ZacharyZhang-NY
4cd29f91e5
Local read-only Model Context Protocol server (Go) exposing the .ely_eye memory store to coding agents such as Codex and Claude Code: nine tools over status, cartridges, Evidence Atoms, compiled evidence packs, proof suites, and HashHop proofs. One-line cross-platform install (no Docker), with a prebuilt-binary release workflow.
3.9 KiB
Ely-Eye MCP Research Notes
Date: 2026-05-30
Current protocol baseline
The MCP specification latest version observed during implementation is 2025-11-25. It defines a JSON-RPC 2.0 lifecycle with initialization, capability negotiation, normal operation, and transport-level shutdown. Server features are resources, prompts, and tools; client features include roots, sampling, and elicitation.
Local Ely-Eye deployment uses stdio transport because Codex and Claude Code both support local stdio MCP servers. HTTP remains the better fit for remote shared services with OAuth; Ely-Eye memory is local project state, so stdio keeps the trust boundary on the user's machine.
The official Go SDK is Tier 1 in the MCP SDK list and supports the latest 2025-11-25 spec in v1.4.0 and newer. This project uses github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk v1.6.1.
Product mapping
Ely-Eye already materializes Context Cartridges, Evidence Atoms, memory capsule indexes, proof suites, and cache events. The MCP layer maps those into agent-native capabilities:
| Ely-Eye object | MCP surface |
|---|---|
| Evidence Atom | search_atoms, fetch_atom |
| Context Cartridge | list_cartridges, get_cartridge |
| Context Compiler | compile_context |
| PRD and docs | MCP resources |
| Proof Suite | list_proof_suites, get_proof_suite |
| HashHop / Visual HashHop | list_hashhop_proofs, get_proof_suite |
| Cache Fabric | ely_eye_status |
Long-context research anchors
Magic's LTM-2-mini announcement establishes the design target: 100M-token context and HashHop as a stricter long-context addressing test than needle-in-a-haystack. Ely-Eye keeps 100M as a logical memory capsule and exposes the capsule through MCP as cartridge scope. Single-request full-attention execution belongs to the physical-model profile.
Qwen3.5-9B supplies the base local VLM target: 262K native context and a 1.01M YaRN profile. Qwen3-VL-Embedding-8B supplies multimodal retrieval coverage across text, images, screenshots, video, and multimodal combinations.
Native Sparse Attention, VL-Cache, SparseVLM, DuoAttention, and the TTT-E2E/Titans line shape the memory system: sparse long-context compute, modality-aware KV compression, visual token sparsification, retrieval/streaming head separation, and test-time memory formation. The MCP server exposes these as evidence and proof artifacts so coding agents can inspect what exists locally before proposing changes.
Security anchors
Recent MCP security papers and threat taxonomies identify tool poisoning, prompt injection, over-broad tool permissions, and hidden metadata attacks as central risks. This implementation limits the first MCP milestone to read-only local tools, concise tool descriptions, structured output schemas, and project-scoped Claude configuration. Write operations can be added as separate audited tools with explicit names and narrow inputs.
Sources
- Model Context Protocol specification 2025-11-25: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25
- MCP Go SDK: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/go-sdk
- Claude Code MCP docs: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp
- OpenAI Docs MCP and Codex config docs: https://developers.openai.com/learn/docs-mcp
- Magic 100M Token Context Windows: https://magic.dev/blog/100m-token-context-windows
- Qwen3.5-9B model card: https://huggingface.co/Qwen/Qwen3.5-9B
- Qwen3-VL-Embedding-8B model card: https://huggingface.co/Qwen/Qwen3-VL-Embedding-8B
- Native Sparse Attention: https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.11089
- End-to-End Test-Time Training for Long Context: https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.23675
- VL-Cache: https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.23317
- SparseVLM: https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.04417
- DuoAttention: https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.10819
- Titans: https://arxiv.org/abs/2501.00663
- Model Context Protocol security landscape: https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.23278
- MCP threat modeling and tool poisoning: https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.22489