cups-browsed is the daemon that watches the network and creates print queues by itself. Hardening it took a root daemon with a predictable cache down to a confined service account, but a daemon that turns anything advertising itself on the network into a print queue is a lot of exposure for a convenience, so it comes out of the default install while that is reworked. Only the discovery half: CUPS itself stays and printing keeps working, with each printer added by hand in Print Settings.
The migration disables the unit before removing the package because that is the only order that works: pacman deletes the unit file but not the enable symlink, and once the unit is gone systemd can no longer resolve it by name to clean that up.
It then removes the queues discovery generated. cups-browsed keeps those when it stops, since KeepGeneratedQueuesOnShutdown defaults to Yes, and they route through its own implicitclass backend, which goes with the package, so they cannot print again. Idle ones go. A queue with jobs on it is left alone and named: implicitclass only needs cups-browsed to choose a destination, so a job already past that point finishes on its own, and deleting the queue would abort it. One printer's job does not hold up the removal. A printer added by hand has an ipp:// or usb:// device and is left where it is.
A queue whose jobs cannot be asked about is left alone rather than assumed idle, including one named so that lpstat would misread it -- "all" is its word for every destination, and a leading dash or a comma reads as another option or a list.
Where CUPS does not answer at all, or a queue will not delete, discovery is still stopped but the package stays and no marker is written. omarchy-migrate records a migration for the user as soon as it exits zero, so that is where the machine stays until someone removes the package by hand, and the message says so rather than implying a retry.
The queue list is read under LC_ALL=C because lpstat translates "device for", and captured rather than piped, so a cupsd it cannot reach is reported instead of reading like a machine with nothing to clean up.
It removes with plain pacman -R rather than omarchy-pkg-drop, which passes -n and would discard /etc/cups/cups-browsed.conf instead of keeping it as a .pacsave. A removal meant to be temporary should not delete the machine's copy of its own configuration. Without -s either, so it only ever removes the package it names: sweeping newly unneeded dependencies is nothing today, but it is not a promise a rolling dependency graph can keep.
Queue names come off the network, since cups-browsed names its queues after what the printer advertised. CUPS allows every printable character but space, tab, / and #, and lpstat and lpadmin take a destination as an option value, so a name with a leading dash or a comma is reported rather than passed to them and guessed at.
Migration state is per user, so a machine-wide marker records the one removal. Without it, an account whose first migration run came after someone deliberately reinstalled discovery would quietly take it back out again.
The install-time override for cups-browsed.conf now waits for cups-browsed rather than for CUPS. Guarding it on a file CUPS still ships would write a configuration file for a package nothing installed, and pacman would later land the package's own copy beside it as a .pacnew.
The hardened configuration stays in the tree. omarchy-settings still ships the cups-browsed.conf override, the sysusers account and the service drop-in, so they are what discovery returns onto.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
Run cups-browsed as a locked service account with a dedicated cache and a focused systemd sandbox. Restrict automatic queues to driverless IPP printers, remove wheel from passwordless CUPS administration, replace cups-pdf with Polkit-backed setup, and migrate existing systems safely.
Reported-By: Erik Hunstad (Bad Sector Labs)
Co-Authored-By: Daybreak Blue <noreply@openai.com>
* Don't put the user in the docker group; make it opt-in
The docker group is root-equivalent: anything in it can `docker run -v /:/host`
and rewrite the host as root with no password. On a single-user box that's not
an escalation (the owner is already a wheel/sudo user), but it hands any code
running as the user — a rogue plugin, a poisoned dependency — a silent, headless,
passwordless path to root that sudo's password prompt would otherwise gate.
Stop granting the docker group by default. The daemon still runs (docker.socket);
the Docker TUI and the Windows VM reach it through a polkit prompt, and the plain
`docker` CLI runs under sudo. Sudoless Docker is a warned opt-in via
Setup > Security (omarchy-setup-security-sudoless-docker).
No automatic path may re-grant it: install and first-boot provisioning never
record or apply the group (provisioning also filters a docker line left in an
older factory snapshot), and the Quattro upgrade no longer adds it.
The Windows VM keeps needing the root daemon for a privileged container (KVM,
NET_ADMIN), so it is reworked to run without the group and without becoming a new
way in:
- The compose lives in a root-owned dir and is only written by an elevated,
input-validated writer. A root-invoked bring-up must never consume a file a
user-process could rewrite to bind-mount / into the guest — the old
~/.config/windows compose was exactly that. Volume paths are rebuilt from
$HOME on migration rather than trusted from the (user-writable) legacy file,
path validation rejects traversal, and the privileged sub-action is checked
against an allowlist before dispatch (a slash in it would otherwise run as a
path).
- pkexec elevates a verified root-owned command path, not a PATH-resolved one,
so an authorized prompt can't be redirected to an attacker's binary.
- The guest password is kept in a private 0600 per-user file for RDP instead of
a world-readable compose, and a declined authorization is reported as such,
never as a completed stop.
Existing installs auto-migrate the VM (no redownload) and refresh the stale
Docker launcher entry.
🤖 Generated by Opus 4.8 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
* Migrate existing installs off the docker group
The default flip only reaches new installs; existing users keep their docker
group membership and stay exposed. Extend the migration that already refreshes
the Docker launcher to also remove the current user from the group when present,
reusing omarchy-remove-security-sudoless-docker so there is one source of truth
for the change and its notice. It takes effect at next login (the current
session keeps working), and passwordless docker can be turned back on from
Setup > Security > Sudoless Docker.
Migrations run with sudo available — during `omarchy update`, or in the terminal
the pending-migrations notification opens — so the privileged removal does not
prompt at an unattended login. The no-op path (already out of the group) needs
no privilege.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
* Refuse symlinked VM mount sources; correct the docker CLI docs
Review follow-ups.
valid_path keeps a traversal string (/./, //, ..) out of the compose, but it is
a string check: a symlink planted at ~/.windows or ~/Windows redirects the
privileged bind mount exactly as traversal would, because docker follows it. So
verify the mount sources as root immediately before bringing the VM up — refuse
a source that is a symlink or resolves through one — which is where the string
check cannot help. A missing source stays fine (docker creates a plain dir).
Also correct the development-tools manual: the CLI is not transparently elevated
(there is no docker wrapper and `d` is still plain docker), so say plainly that
docker on the command line takes `sudo` until sudoless Docker is enabled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
---------
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>