diff --git a/bin/omarchy-setup-security-fido2 b/bin/omarchy-setup-security-fido2
index 85fe2039..75a87124 100755
--- a/bin/omarchy-setup-security-fido2
+++ b/bin/omarchy-setup-security-fido2
@@ -31,11 +31,11 @@ setup_pam_config() {
     echo "Creating polkit configuration with FIDO2 authentication..."
     sudo tee /etc/pam.d/polkit-1 >/dev/null <<'EOF'
 auth      sufficient pam_u2f.so cue authfile=/etc/fido2/fido2
-auth      required pam_unix.so
+auth      include system-auth
 
-account   required pam_unix.so
-password  required pam_unix.so
-session   required pam_unix.so
+account   include system-auth
+password  include system-auth
+session   include system-auth
 EOF
   fi
 }
diff --git a/bin/omarchy-setup-security-fingerprint b/bin/omarchy-setup-security-fingerprint
index a57dea4a..4b3c436a 100755
--- a/bin/omarchy-setup-security-fingerprint
+++ b/bin/omarchy-setup-security-fingerprint
@@ -47,11 +47,11 @@ setup_pam_config() {
     sudo tee /etc/pam.d/polkit-1 >/dev/null <<EOF
 $fprintd_gate
 auth      sufficient pam_fprintd.so
-auth      required pam_unix.so
+auth      include system-auth
 
-account   required pam_unix.so
-password  required pam_unix.so
-session   required pam_unix.so
+account   include system-auth
+password  include system-auth
+session   include system-auth
 EOF
   fi
 }
diff --git a/migrations/1788256455.sh b/migrations/1788256455.sh
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..38022bc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/migrations/1788256455.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+echo "Restore polkit brute-force protection on machines that enabled fingerprint or FIDO2 auth"
+
+polkit=/etc/pam.d/polkit-1
+
+# When fingerprint or FIDO2 auth was set up while /etc/pam.d/polkit-1 did not yet
+# exist -- the normal case on Arch, where the polkit package ships its stack in
+# /usr/lib/pam.d/polkit-1 -- the setup commands hand-rolled an /etc/pam.d/polkit-1
+# that lists pam_unix directly instead of `include system-auth`. That override
+# dropped pam_faillock, so polkit prompts had no brute-force lockout and their
+# failures never counted toward the shared tally. The setup commands now defer to
+# system-auth; this repairs the files the old ones already wrote.
+#
+# Only the exact stack those commands produced is touched. Every non-blank,
+# non-comment line must be one of the known hardware-auth auth lines (the
+# clamshell gate, pam_fprintd, or the FIDO2 pam_u2f line) or a bare
+# `X required pam_unix.so`; all four bare pam_unix lines must be present; and
+# system-auth must not already be included. This matches the fingerprint, FIDO2,
+# combined, and post-removal (markerless, both remove commands strip only their
+# own marker lines) layouts, and refuses any administrator-authored stack that
+# carries other directives. The repair replaces only the bare pam_unix lines, so
+# comments and the hardware-auth lines are preserved verbatim.
+
+is_omarchy_vulnerable_stack() {
+  local file=$1 line
+  local re_gate='^auth[[:space:]]+\[success=1 default=ignore\][[:space:]]+pam_exec\.so quiet /usr/bin/omarchy-hw-laptop-closed[[:space:]]*$'
+  local re_fprintd='^auth[[:space:]]+sufficient[[:space:]]+pam_fprintd\.so[[:space:]]*$'
+  local re_u2f='^auth[[:space:]]+sufficient[[:space:]]+pam_u2f\.so cue authfile=/etc/fido2/fido2[[:space:]]*$'
+  local re_bare='^(auth|account|password|session)[[:space:]]+required[[:space:]]+pam_unix\.so[[:space:]]*$'
+  local phase
+
+  # Already fixed, or partially converted: leave it alone (also makes reruns no-op).
+  if grep -qE '^(auth|account|password|session)[[:space:]]+include[[:space:]]+system-auth' "$file"; then
+    return 1
+  fi
+
+  # The vulnerable signature: all four phases delegated to a bare pam_unix.
