#!/bin/bash # omarchy:summary=Factory-reset this machine back to its freshly-installed state # omarchy:group=setup # omarchy:requires-sudo=true # omarchy:examples=sudo omarchy-system-factory-reset # Returns the machine to provisioning state — fully installed, no user, first-boot # setup pending — the state you want before selling or handing the machine on. # # The running root (@) is swapped for a fresh writable clone of the @factory # snapshot, so user-installed packages and /etc drift are gone too. That # snapshot is taken by the Omarchy Quattro installer, so only machines # installed from that ISO can be reset; a machine upgraded to Quattro from an # earlier version has no baseline to return to and is turned away. # # The heavy lifting happens on the next boot via omarchy-system-factory-reset-finish, staged # here. On encrypted installs the LUKS volume is re-keyed to a throwaway # passphrase with an auto-unlock keyfile for the provisioning window; first-boot setup # re-keys it to the new owner's password and removes the keyfile. A platform # whose boot chain the Limine UKI path can't drive rebuilds, verifies and # unlocks it through omarchy-lifecycle-dispatch. # # Honest limitations: # - On unencrypted disks this is deletion, not forensic erasure. fstrim helps # on SSDs; use blkdiscard + a reinstall if you need certainty. # - LUKS re-keying changes passphrases, not the volume key. Freed extents # remain readable to someone with raw-device access and a valid passphrase. # Use cryptsetup reencrypt or a reinstall if you need certainty. set -euo pipefail PROVISIONING_DIR=/var/lib/omarchy/provisioning PACKAGED_PATH=/usr/bin/omarchy-system-factory-reset OMARCHY_PATH="${OMARCHY_PATH:-/usr/share/omarchy}" TOP_MNT=/run/omarchy-system-factory-reset/top NEXT_NAME=@omarchy-reset-next LOG_FILE=/var/log/omarchy-system-factory-reset.log # Never replace a newer checkout reset with a different installed implementation. if ! /usr/bin/cmp -s -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" "$PACKAGED_PATH"; then echo "Factory reset differs from the installed command. Install the matching Omarchy package before resetting." >&2 exit 1 fi # Self-elevate so the menu entry (and a bare shell invocation) need no sudo # prefix. The caller's gum theme vars are forwarded as `env` arguments rather # than via `sudo -E`, so styling survives even under an env_reset sudoers. # Always elevate the packaged copy, including when invoked from a dev checkout. if (( EUID != 0 )); then mapfile -t gum_env < <(env | grep '^GUM_' || true) exec sudo env "${gum_env[@]}" "$PACKAGED_PATH" "$@" fi export PATH="$OMARCHY_PATH/bin:$PATH" log() { echo "$1" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE" >/dev/null gum style --foreground 8 " $1" } fail() { gum style --foreground 1 "Error: $1" exit 1 } root_device() { findmnt -no SOURCE / | sed 's/\[.*\]//' } root_is_btrfs_at() { [[ $(findmnt -no FSTYPE /) == btrfs ]] && findmnt -no OPTIONS / | grep -q "subvol=/@\(,\|$\)" } DISPATCH="$OMARCHY_PATH/bin/omarchy-lifecycle-dispatch" # A platform whose boot package implements the reset operations rebuilds, # verifies and unlocks the factory root's boot chain itself; everywhere else # the Limine UKI path below does. Deciding fails closed. RESET_BOOT="" reset_boot_owner() { [[ -z $RESET_BOOT ]] || return 0 local operation path found=0 missing=0 for operation in reset-prepare reset-verify reset-commit reset-rollback; do path=$("$DISPATCH" --resolve "$operation") || return 1 if [[ -n $path ]]; then found=$((found + 1)) else missing=$((missing + 1)) fi done if (( missing == 0 )); then RESET_BOOT=platform elif (( found == 0 )); then RESET_BOOT=generic else echo "Error: the boot package implements only some of the factory reset operations" >&2 