* Add OEM first-boot setup and factory reset An OEM-mode ISO install (or omarchy-reset-computer) leaves the machine in OEM state: fully installed, no user, /var/lib/omarchy/oem/pending armed. On the next boot omarchy-oem-setup.service runs the configurator's user form on tty1, creates the user with the groups system setup recorded, finalizes it offline from the stashed Node tarball, re-keys LUKS from the throwaway install passphrase to the user's password, and hands off to SDDM. omarchy-reset-computer returns a machine to that state: it swaps the running root for a fresh clone of the @factory snapshot the ISO takes at install time, scrubs machine identity and prior users, and stages omarchy-factory-wipe to drop the old root and recreate @home/@log on the next boot. Machines installed before @factory existed get a degraded reset (current system kept, users and state wiped) with that caveat surfaced in the confirmation. omarchy-setup-system/-hardware gain --oem to run without an install user; the group-granting install scripts now record their groups in /var/lib/omarchy/oem/groups and only call usermod when the user exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Harden OEM setup: correct cryptsetup key-file usage, retry on failure cryptsetup reads --test-passphrase/--key-file inputs byte-for-byte, so feed passphrases through process substitution consistently instead of positional args or stdin (which has different newline semantics). Run each first-boot setup attempt as its own process so a failure offers a retry instead of stranding the machine at a user-less login screen — bash ignores errexit inside `while !` conditions, a child process does not. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Always grant wheel sudo in OEM first-boot setup Detecting an existing %wheel grant by grepping sudoers is error-prone: omarchy ships narrow '%wheel ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: <command>' rules (e.g. asdcontrol) that match the naive pattern, which left the OEM-created user matching sudoers entries but unable to run anything. Write the drop-in unconditionally — a duplicate of an existing full grant is harmless. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix LUKS re-key device resolution and OEM state readability archinstall's encrypted installs put cryptdevice=PARTUUID=... on the kernel cmdline, not UUID=, so the first-boot re-key never found its device and silently skipped — leaving the throwaway auto-unlock keyfile in place, i.e. the disk effectively unencrypted. Parse every cryptdevice= source spec form and make any re-key failure abort the attempt loudly: a retry prompt beats a machine that quietly boots without a passphrase forever. The OEM state directory also has to be world-readable (its one secret, luks-key, stays 0600): user finalization reads the stashed Node tarball as the new user, and the 0700 directory forced it onto the network fallback. Step markers now land in /var/log/omarchy-oem-setup.log for debuggability. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Purge stale machine-id boot entries when resetting or re-keying limine-entry-tool keys its limine.conf OS entries by machine-id. A factory reset gives the machine a fresh identity, so the previous system's entry survived every rebuild, sorted first, and made Limine stop at a Blake2b hash-mismatch warning once the UKI was rebuilt. Start limine.conf over from the shipped template (and drop foreign machine-id history directories on the ESP) before any post-reset rebuild: in the staged chroot rebuild, in the first-boot LUKS re-key, and — for unencrypted resets, where nothing else rebuilds — in a dedicated first-boot refresh when foreign entries are found. The staged rebuild also verifies every UKI hash referenced by limine.conf against the file on the ESP before the subvolume swap, and the running system's limine-snapper-sync is runtime-masked during staging so it cannot rewrite the config behind the rebuild. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Harden reset and first-boot setup failure paths Review findings from codex and Copilot: - Generate throwaway passphrases without a trailing head stage: under pipefail, SIGPIPE from the infinite tr failed the substitution and errexit aborted every encrypted reset before it could stage anything. - Stage the fallible parts of a degraded reset (LUKS re-key, boot rebuild) before arming the wipe, so a staging failure leaves the machine untouched instead of scheduling a wipe for a reset that never finished. - Gate first-boot setup on the factory wipe having succeeded (ConditionPathExists=!wipe-pending plus an in-script guard): creating the new user on a half-wiped system would hand their data to the wipe retry. - Abort the wipe (keeping its retry marker) when deleting the old root or recreating @home/@log fails, and abort resets that cannot remove a prior account — a surviving account keeps its password and wheel membership. - Resume a partially-created account on setup retry instead of rejecting the username the failed attempt just created. - Only purge machine-id directories the old limine.conf actually referenced; a shared ESP may hold other installations' boot artifacts. - Recreate the hibernation swapfile (nested subvolume, so never captured by the factory snapshot) inside the factory root before its UKI rebuild, so a reset machine keeps disk-backed swap and a valid resume offset. - Source base-test.sh in the OEM groups test per test conventions. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Recreate the hibernation swapfile even when resume drop-ins survive omarchy-hibernation-setup short-circuits as 'already set up' when the resume mkinitcpio drop-in exists — which it always does in a factory root, while the swapfile itself never survives the snapshot (nested subvolume). Drop the marker when the swapfile is gone so setup reconfigures from scratch, and verify the swapfile actually exists before proceeding with the reset. