Publish a checksum beside every released ISO (#119)
The release script computed the ISO's sha256 and echoed it to the releaser's terminal, where nobody downloading the ISO could ever see it, and the uploader shipped the ISO and its signature but nothing to check the download against. So "verify your download" was not advice anyone could act on. That matters more for this ISO than for most. The offline pacman mirror lives inside the airootfs and is stored uncompressed, and the installer bind-mounts it onto the target's package cache, so pacstrap reads packages straight off the medium. A flipped block there meets no decompressor and no squashfs block checksum on the way; pacman's integrity check is the first thing in the chain to notice, minutes into the install, as "invalid or corrupted package" against a package name that says nothing about the download. The sidecar names the ISO alone rather than the build path, so it verifies from whatever directory it was downloaded into. A release that cannot write it stops, because the sidecar left over from the previous release reads as a checksum for this one. The uploader now tallies every copy instead of letting the last one decide the exit status, and warns when there is no checksum to publish. Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
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@@ -6,6 +6,14 @@ The Omarchy ISO is the only supported way to install Omarchy. It ships the Omarc
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See the ISO link on [omarchy.org](https://omarchy.org).
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Every published ISO has a `.sha256` beside it at the same URL. Download both into the same directory and check the ISO before writing it to a USB stick:
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```bash
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sha256sum -c omarchy-3.0.iso.sha256
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```
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Corruption anywhere in the ISO is worth catching before the write, and corruption in the bundled package mirror is worth catching most: the mirror lives inside the ISO and the installer reads it straight off the medium, so those bytes surface minutes into the install as a pacman "invalid or corrupted package" error rather than as anything that names the download. Corruption elsewhere is louder and earlier — it stops the medium booting or mounting. There is a `.sig` beside the ISO too for anyone who wants to verify it against the Omarchy signing key.
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## Creating the ISO
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Run `./bin/omarchy-iso-make`; output goes into `./release`. By default the ISO uses the Omarchy packages and tracks the `quattro` branch, from the stable mirror. Pass `--edge` to use `omarchy-dev` and `omarchy-settings-dev` from the edge mirror.
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@@ -130,7 +138,7 @@ Run `./bin/omarchy-iso-sign [release/omarchy.iso]`. The signing key is retrieved
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## Uploading the ISO
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Run `./bin/omarchy-iso-upload [release/omarchy.iso]`. This requires rclone configuration (`rclone config`).
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Run `./bin/omarchy-iso-upload [release/omarchy.iso]`. This requires rclone configuration (`rclone config`). The `.sig` and `.sha256` sidecars go up with the ISO when they exist beside it.
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## Full release of the ISO
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