Bind protected update commands to their source root

This commit is contained in:
Afonso Oliveira committed 2026-09-07 17:27:04 +01:00
1 parent 5b692c5b30
commit f37c73fa20
6 files changed
+84 -1

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@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ source "${BASH_SOURCE[0]%/*}/omarchy-security-functions" || exit 126
omarchy_security_require_privileged_bash_startup || exit 126 omarchy_security_require_privileged_bash_startup || exit 126
set -e set -e
omarchy_security_sanitize_bash_environment "$0" "$@" omarchy_security_sanitize_bash_environment "$0" "$@"
omarchy_security_require_source_root "$0"
user_path=$PATH user_path=$PATH
omarchy_security_revoke_sudo_timestamp || exit 1 omarchy_security_revoke_sudo_timestamp || exit 1
omarchy_security_install_sudo_cleanup_traps omarchy_security_install_sudo_cleanup_traps
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@@ -44,6 +44,20 @@ omarchy_security_sanitize_bash_environment() {
fi fi
} }
omarchy_security_require_source_root() {
local command_source command_name=${1##*/}
command_source=$(/usr/bin/readlink -e -- "$1") || return 1
# A runtime root selects the code used by this invocation. Accept the
# canonical checkout containing the entrypoint or the package's bin links.
if [[ $OMARCHY_PATH != /* || $(/usr/bin/realpath -e -- "$OMARCHY_PATH") != "$OMARCHY_PATH" ]] ||
! { [[ $command_source == "$OMARCHY_PATH/bin/$command_name" ]] ||
[[ $OMARCHY_PATH == "/usr/share/omarchy" && $command_source == "/usr/bin/$command_name" ]]; }; then
echo "OMARCHY_PATH does not match this Omarchy command." >&2
return 1
fi
}
omarchy_security_sudo_supports_no_update() { omarchy_security_sudo_supports_no_update() {
local help local help
help=$(LC_ALL=C /usr/bin/sudo -h 2>&1) || return 1 help=$(LC_ALL=C /usr/bin/sudo -h 2>&1) || return 1
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@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ source "${BASH_SOURCE[0]%/*}/omarchy-security-functions" || exit 126
omarchy_security_require_privileged_bash_startup || exit 126 omarchy_security_require_privileged_bash_startup || exit 126
set -e set -e
omarchy_security_sanitize_bash_environment "$0" "$@" omarchy_security_sanitize_bash_environment "$0" "$@"
omarchy_security_require_source_root "$0"
# Logging and lock acquisition re-exec this command with a sanitized PATH. # Logging and lock acquisition re-exec this command with a sanitized PATH.
# Preserve the caller's path only for the later unprivileged hook/mise phases. # Preserve the caller's path only for the later unprivileged hook/mise phases.
user_path=${OMARCHY_UPDATE_USER_PATH:-$PATH} user_path=${OMARCHY_UPDATE_USER_PATH:-$PATH}
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@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ source "${BASH_SOURCE[0]%/*}/omarchy-security-functions" || exit 126
omarchy_security_require_privileged_bash_startup || exit 126 omarchy_security_require_privileged_bash_startup || exit 126
set -e set -e
omarchy_security_sanitize_bash_environment "$0" "$@" omarchy_security_sanitize_bash_environment "$0" "$@"
omarchy_security_require_source_root "$0"
omarchy_security_revoke_sudo_timestamp || exit 1 omarchy_security_revoke_sudo_timestamp || exit 1
omarchy_security_install_sudo_cleanup_traps omarchy_security_install_sudo_cleanup_traps
omarchy_security_enable_no_update_sudo omarchy_security_enable_no_update_sudo
+2 -1
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@@ -144,11 +144,12 @@ omarchy-update
Important behavior: Important behavior:
- `omarchy update` uses the session’s `OMARCHY_PATH` and a fixed command search path for its system phases. User PATH is restored behind the sudo wrapper for hooks and mise. - Protected update entrypoints require the session's canonical `OMARCHY_PATH` to match their own checkout or the packaged `/usr/bin` entrypoint before selecting commands or the sudo wrapper. This preserves intentionally trusted development checkouts while rejecting a command paired with a different source root. System phases use a fixed command search path; user PATH is restored behind the sudo wrapper for hooks and mise.
- Mixed-trust update entrypoints start Bash in privileged mode, discard `BASH_ENV`, `ENV`, and exported-function records before launching helpers, and reject an ordinary `bash path/to/command` invocation. Run them as executables (normally through the `omarchy` CLI); `/usr/bin/bash -p path/to/command` is the explicit interpreter form. This keeps shell startup injection from replacing the no-update sudo boundary. - Mixed-trust update entrypoints start Bash in privileged mode, discard `BASH_ENV`, `ENV`, and exported-function records before launching helpers, and reject an ordinary `bash path/to/command` invocation. Run them as executables (normally through the `omarchy` CLI); `/usr/bin/bash -p path/to/command` is the explicit interpreter form. This keeps shell startup injection from replacing the no-update sudo boundary.
- In dev-link mode, `omarchy update` fast-forwards the active checkout from its configured upstream before changing system packages or running migrations. - In dev-link mode, `omarchy update` fast-forwards the active checkout from its configured upstream before changing system packages or running migrations.