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Second review pass: encrypted-config coverage, factory-baseline sanitization, recoverable rekey Codex xhigh round 2: - Detect the LUKS backing device by walking the root's device tree, not only the cmdline cryptdevice=; reset/first-boot now re-key roots reached via rd.luks/crypttab too, instead of silently leaving the seller's slots valid. - Sanitize the retained @factory baseline (accounts, /etc/shadow, machine identity) during a full reset: the new wheel user could otherwise mount it to recover the seller's data, and a second reset would restore the account. - Re-key the disk recoverably: rebuild the no-auto-unlock UKI before killing the throwaway slot or destroying the staged key, and restore the keyfile if that rebuild fails, so a retry with a different password can never leave the disk locked to the first attempt's password. - Roll back a degraded reset's live-root auto-unlock material if its boot rebuild fails, instead of leaving it for a later rebuild to embed. - Treat a missing current-machine limine entry as stale so a retry after a failed rebuild repairs the config instead of clearing OEM state over it. - Erase fingerprint enrollments (/var/lib/fprint) in degraded wipes. - Remove the resume-offset drop-in too when recreating the factory swapfile, so the rebuilt UKI gets a correct offset. - Pin first-boot retries to the account the first attempt created. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Expose factory reset in the Setup menu Add a 'Reset Computer' entry under Setup (Omarchy's Settings menu, where OS factory resets conventionally live), guarded to btrfs roots and launched in a floating terminal. omarchy-reset-computer now self-elevates via sudo so the menu entry needs no sudo prefix, forwarding the caller's gum theme env as env arguments so styling survives an env_reset sudoers. The typed 'reset' confirmation and the sudo password prompt remain as the guards against accidental triggering. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Defer keyboard selection to first boot for OEM installs The OEM first-boot setup now runs a keyboard step before the user form, mirroring the ISO configurator: it loads the chosen layout on the live VT so the password (and the LUKS re-key that follows) are typed under it, and persists it with systemd-firstboot so the installed system gets both the console KEYMAP and the XKB layout Hyprland reads — exactly what a normal install writes. Layouts localectl doesn't know keep the default, same as the installer. This lets the OEM operator set nothing user-specific: the machine's owner picks their keyboard alongside their account at first boot. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Rename factory-reset commands to omarchy-system-factory-reset[-finish] omarchy-reset-computer -> omarchy-system-factory-reset omarchy-factory-wipe -> omarchy-system-factory-reset-finish (and its systemd unit, log path, and temp mount to match) Pure rename: every reference — the Setup menu action, the first-boot finish service the reset stages and enables, the oem-setup ordering/gating, comments, and the menu test — moves together, with no behavior change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Rename OEM vocabulary to provisioning (runtime) Commands unify under the provisioning family: omarchy-oem-setup → omarchy-provision-owner omarchy-finalize-user → omarchy-provision-user omarchy-first-run → omarchy-provision-first-run And the deferred-provisioning state/vocabulary replaces 'OEM': /var/lib/omarchy/oem/ → /var/lib/omarchy/provisioning/ /etc/omarchy/oem.key → /etc/omarchy/provisioning.key install/oem/ → install/provisioning/ OMARCHY_SETUP_CONTEXT=oem-firstboot → provision-owner omarchy-setup-system/-hardware --oem → --defer-provisioning All callers (provision-first-run→provision-user, autostart, factory-reset staging the provisioning units, the group-recording scripts) and comments move together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Drop remaining OEM mentions from the provisioning groups test Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Finish the omarchy-first-run rename in the docs Two doc references to omarchy-first-run were missed when the script was renamed to omarchy-provision-first-run; update them to match. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
481 lines
19 KiB
Bash
Executable File
481 lines
19 KiB
Bash
Executable File
#!/bin/bash
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# omarchy:summary=Factory-reset this machine back to its freshly-installed state
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# omarchy:group=setup
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# omarchy:requires-sudo=true
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# omarchy:examples=sudo omarchy-system-factory-reset
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# Returns the machine to provisioning state — fully installed, no user, first-boot
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# setup pending — the state you want before selling or handing the machine on.
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#
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# On machines installed with an ISO that created the @factory snapshot, the
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# running root (@) is swapped for a fresh writable clone of @factory, so
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# user-installed packages and /etc drift are gone too. Machines without
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# @factory get a degraded reset: the current system is kept and only user
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# accounts, home data, and machine identity are wiped.
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#
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# The heavy lifting happens on the next boot via omarchy-system-factory-reset-finish, staged
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# here. On encrypted installs the LUKS volume is re-keyed to a throwaway
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# passphrase with an auto-unlock keyfile for the provisioning window; first-boot setup
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# re-keys it to the new owner's password and removes the keyfile.
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#
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# Honest limitations:
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# - On unencrypted disks this is deletion, not forensic erasure. fstrim helps
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# on SSDs; use blkdiscard + a reinstall if you need certainty.
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# - LUKS re-keying changes passphrases, not the volume key. Freed extents
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# remain readable to someone with raw-device access and a valid passphrase.
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# Use cryptsetup reencrypt or a reinstall if you need certainty.
