Keep the target user's local bin on user-scoped upgrade paths while giving privileged lock and firewall helpers only root-owned search directories. Pin the lock helper's root PATH and fprintd-list executable, with regression coverage for each defense independently. Reported-by: Rooke Poole <rookpool97@gmail.com>
207 lines
8.3 KiB
Bash
207 lines
8.3 KiB
Bash
#!/bin/bash
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set -euo pipefail
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source "$(cd -- "$(dirname -- "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)/base-test.sh"
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apply_lock="$ROOT/bin/omarchy-apply-lock"
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root_path_guard=$(awk '
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/^if \(\( EUID == 0 \)\); then$/ { inside = 1 }
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inside { print }
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inside && /^fi$/ { exit }
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' "$apply_lock")
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grep -Fx ' export PATH=/usr/share/omarchy/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin' <<<"$root_path_guard" >/dev/null ||
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fail "the root lock helper replaces its inherited command path"
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if grep -E '(\.local/bin|target_user|target_home)' <<<"$root_path_guard" >/dev/null; then
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fail "the root lock helper does not retain a user-controlled command directory"
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fi
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pass "the root lock helper uses only trusted command directories"
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grep -F '[[ -x /usr/bin/fprintd-list ]]' "$apply_lock" >/dev/null ||
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fail "the lock helper checks the trusted fprintd-list executable"
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grep -F '/usr/bin/fprintd-list "$target_user"' "$apply_lock" >/dev/null ||
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fail "the lock helper invokes fprintd-list by its trusted absolute path"
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if grep -F 'omarchy-cmd-present fprintd-list' "$apply_lock" >/dev/null ||
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grep -E '(^|[[:space:];&|])fprintd-list([[:space:]]|$)' "$apply_lock" >/dev/null ||
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grep -E 'command[[:space:]]+-v[[:space:]]+fprintd-list' "$apply_lock" >/dev/null; then
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fail "the lock helper does not resolve fprintd-list through PATH"
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fi
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pass "the lock helper pins fprintd-list to its packaged system path"
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# Exercise the helper as real root when the suite already has it, or as root in
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# an unprivileged user namespace otherwise. A hardened kernel can disable user
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# namespaces, so preserve the static coverage above and skip only this probe.
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root_runner=()
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root_runtime_available=1
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if (( EUID != 0 )); then
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if command -v unshare >/dev/null && unshare --user --map-root-user true 2>/dev/null; then
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root_runner=(unshare --user --map-root-user)
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else
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root_runtime_available=0
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fi
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fi
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if (( ! root_runtime_available )); then
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pass "no unprivileged user namespace; skipping the root lock-helper lookup matrix"
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exit 0
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fi
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# Retarget the two PAM files, the trusted fprintd-list binary, and the final
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# shell status query in copies under this scratch directory. The production
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# files and service stay untouched even when this suite itself runs as root.
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test_tmp=$(mktemp -d)
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trap 'rm -rf "$test_tmp"' EXIT
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poison_bin="$test_tmp/poison-bin"
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trusted_root_bin="$test_tmp/trusted-root-bin"
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trusted_fprintd="$test_tmp/trusted-fprintd-list"
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password_pam="$test_tmp/omarchy-lock-password"
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fingerprint_pam="$test_tmp/omarchy-lock-fingerprint"
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attack_marker="$test_tmp/user-fprintd-list-ran"
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trusted_uid="$test_tmp/trusted-fprintd-list.uid"
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trusted_args="$test_tmp/trusted-fprintd-list.args"
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attack_args="$test_tmp/user-fprintd-list.args"
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patched_helper="$test_tmp/omarchy-apply-lock-patched"
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absolute_only_helper="$test_tmp/omarchy-apply-lock-absolute-only"
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root_path_only_helper="$test_tmp/omarchy-apply-lock-root-path-only"
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unprotected_helper="$test_tmp/omarchy-apply-lock-unprotected"
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target_user=omarchy-regression-user
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mkdir -p "$poison_bin" "$trusted_root_bin"
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# The runtime copy pins to this isolated root path. It contains every bare
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# command the exercised helper needs, but deliberately no fprintd-list.