+  for phase in auth account password session; do
+    grep -qE "^${phase}[[:space:]]+required[[:space:]]+pam_unix\.so[[:space:]]*\$" "$file" || return 1
+  done
+
+  # Every meaningful line must be one Omarchy itself wrote; anything else means
+  # an administrator has edited this file, so it is not ours to rewrite.
+  while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n $line ]]; do
+    [[ -z ${line//[[:space:]]/} ]] && continue
+    [[ $line == \#* ]] && continue
+    [[ $line =~ $re_gate || $line =~ $re_fprintd || $line =~ $re_u2f || $line =~ $re_bare ]] && continue
+    return 1
+  done <"$file"
+
+  return 0
+}
+
+if [[ -f $polkit ]] && is_omarchy_vulnerable_stack "$polkit"; then
+  echo "Rewriting $polkit to defer to system-auth (restores pam_faillock lockout)..."
+
+  backup="$polkit.omarchy-bak.$(date +%s)"
+  if ! sudo cp -a "$polkit" "$backup"; then
+    echo "Could not back up $polkit; leaving it unchanged so the migration retries." >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  # Replace only the bare pam_unix lines; keep comments, blank lines, and the
+  # hardware-auth (gate / pam_fprintd / pam_u2f) lines exactly as they are.
+  # sed -i renames a complete file into place, so an interrupted run never leaves polkit-1 truncated.
+  if ! sudo sed -i -E 's/^(auth|account|password|session)([[:space:]]+)required[[:space:]]+pam_unix\.so[[:space:]]*$/\1\2include system-auth/' "$polkit"; then
+    echo "Could not rewrite $polkit; leaving it unchanged so the migration retries." >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  if grep -qE '^auth[[:space:]]+include[[:space:]]+system-auth' "$polkit"; then
+    echo "Restored polkit brute-force protection. Previous file saved at $backup."
+  else
+    echo "polkit repair could not be verified; restoring the original file." >&2
+    sudo cp -a "$backup" "$polkit"
+    exit 1
+  fi
+fi
diff --git a/test/shell.d/security-polkit-faillock-test.sh b/test/shell.d/security-polkit-faillock-test.sh
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..74582457
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/shell.d/security-polkit-faillock-test.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+source "$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)/base-test.sh"
+
+# The fingerprint and FIDO2 setup commands each create /etc/pam.d/polkit-1 from
+# scratch when the file does not already exist -- which is the normal case on
+# Arch, where the polkit package ships its PAM stack in /usr/lib/pam.d/polkit-1
+# and /etc/pam.d/polkit-1 is absent. A hand-rolled stack that lists pam_unix
+# directly instead of `include system-auth` silently drops pam_faillock, so
+# polkit prompts would have no brute-force lockout and their failures would not
+# count toward the shared tally. Assert the created stack defers to system-auth.
+
+for setup in omarchy-setup-security-fingerprint omarchy-setup-security-fido2; do
+  script="$ROOT/bin/$setup"
+
+  # Pull the here-doc body the setup writes to /etc/pam.d/polkit-1.
+  body=$(sed -n "/tee \/etc\/pam.d\/polkit-1/,/^EOF\$/p" "$script")
+
+  [[ -n $body ]] || fail "$setup writes a polkit-1 stack"
+
+  for phase in auth account password session; do
+    grep -qE "^${phase}[[:space:]]+include[[:space:]]+system-auth" <<<"$body" ||
+      fail "$setup polkit-1 $phase defers to system-auth (keeps faillock)" "$body"
+  done
+
+  ! grep -qE "^(account|password|session)[[:space:]]+required[[:space:]]+pam_unix" <<<"$body" ||
+    fail "$setup polkit-1 does not hand-roll a bare pam_unix stack" "$body"
+
+  pass "$setup creates a polkit-1 stack that includes system-auth"
+done
diff --git a/test/shell.d/security-polkit-migration-test.sh b/test/shell.d/security-polkit-migration-test.sh
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d9b14fa1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/test/shell.d/security-polkit-migration-test.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+source "$(dirname "$0")/base-test.sh"
+
+# Exercises migrations/1788256455.sh, which repairs an Omarchy-created
+# /etc/pam.d/polkit-1 that lists pam_unix directly (dropping pam_faillock)
+# instead of including system-auth. The migration keeps its production path
+# fixed; as in sshd-hardening-migration-test.sh, this test rewrites that one
+# assignment in the input fed to bash and stubs sudo so nothing touches the
+# host's /etc.
