshError::Unauthorized {
status,
description,
} => {
assert_eq!(status, 401);
assert_eq!(description, "refresh revoked");
}
other => panic!("expected Unauthorized, got {other:?}"),
}
}
// ── ChatGPT/Codex PKCE (openai-codex) ────────────────────────────────────
/// Codex PKCE uses an INDEPENDENT fresh-random state (NOT `state ==
/// verifier`) so the verifier never rides the callback.
#[test]
fn codex_pkce_state_is_independent_of_the_verifier() {
let pkce = generate_pkce_random_state();
assert_ne!(
pkce.state, pkce.verifier,
"codex state must be fresh-random, not the verifier"
);
assert!(!pkce.state.is_empty() && !pkce.verifier.is_empty());
// Challenge is still the S256 of the verifier.
let expect = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
.encode(Sha256::digest(pkce.verifier.as_bytes()));
assert_eq!(pkce.challenge, expect);
assert_ne!(
generate_pkce_random_state().state,
pkce.state,
"fresh state"
);
}
/// The codex authorize URL carries the PKCE state + S256 challenge AND the
/// three codex-only extra params, and targets `auth.openai.com/oauth/
/// authorize` with the `/auth/callback` redirect. The verifier never rides it.
#[test]
fn codex_authorize_url_has_state_challenge_and_three_extra_params() {
use kigi_models::CODEX_OAUTH_CONFIG;
let pkce = generate_pkce_random_state();
let redirect = redirect_uri(1455, "/auth/callback");
assert_eq!(redirect, "http://localhost:1455/auth/callback");
let url = build_authorize_url(&CODEX_OAUTH_CONFIG, &redirect, &pkce);
let parsed = url::Url::parse(&url).expect("valid URL");
assert_eq!(parsed.host_str(), Some("auth.openai.com"));
assert_eq!(parsed.path(), "/oauth/authorize");
let q: std::collections::HashMap<_, _> = parsed.query_pairs().into_owned().collect();
assert_eq!(
q.get("state").map(String::as_str),
Some(pkce.state.as_str())
);
assert_eq!(
q.get("code_challenge").map(String::as_str),
Some(pkce.challenge.as_str())
);
assert_eq!(
q.get("code_challenge_method").map(String::as_str),
Some("S256")
);
// The three codex-only extra params.
assert_eq!(
q.get("id_token_add_organizations").map(String::as_str),
Some("true")
);
assert_eq!(
q.get("codex_cli_simplified_flow").map(String::as_str),
Some("true")
);
assert_eq!(
q.get("originator").map(String::as_str),
Some("codex_cli_rs")
);
assert!(
!url.contains("code_verifier"),
"the verifier must not ride the authorize URL"
);
}
/// The claude authorize URL is UNCHANGED (no extra params) — its empty
/// `authorize_extra` keeps it byte-identical.
#[test]
fn claude_authorize_url_carries_no_extra_params() {
let pkce = generate_pkce();
let url = build_authorize_url(
&CLAUDE_OAUTH_CONFIG,
&redirect_uri(53692, "/callback"),
&pkce,
);
assert!(!url.contains("id_token_add_organizations"));
assert!(!url.contains("codex_cli_simplified_flow"));
assert!(!url.contains("originator"));
}
fn codex_mock_cfg(token_host: &'static str) -> OAuthConfig {
OAuthConfig {
token_host,
..kigi_models::CODEX_OAUTH_CONFIG
}
}
/// Codex code→token exchange posts a FORM body carrying the grant + code +
/// verifier + redirect_uri, and NOTABLY NO `state` field (the codex token
/// endpoint does not expect it). Response materializes a `KimiAuth`.
#[tokio::test]
async fn codex_exchange_code_posts_form_without_state() {
use wiremock::matchers::{body_string_contains, header, method, path};
let server = MockServer::start().await;
let host: &'static str = Box::leak(server.uri().into_boxed_str());
Mock::given(method("POST"))
.and(path("/oauth/token"))
.and(header("content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"))
.and(body_string_contains("grant_type=authorization_code"))
.and(body_string_contains("code=codex-auth-code"))
.and(body_string_contains("code_verifier="))
.and(body_string_contains("redirect_uri="))
.respond_with(ResponseTemplate::new(200).set_body_json(serde_json::json!({
"access_token": "codex-access-jwt",
"refresh_token": "codex-refresh",
"expires_in": 3600,
})))
.expect(1)
.mount(&server)
.await;
let cfg = codex_mock_cfg(host);
let pkce = generate_pkce_random_state();
let auth = exchange_code_form(
&cfg,
"codex-auth-code",
&pkce,
"http://localhost:1455/auth/callback",
)
.await
.unwrap();
assert_eq!(auth.key, "codex-access-jwt");
assert_eq!(auth.refresh_token.as_deref(), Some("codex-refresh"));
assert_eq!(auth.expires_in, Some(3600));
}
}