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for helper in grep rm tee; do
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ln -s "/usr/bin/$helper" "$trusted_root_bin/$helper"
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done
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export TEST_ATTACK_ARGS="$attack_args"
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export TEST_ATTACK_MARKER="$attack_marker"
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export TEST_TRUSTED_ARGS="$trusted_args"
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export TEST_TRUSTED_UID="$trusted_uid"
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cat >"$trusted_fprintd" <<'EOF'
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#!/bin/bash
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printf '%s\n' "$EUID" >"$TEST_TRUSTED_UID"
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printf '%s\n' "$*" >"$TEST_TRUSTED_ARGS"
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echo "Fingerprints are enrolled"
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EOF
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cat >"$poison_bin/fprintd-list" <<'EOF'
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#!/bin/bash
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printf '%s\n' "$EUID" >"$TEST_ATTACK_MARKER"
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printf '%s\n' "$*" >"$TEST_ATTACK_ARGS"
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echo "Fingerprints are enrolled"
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EOF
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chmod +x "$trusted_fprintd" "$poison_bin/fprintd-list"
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prepare_helper() {
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local destination="$1" keep_root_path="$2" use_absolute_fprintd="$3"
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awk \
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-v password_pam="$password_pam" \
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-v fingerprint_pam="$fingerprint_pam" \
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-v trusted_root_bin="$trusted_root_bin" \
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-v trusted_fprintd="$trusted_fprintd" \
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-v keep_root_path="$keep_root_path" \
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-v use_absolute_fprintd="$use_absolute_fprintd" '
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{
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line = $0
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gsub("/etc/pam\\.d/omarchy-lock-password", "\"" password_pam "\"", line)
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gsub("/etc/pam\\.d/omarchy-lock-fingerprint", "\"" fingerprint_pam "\"", line)
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if (line == "if (( EUID == 0 )); then" && keep_root_path == 0) {
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print "if (( 0 )); then"
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next
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}
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if (line == " export PATH=/usr/share/omarchy/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin") {
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print " export PATH=\"" trusted_root_bin "\""
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next
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}
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if (line == "if [[ -x /usr/bin/fprintd-list ]] &&") {
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if (use_absolute_fprintd == 1) {
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print "if [[ -x \"" trusted_fprintd "\" ]] &&"
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} else {
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print "if command -v fprintd-list >/dev/null 2>&1 &&"
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}
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next
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}
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if (line == " /usr/bin/fprintd-list \"$target_user\" 2>/dev/null | grep -qi finger; then") {
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if (use_absolute_fprintd == 1) {
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print " \"" trusted_fprintd "\" \"$target_user\" 2>/dev/null | grep -qi finger; then"
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} else {
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print " fprintd-list \"$target_user\" 2>/dev/null | grep -qi finger; then"
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}
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next
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}
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if (line == "if omarchy-shell lock status >/dev/null 2>&1; then") {
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print "if false; then"
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next
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}
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print line
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}
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' "$apply_lock" >"$destination"
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chmod +x "$destination"
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}
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prepare_helper "$patched_helper" 1 1
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prepare_helper "$absolute_only_helper" 0 1
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prepare_helper "$root_path_only_helper" 1 0
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prepare_helper "$unprotected_helper" 0 0
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for helper in "$patched_helper" "$absolute_only_helper" "$root_path_only_helper" "$unprotected_helper"; do
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if grep -F '/etc/pam.d/' "$helper" >/dev/null ||
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grep -F '/usr/bin/fprintd-list' "$helper" >/dev/null ||
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grep -F 'omarchy-shell lock status' "$helper" >/dev/null; then
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fail "the isolated root fixture redirects every live-system lock-helper target"
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fi
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done
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reset_runtime_files() {
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rm -f "$password_pam" "$fingerprint_pam" "$trusted_uid" "$trusted_args" "$attack_marker" "$attack_args"
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}
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run_as_root() {
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local helper="$1" description="$2" output
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if ! output=$(PATH="$poison_bin:/usr/bin:/bin" OMARCHY_INSTALL_USER="$target_user" \
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"${root_runner[@]}" /bin/bash "$helper" 2>&1); then
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fail "$description" "$output"
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fi
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}
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reset_runtime_files
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run_as_root "$patched_helper" "the fully hardened lock helper runs in an isolated root context"
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[[ ! -e $attack_marker ]] || fail "the hardened root lock helper executes the user-planted fprintd-list"
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grep -Fx '0' "$trusted_uid" >/dev/null || fail "the trusted fprintd-list probe runs with EUID 0"
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grep -Fx "$target_user" "$trusted_args" >/dev/null || fail "the trusted fprintd-list probe receives the target user"
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[[ -s $password_pam && -s $fingerprint_pam ]] ||
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fail "the isolated root lock-helper run writes both scratch PAM fixtures"
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pass "the hardened root lock helper uses the trusted fingerprint probe"
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reset_runtime_files
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run_as_root "$absolute_only_helper" "the absolute-path-only lock helper runs in an isolated root context"
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[[ ! -e $attack_marker ]] || fail "an absolute fprintd-list path permits the user-planted command"
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grep -Fx '0' "$trusted_uid" >/dev/null || fail "the absolute-path defense runs the trusted probe as root"
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pass "the absolute fprintd-list path independently blocks the user-planted command"
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reset_runtime_files
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run_as_root "$root_path_only_helper" "the root-PATH-only lock helper runs in an isolated root context"
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[[ ! -e $attack_marker ]] || fail "the trusted root path permits the user-planted fprintd-list"
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pass "the trusted root path independently blocks the user-planted command"
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# Mutation control: removing both protections must execute the planted command
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# as UID 0, proving the matrix detects the original privilege-boundary failure.
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reset_runtime_files
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run_as_root "$unprotected_helper" "the unprotected mutation runs in an isolated root context"
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grep -Fx '0' "$attack_marker" >/dev/null ||
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fail "the root lock-helper fixture detects a PATH-resolved fprintd-list regression"
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grep -Fx "$target_user" "$attack_args" >/dev/null ||
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fail "the planted fprintd-list receives the target user"
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[[ -s $fingerprint_pam ]] || fail "the planted fprintd-list controls the fingerprint PAM branch"
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pass "the root lock-helper matrix rejects the vulnerable PATH lookup"
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