+
+test_dir=$(mktemp -d)
+trap 'rm -rf "$test_dir"' EXIT
+
+migration="$ROOT/migrations/1788256455.sh"
+stub_bin="$test_dir/bin"
+mkdir -p "$stub_bin"
+
+# sudo stub: log, optionally refuse (SUDO_ALLOWED=0), and optionally make the
+# `sed` rewrite empty the file and report success (WRITE_BREAKS=1) so the
+# verification/restore path is exercised. Otherwise run the real command so
+# cp/sed act on the temp file.
+cat >"$stub_bin/sudo" <<'STUB'
+#!/bin/bash
+printf 'sudo %s\n' "$*" >>"${CALL_LOG:?}"
+if [[ ${SUDO_ALLOWED:-1} != "1" ]]; then
+  exit 1
+elif [[ ${WRITE_BREAKS:-0} == "1" && $1 == "sed" ]]; then
+  : >"${!#}"
+else
+  exec "$@"
+fi
+STUB
+chmod +x "$stub_bin"/*
+
+# Run the migration against a polkit-1 file seeded with $1; leaves the result in
+# "$test_dir/<scenario>/polkit-1" and records the exit status in migrate_rc.
+migrate_rc=0
+run_migration() {
+  local scenario=$1 content=$2
+  local dir="$test_dir/$scenario"
+  local polkit="$dir/polkit-1"
+  mkdir -p "$dir"
+  printf '%s' "$content" >"$polkit"
+  : >"$test_dir/$scenario.calls"
+
+  migrate_rc=0
+  sed "s|^polkit=/etc/pam.d/polkit-1\$|polkit=$polkit|" "$migration" |
+    CALL_LOG="$test_dir/$scenario.calls" PATH="$stub_bin:$PATH" \
+      SUDO_ALLOWED="${SUDO_ALLOWED:-1}" WRITE_BREAKS="${WRITE_BREAKS:-0}" \
+      bash -euo pipefail >/dev/null 2>&1 || migrate_rc=$?
+}
+
+result() { cat "$test_dir/$1/polkit-1"; }
+
+# The four layouts the old setup / remove commands leave behind.
+fingerprint_stack='auth      [success=1 default=ignore] pam_exec.so quiet /usr/bin/omarchy-hw-laptop-closed
+auth      sufficient pam_fprintd.so
+auth      required pam_unix.so
+
+account   required pam_unix.so
+password  required pam_unix.so
+session   required pam_unix.so
+'
+fido2_stack='auth      sufficient pam_u2f.so cue authfile=/etc/fido2/fido2
+auth      required pam_unix.so
+
+account   required pam_unix.so
+password  required pam_unix.so
+session   required pam_unix.so
+'
+both_stack='auth      [success=1 default=ignore] pam_exec.so quiet /usr/bin/omarchy-hw-laptop-closed
+auth      sufficient pam_fprintd.so
+auth      sufficient pam_u2f.so cue authfile=/etc/fido2/fido2
+auth      required pam_unix.so
+
+account   required pam_unix.so
+password  required pam_unix.so
+session   required pam_unix.so
+'
+# What both remove commands leave: their own marker lines stripped, the bare
+# pam_unix stack (and no marker) behind.
+markerless_stack='auth      required pam_unix.so
+
+account   required pam_unix.so
+password  required pam_unix.so
+session   required pam_unix.so
+'
+fixed_stack='auth      sufficient pam_fprintd.so
+auth      include system-auth
+account   include system-auth
+password  include system-auth
+session   include system-auth
+'
+# An administrator's own stack that happens to use pam_fprintd but carries an
+# extra directive Omarchy never writes.
+admin_stack='auth      sufficient pam_fprintd.so
+auth      required pam_unix.so
+auth      optional pam_permit.so
+account   required pam_unix.so
+password  required pam_unix.so
+session   required pam_unix.so
+'
+
+# Every phase of a repaired stack must defer to system-auth and no bare pam_unix
+# may remain in the account/password/session block.
