Commit Graph
7 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Emir Beganovic f9d184f2bc VM image: one file, named like the ISO
The image was a folder, vm/, holding base.qcow2 and what boots it. It is
now one file next to the ISO, with the ISO's name and its own checksum
file, the way Ubuntu, Debian, Arch, Fedora and CentOS publish theirs:

  edge/<version>/omarchy-edge-<version>.qcow2
  stable/<version>/<run>/omarchy-<version>.qcow2

The image boots by itself through UEFI. What a direct boot needs, the
kernel, initramfs, kernel arguments and vm-boot, is in an unpacked/
folder beside it, Ubuntu's name for the same thing. The firmware
variables are no longer published: a boot with the firmware's defaults
finds the disk.

latest.json follows: vm.url, vm.sha256 and vm.size are the image, as
url, sha256 and size are the ISO; vm.unpacked and vm.unpacked_files are
the folder. vm-boot takes the image file. The publish job compares every
file it uploaded, whatever the layout. README, tests and the workflow's
header say the same.
2026-10-09 21:40:01 +02:00
Emir Beganovic 0abcbb0b97 Nightly: its decisions are scripts, with tests
Which channels a run makes and where they go, and what is laid out and
what latest.json then says, were shell inside the workflow file, tried
only by hand. A green run published a latest.json with the Omarchy
version in it twice, and nothing noticed.

Both are scripts now, test/vm-image/nightly-plan and nightly-layout,
and test/unit/nightly-test.sh tries them without a runner: a first run,
a run started again, a release already published, a tag that is not a
version; every field of latest.json for each channel, the checksums
against the files, the version a consumer reads from the ISO's name.
nightly-layout also refuses to describe an image it cannot describe
fully, and checks its own latest.json before anything is published.

The same test covers two things the install test decides: which Omarchy
packages an ISO installs, and when an install is over.
2026-10-09 20:12:14 +02:00
Emir Beganovic c97836e4f2 VM image: check the factory snapshot holds no SSH login key
The install test's key sits in the user's home, which is its own
subvolume and not part of the factory snapshot, and the seal removes it
there. The check says so of every image, instead of leaving it to the
layout staying as it is.
2026-10-09 19:45:40 +02:00
Emir Beganovic 41fa32d671 VM image: seal whichever kernel the system runs
The seal read /boot/EFI/Linux/omarchy_linux-omarchy.efi. An edge install
has linux-omarchy-bore, so the first nightly run stopped there. It now
asks the running system which kernel package it booted and takes that
UKI, and takes the command line from /proc/cmdline, since the boot
entry, not the UKI, may be what holds it. The nightly's package report
names the kernel the same way.
2026-10-09 19:42:34 +02:00
Emir Beganovic c0a0e787f3 VM image: seal the install test's own base image
test/integration already installs the ISO unattended and saves the
installed disk as test-runs/<iso>-integration/base.qcow2, with its
firmware variables and the key that logs in to it. That folder is what
vm-seal takes, so the separate install script goes.

The sealed image now also carries the firmware variables, which hold the
boot entry the installer registered: a consumer that boots the disk
through UEFI needs them, a direct kernel boot does not.
2026-10-09 19:06:48 +02:00
Emir Beganovic 466a7a8221 Integration harness: an edge ISO installs the -dev packages
builder/build-iso.sh puts omarchy-dev and omarchy-settings-dev on an edge
ISO, as it does on a dev or local one. The harness picked its package
names from the ISO's file name and knew dev, local and pr, so for an edge
ISO it asked the installer for the release packages.
2026-10-09 19:06:48 +02:00
Emir Beganovic 4e7b18eb7d Scripts that turn an installed Omarchy disk into a downloadable VM image
As they were tested by hand on the 4.0.4 ISO, before any of it is wired
into a workflow:

  vm-install  unattended install of an ISO into a qcow2, through cidata
  vm-seal     makes the disk publishable: SSH takes keys only, no machine
              ID, host keys, build key or build logs left, compressed
              with zstd, with checksums and the kernel pulled out for
              direct boot
  vm-verify   boots the sealed image once and checks all of that
  vm-boot     boots a throwaway copy with a key made for that boot and
              runs a command in it

On this machine: install 114 s, seal 27 s, a 4.2 GB image, SSH about 5 s
after power-on, 17 of 17 verify checks, and 7 of them failing on an
image sealed without these fixes.
2026-10-09 18:56:35 +02:00