* Don't put the user in the docker group; make it opt-in
The docker group is root-equivalent: anything in it can `docker run -v /:/host`
and rewrite the host as root with no password. On a single-user box that's not
an escalation (the owner is already a wheel/sudo user), but it hands any code
running as the user — a rogue plugin, a poisoned dependency — a silent, headless,
passwordless path to root that sudo's password prompt would otherwise gate.
Stop granting the docker group by default. The daemon still runs (docker.socket);
the Docker TUI and the Windows VM reach it through a polkit prompt, and the plain
`docker` CLI runs under sudo. Sudoless Docker is a warned opt-in via
Setup > Security (omarchy-setup-security-sudoless-docker).
No automatic path may re-grant it: install and first-boot provisioning never
record or apply the group (provisioning also filters a docker line left in an
older factory snapshot), and the Quattro upgrade no longer adds it.
The Windows VM keeps needing the root daemon for a privileged container (KVM,
NET_ADMIN), so it is reworked to run without the group and without becoming a new
way in:
- The compose lives in a root-owned dir and is only written by an elevated,
input-validated writer. A root-invoked bring-up must never consume a file a
user-process could rewrite to bind-mount / into the guest — the old
~/.config/windows compose was exactly that. Volume paths are rebuilt from
$HOME on migration rather than trusted from the (user-writable) legacy file,
path validation rejects traversal, and the privileged sub-action is checked
against an allowlist before dispatch (a slash in it would otherwise run as a
path).
- pkexec elevates a verified root-owned command path, not a PATH-resolved one,
so an authorized prompt can't be redirected to an attacker's binary.
- The guest password is kept in a private 0600 per-user file for RDP instead of
a world-readable compose, and a declined authorization is reported as such,
never as a completed stop.
Existing installs auto-migrate the VM (no redownload) and refresh the stale
Docker launcher entry.
🤖 Generated by Opus 4.8 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
* Migrate existing installs off the docker group
The default flip only reaches new installs; existing users keep their docker
group membership and stay exposed. Extend the migration that already refreshes
the Docker launcher to also remove the current user from the group when present,
reusing omarchy-remove-security-sudoless-docker so there is one source of truth
for the change and its notice. It takes effect at next login (the current
session keeps working), and passwordless docker can be turned back on from
Setup > Security > Sudoless Docker.
Migrations run with sudo available — during `omarchy update`, or in the terminal
the pending-migrations notification opens — so the privileged removal does not
prompt at an unattended login. The no-op path (already out of the group) needs
no privilege.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
* Refuse symlinked VM mount sources; correct the docker CLI docs
Review follow-ups.
valid_path keeps a traversal string (/./, //, ..) out of the compose, but it is
a string check: a symlink planted at ~/.windows or ~/Windows redirects the
privileged bind mount exactly as traversal would, because docker follows it. So
verify the mount sources as root immediately before bringing the VM up — refuse
a source that is a symlink or resolves through one — which is where the string
check cannot help. A missing source stays fine (docker creates a plain dir).
Also correct the development-tools manual: the CLI is not transparently elevated
(there is no docker wrapper and `d` is still plain docker), so say plainly that
docker on the command line takes `sudo` until sudoless Docker is enabled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
---------
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
* Keep the bar mapped while hidden so revealing it is instant
Hiding the bar set the panel invisible, which unmaps the layer surface and
releases the scene graph with it. Every reveal then had to rebuild all of
it: a new layer surface, a configure roundtrip, re-shaped glyphs and
re-uploaded textures, and a first frame before anything appeared.
Measured on a 2560x1440 screen, showing took 155-175ms against 20ms to
hide, and 400-595ms on the first reveal after a cold start. Splitting the
cost showed the exclusive-zone reflow was not to blame: show latency was
the same on an empty workspace as on a tiled one, and windows finished
moving ~15ms after the bar was already on screen.
Park the bar one bar-width past its anchored edge instead, and drop its
exclusion zone while hidden. The surface stays alive, so showing is only
a margin change: 10-14ms in both directions, at every bar position.
Since a hidden bar is now mapped, layer_present no longer proves the bar
is visible; the session acceptance test asserts on-screen geometry.
* Fix layer visibility checks on offset monitors
* Handle rotated outputs in layer visibility checks
* Cover hidden bar behavior in acceptance tests
---------
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
* Stop pipefail from turning grep -q SIGPIPE exits into false negatives
grep -q exits at the first match, and when the producer is still writing
it dies with SIGPIPE. Under pipefail that 141 becomes the pipeline's
status, so hardware checks like lspci | grep -q read as "not found" on
exactly the machines they target. The T2 defaults migration hit this and
silently skipped real T2 Macs (#6608).
Redirect grep to /dev/null instead of -q wherever a pipeline feeds grep
in a pipefail context, so grep reads all input and the producer never
gets killed. The install-time T2 checks aren't run under pipefail today
but are switched too, since they're the same detection line the issue
calls out.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Re-run the T2 defaults migration its broken hardware check skipped
The SIGPIPE bug marked 1785944594 as applied without doing anything on
affected T2 Macs. The original migration is idempotent, so a fresh
migration can just source it now that the guard is fixed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Address Copilot review: fix OCR grep pipeline and prove the T2 repair
screen_contains piped tesseract into grep -Fqi under the acceptance
suite's pipefail, the same SIGPIPE false negative the rest of the branch
fixes. The T2 test's lspci stub now keeps writing past the pipe buffer
after the match so every scenario exercises the SIGPIPE case, and a new
case runs the rerun migration against fixtures a bitten install would
have.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Dismiss bar panels when clicking on another monitor
* Preserve keyboard focus for reopened panels
* Harden cross-monitor panel dismissal
* Wait for panel mapping before releasing focus
---------
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
Runs inside a live Omarchy session (typically a VM installed by
omarchy-iso-test) and verifies the desktop actually works: session
health, application launches by window class, and shell surfaces via
IPC — including typing into the launcher and launching the top hit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
