Keep provisioning credentials out of OEM installs and factory snapshots

Review findings from codex and Copilot:

- A rig-supplied credentials file in OEM mode now contributes only its LUKS
  passphrase: preserved users/root_enc_password fields would have created a
  hidden provisioning account despite OEM promising no user until first boot.
- The factory snapshot is taken writable, scrubbed of deployment credentials
  (staged authorized_keys, tailscale auth key and join unit, the dead OEM
  LUKS key and its initramfs drop-ins), then set read-only — a reset years
  later must not authorize the original deployment key or rejoin its tailnet.
- The missing-Node-tarball case is a hard install error on every install,
  not just OEM: the stash is what lets a factory reset finalize offline.
- The configurator's OEM gate checks the runtime package for the service
  unit as well as the setup binary.
- The test harness handles the deliberately skipped mode picker on blank
  disks when the bundled runtime lacks OEM support.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
David Heinemeier HanssonandClaude Fable 5 committed 2026-08-07 18:09:10 -07:00
1 parent 445db32792
commit e49ea2bc96
5 files changed
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@@ -791,7 +791,8 @@ oem_supported() {
OEM_SUPPORTED=true
if [[ -d $mirror ]]; then
pkg=$(ls "$mirror/$OMARCHY_RUNTIME_PACKAGE"-[0-9]*.pkg.tar.zst 2>/dev/null | head -1)
if [[ -z $pkg ]] || ! tar -tf "$pkg" usr/bin/omarchy-oem-setup &>/dev/null; then
if [[ -z $pkg ]] || ! tar -tf "$pkg" usr/bin/omarchy-oem-setup \
usr/share/omarchy/install/oem/omarchy-oem-setup.service &>/dev/null; then
OEM_SUPPORTED=false
fi
fi