return 1 fi } # Runs a reset operation with its output in the log. A failure keeps the # operation's last line for the error shown. RESET_BOOT_ERROR="" reset_boot_op() { local output status=0 output=$("$DISPATCH" "$@" 2>&1) || status=$? [[ -z $output ]] || printf '%s\n' "$output" >>"$LOG_FILE" if (( status == 0 )); then return 0 fi RESET_BOOT_ERROR=$(tail -n 1 <<<"$output") RESET_BOOT_ERROR=${RESET_BOOT_ERROR:-"$1 failed"} return 1 } # Resolve the crypto_LUKS partition backing the root, or return non-zero if # the root is not on LUKS. Prefers the cmdline cryptdevice= spec (archinstall # writes PARTUUID=, the pre-mounted path UUID=), and falls back to walking the # device tree for roots reached via rd.luks/crypttab with a plain /dev/mapper # root and no cryptdevice=. luks_device() { local spec spec=$(grep -o 'cryptdevice=[^ :]*' /proc/cmdline | head -1 | cut -d= -f2-) case $spec in UUID=*) echo "/dev/disk/by-uuid/${spec#UUID=}"; return 0 ;; PARTUUID=*) echo "/dev/disk/by-partuuid/${spec#PARTUUID=}"; return 0 ;; LABEL=*) echo "/dev/disk/by-label/${spec#LABEL=}"; return 0 ;; PARTLABEL=*) echo "/dev/disk/by-partlabel/${spec#PARTLABEL=}"; return 0 ;; /dev/*) echo "$spec"; return 0 ;; esac local src part src=$(findmnt -no SOURCE / | sed 's/\[.*//') [[ -n $src ]] || return 1 part=$(lsblk -nsrpo NAME,FSTYPE "$src" 2>/dev/null | awk '$2=="crypto_LUKS"{print $1; exit}') [[ -n $part ]] && { echo "$part"; return 0; } return 1 } encrypted_install() { luks_device >/dev/null 2>&1 } # No trailing `| head` stage: under pipefail an infinite tr killed by # SIGPIPE fails the substitution and errexit aborts the whole reset. generate_passphrase() { local raw raw=$(head -c 4096 /dev/urandom | tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9') printf '%s' "${raw:0:48}" } cleanup() { # Before the switch the old root still boots: the boot package gives it back # its boot state before the reset's throwaway slot is revoked. if [[ ${reset_committed:-0} == 0 && ${RESET_BOOT_PREPARED:-0} == 1 ]]; then reset_boot_op reset-rollback || echo "Error: $RESET_BOOT_ERROR (see $LOG_FILE)" >&2 fi if mountpoint -q "$TOP_MNT" 2>/dev/null; then if [[ -d $TOP_MNT/$NEXT_NAME && ${swap_done:-0} == 0 ]]; then btrfs subvolume delete --recursive "$TOP_MNT/$NEXT_NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true fi umount -R "$TOP_MNT" 2>/dev/null || true fi rmdir "$TOP_MNT" 2>/dev/null || true if [[ ${reset_committed:-0} == 0 ]]; then revoke_reset_luks fi } trap cleanup EXIT confirm_reset() { echo gum style --bold --foreground 1 "Reset this computer to factory state?" echo gum style "This will permanently erase:" gum style " • All user accounts and everything in /home" gum style " • All packages and system changes made since installation" gum style " • Machine identity (network connections, host keys, machine-id)" echo gum style "The next boot asks for a new user, exactly like a fresh install." gum style --foreground 8 "Note: on disks without encryption this is deletion, not secure erasure." echo local typed typed=$(gum input --placeholder "Type 'reset' to continue" --prompt "> ") || exit 1 [[ $typed == "reset" ]] || fail "Reset not confirmed." } # The slot the reset's throwaway key opens, or nothing. Restricting cryptsetup # to a token type no token has keeps an enrolled token from answering for it. reset_luks_slot() { local - set +x LC_ALL=C cryptsetup open --test-passphrase --verbose --token-type passphrase-only \ --key-file <(printf '%s' "$RESET_THROWAWAY") "$RESET_LUKS_DEVICE" 2>&1 | grep -o 'Key slot [0-9]* unlocked' | grep -o '[0-9]*' | head -1 || true } # Add the throwaway slot where the platform's boot package owns the unlock. # Called once reset-verify passed, so a failed rebuild adds no credential. # reset-commit