- Migrations remain in chronological order even though historical entries mix user-controlled code with later privileged repairs. Before entering that mixed-trust tail, Omarchy invalidates its timestamp and forces every later sudo call—including AUR's configurable sudo command—to use `--no-update`; prompts authorize one command without publishing a reusable timestamp. Yay's credential loop is disabled for the update. - Migrations remain in chronological order even though historical entries mix user-controlled code with later privileged repairs. Before entering that mixed-trust tail, Omarchy invalidates its timestamp and forces every later sudo call—including AUR's configurable sudo command—to use `--no-update`; prompts authorize one command without publishing a reusable timestamp. Yay's credential loop is disabled for the update.
- User-controlled post-update hooks and mise tools run only after every sudo-capable update stage. Omarchy invalidates its sudo timestamp before each boundary and on every exit; detached children therefore have no later reusable update authorization to wait for. - User-controlled post-update hooks and mise tools run only after every sudo-capable update stage. Omarchy invalidates its sudo timestamp before each boundary and on every exit; detached children therefore have no later reusable update authorization to wait for.
- This lifecycle controls authorization created by the protected workflow. `sudo -N` prevents cache updates but can use an existing valid credential, and `sudo -k` revokes the current session's timestamp. It does not isolate the account from unrelated concurrent authentication in another workflow.
- `-y` exports `OMARCHY_UPDATE_UNATTENDED=1` and suppresses Omarchy confirmation prompts. Interactive review steps (orphan removal, conflict handoff) report and skip instead of blocking. Privileged commands still require sudo authorization, and command-scoped authentication can prompt separately for each command. - `-y` exports `OMARCHY_UPDATE_UNATTENDED=1` and suppresses Omarchy confirmation prompts. Interactive review steps (orphan removal, conflict handoff) report and skip instead of blocking. Privileged commands still require sudo authorization, and command-scoped authentication can prompt separately for each command.
- The free-space requirement uses a 10 GiB threshold and stops the update before - The free-space requirement uses a 10 GiB threshold and stops the update before
confirmation when it is not met. If free space cannot be determined, the confirmation when it is not met. If free space cannot be determined, the
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@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
#!/bin/bash
set -euo pipefail
source "$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)/base-test.sh"
source "$SHELL_TEST_DIR/fixtures/sudo-boundary-test.sh"
source "$SUDO_TEST_ROOT/bin/omarchy-security-functions"
rm -f "$SUDO_TEST_ROOT/bin/omarchy-update"
copy_boundary_file bin/omarchy-update
omarchy_security_require_source_root "$SUDO_TEST_ROOT/bin/omarchy-update" || fail "matching checkout root was rejected"
pass "a canonical checkout matches its own entrypoint"
mkdir "$boundary_tmp/other-root"
ln -s "$SUDO_TEST_ROOT" "$boundary_tmp/root-link"
for root in "$boundary_tmp/other-root" "$boundary_tmp/root-link" .; do
if OMARCHY_PATH="$root" omarchy_security_require_source_root "$SUDO_TEST_ROOT/bin/omarchy-update" >"$boundary_tmp/output" 2>&1; then
fail "a different or noncanonical source root was accepted"
fi
done
pass "different, symlink and relative roots are rejected"
# Redirect only the two package-layout literals into the fixture. Resolution
# still uses real readlink/realpath; no host /usr/bin file is changed or run.
package_root="$boundary_tmp/usr/share/omarchy"
package_bin="$boundary_tmp/usr/bin"
mkdir -p "$package_root/bin" "$package_bin"
cp "$SUDO_TEST_ROOT/bin/omarchy-update" "$package_bin/omarchy-update"
cp "$SUDO_TEST_ROOT/bin/omarchy-update" "$package_bin/different-command"
ln -s "$package_bin/omarchy-update" "$package_root/bin/omarchy-update"
python3 - "$SUDO_TEST_ROOT/bin/omarchy-security-functions" "$boundary_tmp/package-library" "$package_root" "$package_bin" <<'PY'
import sys
from pathlib import Path
source, output, root, binaries = sys.argv[1:]
text = Path(source).read_text()
text = text.replace('"/usr/share/omarchy"', f'"{root}"')
text = text.replace('"/usr/bin/$command_name"', f'"{binaries}/$command_name"')
Path(output).write_text(text)
PY
source "$boundary_tmp/package-library"
OMARCHY_PATH="$package_root" omarchy_security_require_source_root "$package_bin/omarchy-update" || fail "package binary was rejected"
OMARCHY_PATH="$package_root" omarchy_security_require_source_root "$package_root/bin/omarchy-update" || fail "package link was rejected"
pass "the package binary and its matching source-tree link are accepted"
ln -sfn "$package_bin/different-command" "$package_root/bin/omarchy-update"
if OMARCHY_PATH="$package_root" omarchy_security_require_source_root "$package_root/bin/omarchy-update" >"$boundary_tmp/output" 2>&1; then
fail "a package link to a different command was accepted"
fi
pass "a package link must resolve to its named command"
# Run the protected entrypoints themselves with a mismatched root. These must
# stop before any sudo or operational fixture command, not merely validate in
# an isolated library test.
for command in omarchy-update omarchy-refresh-pacman omarchy-update-stay-awake; do
rm -f "$SUDO_TEST_ROOT/bin/$command"
copy_boundary_file "bin/$command"
for root in "$boundary_tmp/other-root" .; do
reset_boundary
if OMARCHY_PATH="$root" "$SUDO_TEST_ROOT/bin/$command" >"$boundary_tmp/output" 2>&1; then
fail "$command accepted a mismatched root"
fi
[[ ! -s $SUDO_TEST_LOG ]] || fail "$command ran work before rejecting its root"
done
pass "$command rejects mismatched and relative roots before work"
done