Keep provisioning credentials out of OEM installs and factory snapshots
Review findings from codex and Copilot: - A rig-supplied credentials file in OEM mode now contributes only its LUKS passphrase: preserved users/root_enc_password fields would have created a hidden provisioning account despite OEM promising no user until first boot. - The factory snapshot is taken writable, scrubbed of deployment credentials (staged authorized_keys, tailscale auth key and join unit, the dead OEM LUKS key and its initramfs drop-ins), then set read-only — a reset years later must not authorize the original deployment key or rejoin its tailnet. - The missing-Node-tarball case is a hard install error on every install, not just OEM: the stash is what lets a factory reset finalize offline. - The configurator's OEM gate checks the runtime package for the service unit as well as the setup binary. - The test harness handles the deliberately skipped mode picker on blank disks when the bundled runtime lacks OEM support. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -791,7 +791,8 @@ oem_supported() {
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OEM_SUPPORTED=true
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if [[ -d $mirror ]]; then
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pkg=$(ls "$mirror/$OMARCHY_RUNTIME_PACKAGE"-[0-9]*.pkg.tar.zst 2>/dev/null | head -1)
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if [[ -z $pkg ]] || ! tar -tf "$pkg" usr/bin/omarchy-oem-setup &>/dev/null; then
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if [[ -z $pkg ]] || ! tar -tf "$pkg" usr/bin/omarchy-oem-setup \
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usr/share/omarchy/install/oem/omarchy-oem-setup.service &>/dev/null; then
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OEM_SUPPORTED=false
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fi
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fi
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