writes the boot-time key only once the factory root is active: # a power loss before the switch leaves the old root asking for its password, # never unlocked unattended. add_reset_luks_slot() { local - set +x [[ -n ${RESET_LUKS_DEVICE:-} && -n ${RESET_LUKS_AUTH:-} && -n ${RESET_THROWAWAY:-} ]] || fail "the reset is missing its throwaway passphrase" RESET_LUKS_ADDED=1 { cryptsetup luksAddKey --key-file <(printf '%s' "$RESET_LUKS_AUTH") "$RESET_LUKS_DEVICE" <(printf '%s' "$RESET_THROWAWAY") ; } 2>>"$LOG_FILE" || fail "could not add the throwaway LUKS keyslot" RESET_LUKS_SLOT=$(reset_luks_slot) [[ -n $RESET_LUKS_SLOT ]] || fail "could not identify the throwaway LUKS keyslot" } # Only the slot this attempt added goes, found by its key if the add was not # confirmed. The platform's boot-time key is written only after activation, so # a failed reset has none to revoke. revoke_reset_luks() { local - set +x [[ ${RESET_LUKS_ADDED:-0} == 1 && -n ${RESET_LUKS_AUTH:-} ]] || return 0 [[ -n ${RESET_LUKS_SLOT:-} ]] || RESET_LUKS_SLOT=$(reset_luks_slot) if [[ -n $RESET_LUKS_SLOT ]]; then { cryptsetup luksKillSlot -q --key-file <(printf '%s' "$RESET_LUKS_AUTH") "$RESET_LUKS_DEVICE" "$RESET_LUKS_SLOT" ; } 2>>"$LOG_FILE" || true else echo "Could not find the reset's throwaway LUKS slot on $RESET_LUKS_DEVICE to revoke; check its keyslots" >>"$LOG_FILE" fi RESET_LUKS_ADDED=0 RESET_LUKS_SLOT="" } # Re-key to a throwaway passphrase whose keyfile auto-unlocks boot during the # provisioning window. $1 is the root of the staged factory system. Where the # platform's boot package owns the unlock, only the staged key is written here: # reset-prepare stages the unlock with the rest of the boot files, and the # throwaway slot follows their verification. stage_luks_rekey() { local next="$1" device passphrase device=$(luks_device) || fail "encrypted install, but no usable cryptdevice= in /proc/cmdline" [[ -e $device ]] || fail "LUKS device $device not found" echo gum style "Confirm your disk encryption passphrase to authorize the re-key." local current while true; do current=$(gum input --password --placeholder "Current disk encryption passphrase" --prompt "Passphrase> ") || exit 1 if cryptsetup open --test-passphrase --token-type passphrase-only --key-file <(printf '%s' "$current") "$device" 2>/dev/null; then break fi gum style --foreground 1 "That passphrase does not unlock $device. Try again." done passphrase=$(generate_passphrase) reset_boot_owner || fail "could not tell how this machine's boot chain is reset" RESET_LUKS_AUTH=$current RESET_LUKS_DEVICE=$device RESET_THROWAWAY=$passphrase if [[ $RESET_BOOT == "generic" ]]; then # Revoked like the platform's slot if the reset fails before activation. RESET_LUKS_ADDED=1 cryptsetup luksAddKey --key-file <(printf '%s' "$current") "$device" <(printf '%s' "$passphrase") fi install -d -m 755 "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR" printf '%s' "$passphrase" >"$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/luks-key" chmod 600 "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/luks-key" [[ $RESET_BOOT == "generic" ]] || return 0 install -d -m 755 "$next/etc/omarchy" printf '%s' "$passphrase" >"$next/etc/omarchy/provisioning.key" chmod 600 "$next/etc/omarchy/provisioning.key" install -d "$next/etc/limine-entry-tool.d" "$next/etc/mkinitcpio.conf.d" echo 'KERNEL_CMDLINE[default]+=" cryptkey=rootfs:/etc/omarchy/provisioning.key"' \ >"$next/etc/limine-entry-tool.d/99-omarchy-provisioning-unlock.conf" echo 'FILES+=(/etc/omarchy/provisioning.key)' \ >"$next/etc/mkinitcpio.conf.d/99-omarchy-provisioning-key.conf" } install_provisioning_units() { local next="$1" unit_src="$2" install -Dm644 "$unit_src/omarchy-provision-owner.service" \ "$next/etc/systemd/system/omarchy-provision-owner.service" install -Dm644 "$unit_src/omarchy-system-factory-reset-finish.service" \ "$next/etc/systemd/system/omarchy-system-factory-reset-finish.service" install -d "$next/etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants" \ "$next/etc/systemd/system/sysinit.target.wants" ln -sf /etc/systemd/system/omarchy-provision-owner.service \ "$next/etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/omarchy-provision-owner.service" ln -sf /etc/systemd/system/omarchy-system-factory-reset-finish.service \ "$next/etc/systemd/system/sysinit.target.wants/omarchy-system-factory-reset-finish.service" } # Start the ESP's limine.conf over from the shipped template and drop the # previous Omarchy identity's state. limine-entry-tool keys OS entries by # machine-id, so after a reset gives the machine a fresh identity, the # previous system's entry (with the now-stale UKI hash) would survive, sort # first, and make Limine refuse the rebuilt UKI with a hash-mismatch warning. # Only machine-ids the old limine.conf referenced are removed — a shared ESP # may hold other installations' machine-id directories. reset_limine_config() { local root="$1" esp="$2" template found="" local old_ids="" if [[ -f $root$esp/limine.conf ]]; then old_ids=$(grep -o 'machine-id=[0-9a-f]\{32\}' "$root$esp/limine.conf" | cut -d= -f2 | sort -u) fi for template in "$root/usr/share/omarchy/install/assets/limine/limine.conf" \ "$root/usr/share/omarchy/default/limine/limine.conf"; do if [[ -f $template ]]; then cp "$template" "$root$esp/limine.conf" found=1 break fi done [[ -n $found ]] || fail "no limine.conf template in $root/usr/share/omarchy" local machine_id old_id machine_id=$(cat "$root/etc/machine-id" 2>/dev/null || true) for old_id in $old_ids; do [[ $old_id == "$machine_id" ]] && continue rm -rf "${root:?}$esp/$old_id" done } # Every UKI entry in limine.conf carries a #blake2b hash of the file it # points at; a mismatch makes Limine stop at a scary warning. Never hand over # a staged reset in that state. verify_limine_hashes() { local root="$1" esp="$2" line path hash file while IFS= read -r line; do path=${line#*boot():} path=${path%%#*} hash=${line##*#} file="$root$esp$path" [[ -f $file ]] || fail "limine.conf points at missing $path" [[ $(b2sum "$file" | cut -d' ' -f1) == "$hash" ]] || fail "limine.conf hash for $path does not match the rebuilt file" done < <(grep -o 'boot():/EFI/Linux/[^#]*#[0-9a-f]*' "$root$esp/limine.conf") } # Rebuild the UKI from inside the next root so the deployed kernel/initramfs # match the factory root's modules (the seller may have updated kernels since # install) and embed the auto-unlock keyfile on encrypted machines. rebuild_next_boot() { local next="$1" reset_boot_owner || fail "could not tell how this machine's boot chain is reset" if [[ $RESET_BOOT == "platform" ]]; then rebuild_next_boot_platform "$next" return fi local esp_source esp_mount esp_mount=$(awk '$3 == "vfat" && $2 ~ /^\/(boot|efi)/ { print $2; exit }' "$next/etc/fstab") esp_source=$(awk '$3 == "vfat" && $2 ~ /^\/(boot|efi)/ { print $1; exit }' "$next/etc/fstab") [[ -n $esp_mount && -n $esp_source ]] || fail "could not find the ESP in $next/etc/fstab" local esp_device=$esp_source if [[ $esp_source == UUID=* ]]; then esp_device="/dev/disk/by-uuid/${esp_source#UUID=}" fi [[ -e $esp_device ]] || fail "ESP device $esp_device not found" mount "$esp_device" "$next$esp_mount" local dir for dir in proc sys dev run; do mount --rbind "/$dir" "$next/$dir" mount --make-rslave "$next/$dir" done # Btrfs snapshots do not recurse into nested subvolumes, so the factory # root carries only an empty /swap directory where the hibernation swapfile # lived. Recreate it and refresh the resume offset before the UKI