+assert_repaired() {
+  local scenario=$1 phase
+  for phase in auth account password session; do
+    grep -qE "^${phase}[[:space:]]+include[[:space:]]+system-auth" <<<"$(result "$scenario")" ||
+      fail "$scenario: $phase defers to system-auth" "$(result "$scenario")"
+  done
+  ! grep -qE '^(account|password|session)[[:space:]]+required[[:space:]]+pam_unix' <<<"$(result "$scenario")" ||
+    fail "$scenario: no bare pam_unix remains" "$(result "$scenario")"
+}
+
+run_migration fingerprint "$fingerprint_stack"
+(( migrate_rc == 0 )) || fail "fingerprint stack migrates cleanly"
+assert_repaired fingerprint
+grep -qF 'pam_fprintd.so' <<<"$(result fingerprint)" || fail "fingerprint line is preserved"
+grep -qF 'omarchy-hw-laptop-closed' <<<"$(result fingerprint)" || fail "clamshell gate is preserved"
+pass "migration repairs the fingerprint stack and keeps its hardware-auth lines"
+
+run_migration fido2 "$fido2_stack"
+(( migrate_rc == 0 )) || fail "fido2 stack migrates cleanly"
+assert_repaired fido2
+grep -qF 'pam_u2f.so cue authfile=/etc/fido2/fido2' <<<"$(result fido2)" || fail "FIDO2 line is preserved"
+pass "migration repairs the FIDO2 stack and keeps its hardware-auth line"
+
+run_migration both "$both_stack"
+(( migrate_rc == 0 )) || fail "combined stack migrates cleanly"
+assert_repaired both
+grep -qF 'pam_fprintd.so' <<<"$(result both)" && grep -qF 'pam_u2f.so' <<<"$(result both)" ||
+  fail "both hardware-auth lines are preserved"
+pass "migration repairs a combined fingerprint+FIDO2 stack"
+
+run_migration markerless "$markerless_stack"
+(( migrate_rc == 0 )) || fail "markerless stack migrates cleanly"
+assert_repaired markerless
+pass "migration repairs the markerless post-removal stack"
+
+run_migration comment "# managed by omarchy
+$fingerprint_stack"
+(( migrate_rc == 0 )) || fail "commented stack migrates cleanly"
+assert_repaired comment
+grep -qxF '# managed by omarchy' <<<"$(result comment)" || fail "comments are preserved through the rewrite"
+pass "migration repairs a commented stack and preserves the comment"
+
+run_migration commented-include "# auth include system-auth
+$fingerprint_stack"
+(( migrate_rc == 0 )) || fail "a stack with a commented-out include migrates cleanly"
+assert_repaired commented-include
+pass "migration repairs a stack whose only include is commented out"
+
+run_migration fixed "$fixed_stack"
+[[ "$(result fixed)" == "$(printf '%s' "$fixed_stack")" ]] || fail "an already-fixed stack is left byte-for-byte unchanged"
+! grep -q '^sudo ' "$test_dir/fixed.calls" || fail "an already-fixed stack triggers no privileged writes"
+pass "migration is idempotent: an already-fixed stack is untouched"
+
+run_migration admin "$admin_stack"
+[[ "$(result admin)" == "$(printf '%s' "$admin_stack")" ]] || fail "an administrator-authored stack is left unchanged"
+! grep -q '^sudo ' "$test_dir/admin.calls" || fail "an administrator-authored stack triggers no privileged writes"
+pass "migration refuses a stack carrying non-Omarchy directives"
+
+# Privilege failure is the retryable case: the migration must exit non-zero so
+# omarchy-migrate does not record it complete, and must leave the file unchanged.
+SUDO_ALLOWED=0 run_migration no-sudo "$fingerprint_stack"
+(( migrate_rc != 0 )) || fail "the migration stays pending when privileges are unavailable"
+[[ "$(result no-sudo)" == "$(printf '%s' "$fingerprint_stack")" ]] || fail "a failed repair leaves the original file intact"
+pass "migration exits non-zero and preserves the file when sudo is refused"
+
+# A write that does not take effect must be caught by verification, restored,
+# and reported as a failure rather than silently marked complete.
+WRITE_BREAKS=1 run_migration verify-fail "$fingerprint_stack"
+(( migrate_rc != 0 )) || fail "a failed verification exits non-zero"
+[[ "$(result verify-fail)" == "$(printf '%s' "$fingerprint_stack")" ]] || fail "a failed verification restores the original file"
+pass "migration exits non-zero and restores when the write cannot be verified"