* Detect Elan match-on-chip fingerprint readers again
Elan readers report "ELAN:ARM-M4" as their product string, so the
*fingerprint* and *biometric* checks miss them. Elan's 04f3 is also left
out of the vendor list on purpose, because Elan makes touchscreens too.
Both checks fail, so the machine looks like it has no reader.
Add "elan:arm-m4" to the product string check. The comment above the
vendor list already says the excluded vendors should still match there,
so this makes that true. The vendor list and its has_kernel_driver guard
are unchanged, and touchscreens still cannot cause a false positive.
The string is a family name, not one device. libfprint uses it for
04f3:0c9c and 04f3:0ca7 as well as 04f3:0ca8.
Tested on an HP EliteBook X G2i with 04f3:0ca8.
* Point the Elan comment at the vendor list above it
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Configure PAM only after a fingerprint enrolls and verifies
Detection proves a reader is present, not that libfprint can drive it.
Elan MOC sensors outside the elanmoc table pass the gate and then fail
to enroll, which left pam_fprintd in the sudo and polkit stacks with no
print to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A Dell XPS 14 with no fingerprint reader was invited to set one up on first
run. Its Synaptics webcam bridge, 06cb:0701 "SVP7500" bound to usbio-bridge,
matched omarchy-hw-fingerprint on the bare 06cb vendor ID.
The vendor list already excludes Elan and STMicro for being multi-purpose, but
Synaptics is just as multi-purpose and was left in. Dropping 06cb is not an
option: Synaptics and Validity are among the most common real reader vendors,
and many of those readers report no product string at all, so the vendor ID is
the only signal that finds them.
The vendor guess is now qualified instead. libfprint drives every reader it
supports from userspace over libusb, so a real reader sits with no kernel
driver bound to any of its interfaces, while the bridges, touchpads and cameras
that share these vendor IDs all bind one. The guard applies only to the fuzzy
vendor-ID path; a device whose product descriptor names it a fingerprint reader
is still trusted outright, since that signal is precise enough on its own and
should not be lost to a driver that happened to claim the device.
The menu entry was a second surface for the same bug. Setup > Security >
Fingerprint carried no when clause, unlike the Remove entry beside it, so it
appeared on every machine and dead-ended in the setup script's own hardware
check. It now gates on the same detector.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017q97Rsk8KwgaPUVq5ArLgM
Add a first-run notification, alongside the keybindings/Wi-Fi toasts, that
invites anyone with a fingerprint sensor to enable it. Clicking launches
omarchy-setup-security-fingerprint in a floating terminal.
Detection lives in a new omarchy-hw-fingerprint helper that reads sysfs
(device product descriptor plus a fingerprint-vendor allowlist), so it
works before fprintd/usbutils are installed and without nagging machines
that have no reader. The setup script reuses the same helper as an early
gate, bailing before installing any packages when no reader is found
(replacing the old post-install fprintd-list probe).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