build # bakes the cmdline; the empty placeholder directory has to go first so the # subvolume can be recreated. if [[ -x $next/usr/bin/omarchy-hibernation-setup ]] && grep -q "/swap/swapfile" "$next/etc/fstab"; then log "Recreating the hibernation swapfile in the factory system" if [[ -d $next/swap ]] && ! btrfs subvolume show "$next/swap" >/dev/null 2>&1; then rmdir "$next/swap" 2>/dev/null || true fi # The factory root still carries the resume drop-ins from install, which # make hibernation-setup conclude it has nothing to do; with the swapfile # gone they must go so it reconfigures from scratch. The resume-offset # drop-in especially: hibernation-setup only recomputes the physical # offset when it is absent, so a surviving one bakes the old swapfile's # offset into the rebuilt UKI and breaks resume. if [[ ! -f $next/swap/swapfile ]]; then rm -f "$next/etc/mkinitcpio.conf.d/omarchy_resume.conf" \ "$next/etc/limine-entry-tool.d/resume.conf" fi if ! chroot "$next" env OMARCHY_PATH=/usr/share/omarchy \ /usr/bin/omarchy-hibernation-setup --force --no-rebuild >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; then fail "hibernation setup failed in the factory root (see $LOG_FILE)" fi [[ -f $next/swap/swapfile ]] || fail "hibernation setup did not recreate $next/swap/swapfile (see $LOG_FILE)" fi reset_limine_config "$next" "$esp_mount" log "Rebuilding boot files from the factory system (this can take a minute)" if ! chroot "$next" /usr/bin/limine-update >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; then fail "limine-update failed in the factory root (see $LOG_FILE)" fi verify_limine_hashes "$next" "$esp_mount" for dir in run dev sys proc; do umount -R "$next/$dir" 2>/dev/null || true done umount "$next$esp_mount" } # The boot package stages the factory root's boot files and unlock, then proves # they boot it; reset-rollback undoes both if the reset fails before the switch. # The throwaway slot is added only once they are proven. rebuild_next_boot_platform() { local next="$1" local -a luks=() [[ -z ${RESET_LUKS_DEVICE:-} ]] || luks=("$RESET_LUKS_DEVICE") RESET_BOOT_PREPARED=1 log "Rebuilding boot files from the factory system (this can take a minute)" reset_boot_op reset-prepare "$next" "${luks[@]}" || fail "$RESET_BOOT_ERROR (see $LOG_FILE)" log "Verifying that the factory system boots" reset_boot_op reset-verify "$next" || fail "$RESET_BOOT_ERROR (see $LOG_FILE)" [[ -z ${RESET_LUKS_DEVICE:-} ]] || add_reset_luks_slot } # Both the staged system and the retained baseline must lose the old hashes. scrub_factory_accounts() { local root="$1" user users users=$(awk -F: '$3 >= 1000 && $3 < 60000 { print $1 }' "$root/etc/passwd") || return 1 for user in $users; do userdel --root "$root" "$user" 2>>"$LOG_FILE" || return 1 rm -rf "${root:?}/home/$user" || return 1 done # passwd --lock preserves the hash. Replace it, then remove the backups # that userdel and usermod leave behind. usermod --root "$root" --password '!' root >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || return 1 rm -f "$root/etc/"{shadow-,gshadow-,passwd-,group-,subuid-,subgid-} } # Remove the seller's account material and machine identity from the retained # @factory baseline so it can neither be mounted for recovery nor restore the # seller's account on a future reset. Idempotent (a scrubbed baseline has no # uid>=1000 accounts left to remove). sanitize_factory_baseline() { local factory="$1" btrfs property set -ts "$factory" ro false if [[ -d $factory/var/lib/omarchy/thunderbolt-authorization || -f $factory/etc/omarchy/thunderbolt-authorization.enabled || -f $factory/etc/omarchy/thunderbolt-authorization.pending ]]; then if ! /usr/bin/omarchy-thunderbolt-authorization-admin reset-root "$factory"; then btrfs property set -ts "$factory" ro true fail "could not reset Thunderbolt authorization in the factory baseline" fi fi if ! scrub_factory_accounts "$factory"; then btrfs property set -ts "$factory" ro true fail "could not remove account credentials from the factory baseline (see $LOG_FILE)" fi rm -f "$factory"/etc/ssh/ssh_host_* rm -f "$factory"/etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/* rm -rf "$factory"/var/lib/NetworkManager/* "$factory/var/lib/tailscale" "$factory/var/lib/iwd" rm -f "$factory/var/lib/sddm/state.conf" "$factory/etc/sddm.conf.d/autologin.conf" : >"$factory/etc/machine-id" btrfs property set -ts "$factory" ro true } stage_full_reset() { local top="$TOP_MNT" next="$TOP_MNT/$NEXT_NAME" log "Cloning the factory snapshot" [[ -d $next ]] && btrfs subvolume delete --recursive "$next" >/dev/null btrfs subvolume snapshot "$top/@factory" "$next" >>"$LOG_FILE" local unit_src="$next/usr/share/omarchy/install/provisioning" [[ -f $unit_src/omarchy-provision-owner.service && -x $next/usr/bin/omarchy-provision-owner ]] || fail "the factory snapshot predates provisioning support; cannot reset from it" # A normal install's factory snapshot includes the original owner's USB # policy and enabled daemon. Keep input usable during the new owner's setup; # provisioning enrolls their devices before enabling USBGuard again. if [[ -f $next/usr/lib/systemd/system/usbguard.service ]]; then systemctl --root="$next" disable usbguard.service >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || fail "could not disable USBGuard in the factory system (see $LOG_FILE)" fi log "Scrubbing machine identity from the factory system" systemd-id128 new >"$next/etc/machine-id" rm -f "$next"/etc/ssh/ssh_host_* rm -f "$next"/etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/* rm -rf "$next"/var/lib/NetworkManager/* "$next/var/lib/tailscale" "$next/var/lib/iwd" rm -f "$next/var/lib/sddm/state.conf" "$next/etc/sddm.conf.d/autologin.conf" # A factory snapshot from a normal install contains the original # user account; first-boot setup must start from none. A leftover account # would keep its password hash and group memberships (including wheel), so # failure here has to abort the reset, not be shrugged off. log "Removing account credentials from the factory system" scrub_factory_accounts "$next" || fail "could not remove account credentials from the factory system (see $LOG_FILE)" # Leave the new owner's input available before interactive enrollment. Clear # inherited accessory identities in both roots; never change the live daemon. if [[ -d $next/var/lib/omarchy/thunderbolt-authorization || -f $next/etc/omarchy/thunderbolt-authorization.enabled || -f $next/etc/omarchy/thunderbolt-authorization.pending ]]; then /usr/bin/omarchy-thunderbolt-authorization-admin reset-root "$next" || fail "could not reset Thunderbolt authorization in the staged root" fi # @factory itself survives the wipe as the baseline for future resets. If it # came from a normal install it still holds the seller's account and # /etc/shadow, which the new wheel user could mount and read — and a second # reset would restore that account. Scrub it once, in place. sanitize_factory_baseline "$top/@factory" # Keep the Node tarball reachable for offline first-boot finalization. if ! compgen -G "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/packages/node-v*.tar.gz" >/dev/null; then if compgen -G "$PROVISIONING_DIR/packages/node-v*.tar.gz" >/dev/null; then install -d -m 755 "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/packages" cp "$PROVISIONING_DIR"/packages/node-v*.tar.gz "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/packages/" fi fi install -d -m 755 "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR" touch "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/pending" "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/wipe-pending" install_provisioning_units "$next" "$unit_src" if encrypted_install; then stage_luks_rekey "$next" fi rebuild_next_boot "$next" log "Activating the factory system" local old="@omarchy-old-$(date +%s)" mv "$top/@" "$top/$old" # Until the factory root is at @ the reset is not committed: cleanup has the # platform's boot package roll its boot state back to the old root and # revokes the throwaway slot, so the old root goes back to @ first. if ! mv "$next" "$top/@"; then if mv "$top/$old" "$top/@"; then [[ $RESET_BOOT == "platform" ]] || fail "could not activate the factory system; the current root is back at @, but its boot files were already rebuilt from the factory system: run 'sudo limine-update' before rebooting (see $LOG_FILE)" fail "could not activate the factory system; the current root is back at @ (see $LOG_FILE)" fi # Neither root is at @. Keep the staged one as well for recovery. swap_done=1 fail "could not activate the factory system or put the current root back; from a live USB, mount the Btrfs top level, rename $old to @, and rebuild its boot files if it does not boot" fi # From here the old root is gone, so the reset's unlock must survive. reset_committed=1 swap_done=1 sync # The boot package that prepared the reset gets the key on standard input, # never in arguments. A failure costs the first boot one prompt for the # current disk password. if [[ ${RESET_BOOT_PREPARED:-0} == 1 ]] && ! reset_boot_op reset-commit < <(printf '%s' "${RESET_THROWAWAY:-}"); then log "$RESET_BOOT_ERROR" fi } # A reset is a clone of @factory, so a machine without one has nothing to # return to. Only the Quattro installer takes that snapshot. require_factory_snapshot() { [[ -d $TOP_MNT/@factory ]] && return 0 echo gum style --bold --foreground 3 "This machine has no factory snapshot to reset to." echo gum style "A reset restores the @factory snapshot the Omarchy Quattro installer takes" gum style "right after installing. Machines upgraded to Quattro from an earlier version," gum style "or installed some other way, never got one, so there is no baseline here to" gum style "return to." echo gum style --foreground 8 "Reinstall from the Omarchy ISO to make this machine resettable." exit 1 } main() { omarchy-cmd-present btrfs || { echo "Error: btrfs-progs is required" >&2; exit 1; } root_is_btrfs_at || fail "reset requires the standard Omarchy Btrfs layout (subvol=@)" touch "$LOG_FILE" chmod 600 "$LOG_FILE" swap_done=0 local device device=$(root_device) [[ -n $device ]] || fail "could not determine the root device" mkdir -p "$TOP_MNT" mountpoint -q "$TOP_MNT" || mount -o subvolid=5 "$device" "$TOP_MNT" require_factory_snapshot # Decided before anything is asked: a platform whose boot package is missing # stops here, with the dispatcher's error naming the package. reset_boot_owner || fail "this machine's boot package cannot factory-reset it" confirm_reset # The running system's limine-snapper-sync must not rewrite the ESP's # limine.conf behind the staged rebuild (subvolume changes below can # trigger it). The runtime mask evaporates on the reboot that follows. systemctl mask --runtime --now limine-snapper-sync.service >/dev/null 2>&1 || true systemctl mask --runtime --now limine-snapper-sync.path >/dev/null 2>&1 || true stage_full_reset umount -R "$TOP_MNT" 2>/dev/null || true echo gum style --bold "Reset staged. The wipe finishes on the next boot." if gum confirm --affirmative "Reboot now" --negative "Reboot later" "Reboot to complete the reset?"; then systemctl reboot else gum style --foreground 3 "Do not keep using this machine — changes made now will be lost." fi } main "$@"