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set -euo pipefail
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PROVISIONING_DIR=/var/lib/omarchy/provisioning
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OMARCHY_PATH="${OMARCHY_PATH:-/usr/share/omarchy}"
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TOP_MNT=/run/omarchy-system-factory-reset/top
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NEXT_NAME=@omarchy-reset-next
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LOG_FILE=/var/log/omarchy-system-factory-reset.log
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# Self-elevate so the menu entry (and a bare shell invocation) need no sudo
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# prefix. The caller's gum theme vars are forwarded as `env` arguments rather
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# than via `sudo -E`, so styling survives even under an env_reset sudoers.
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if (( EUID != 0 )); then
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mapfile -t gum_env < <(env | grep '^GUM_' || true)
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exec sudo env "${gum_env[@]}" "$0" "$@"
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fi
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export PATH="$OMARCHY_PATH/bin:$PATH"
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log() {
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echo "$1" | tee -a "$LOG_FILE" >/dev/null
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gum style --foreground 8 " $1"
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}
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fail() {
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gum style --foreground 1 "Error: $1"
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exit 1
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}
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root_device() {
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findmnt -no SOURCE / | sed 's/\[.*\]//'
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}
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root_is_btrfs_at() {
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[[ $(findmnt -no FSTYPE /) == btrfs ]] && findmnt -no OPTIONS / | grep -q "subvol=/@\(,\|$\)"
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}
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# Resolve the crypto_LUKS partition backing the root, or return non-zero if
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# the root is not on LUKS. Prefers the cmdline cryptdevice= spec (archinstall
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# writes PARTUUID=, the pre-mounted path UUID=), and falls back to walking the
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# device tree for roots reached via rd.luks/crypttab with a plain /dev/mapper
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# root and no cryptdevice=.
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luks_device() {
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local spec
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spec=$(grep -o 'cryptdevice=[^ :]*' /proc/cmdline | head -1 | cut -d= -f2-)
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case $spec in
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UUID=*) echo "/dev/disk/by-uuid/${spec#UUID=}"; return 0 ;;
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PARTUUID=*) echo "/dev/disk/by-partuuid/${spec#PARTUUID=}"; return 0 ;;
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LABEL=*) echo "/dev/disk/by-label/${spec#LABEL=}"; return 0 ;;
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PARTLABEL=*) echo "/dev/disk/by-partlabel/${spec#PARTLABEL=}"; return 0 ;;
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/dev/*) echo "$spec"; return 0 ;;
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esac
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local src part
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src=$(findmnt -no SOURCE / | sed 's/\[.*//')
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[[ -n $src ]] || return 1
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part=$(lsblk -nspo NAME,FSTYPE "$src" 2>/dev/null | awk '$2=="crypto_LUKS"{print $1; exit}')
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[[ -n $part ]] && { echo "$part"; return 0; }
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return 1
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}
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encrypted_install() {
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luks_device >/dev/null 2>&1
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}
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# No trailing `| head` stage: under pipefail an infinite tr killed by
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# SIGPIPE fails the substitution and errexit aborts the whole reset.
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generate_passphrase() {
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local raw
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raw=$(head -c 4096 /dev/urandom | tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9')
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printf '%s' "${raw:0:48}"
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}
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cleanup() {
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if (( ${swap_done:-0} == 0 )); then
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rollback_degraded_rekey
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fi
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if mountpoint -q "$TOP_MNT" 2>/dev/null; then
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if [[ -d $TOP_MNT/$NEXT_NAME && ${swap_done:-0} == 0 ]]; then
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btrfs subvolume delete --recursive "$TOP_MNT/$NEXT_NAME" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
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fi
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umount -R "$TOP_MNT" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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rmdir "$TOP_MNT" 2>/dev/null || true
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}
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trap cleanup EXIT
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confirm_reset() {
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local degraded="$1"
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echo
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gum style --bold --foreground 1 "Reset this computer to factory state?"
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echo
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gum style "This will permanently erase:"
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gum style " • All user accounts and everything in /home"
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if [[ $degraded == true ]]; then
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gum style --foreground 3 " • Machine identity (network connections, host keys, machine-id)"
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echo
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gum style --foreground 3 "This machine was installed before factory snapshots existed, so the"
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gum style --foreground 3 "current system (installed packages, /etc changes) is kept — only user"
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gum style --foreground 3 "accounts and machine state are wiped."
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else
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gum style " • All packages and system changes made since installation"
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gum style " • Machine identity (network connections, host keys, machine-id)"
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fi
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echo
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gum style "The next boot asks for a new user, exactly like a fresh install."
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gum style --foreground 8 "Note: on disks without encryption this is deletion, not secure erasure."
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echo
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local typed
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typed=$(gum input --placeholder "Type 'reset' to continue" --prompt "> ") || exit 1
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[[ $typed == "reset" ]] || fail "Reset not confirmed."
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}
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# Re-key to a throwaway passphrase whose keyfile auto-unlocks boot during the
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# provisioning window. $1 is the root of the system the staging applies to ("" for the
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# running root in degraded mode).
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stage_luks_rekey() {
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local next="$1" device passphrase
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device=$(luks_device) || fail "encrypted install, but no usable cryptdevice= in /proc/cmdline"
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[[ -e $device ]] || fail "LUKS device $device not found"
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echo
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gum style "Confirm your disk encryption passphrase to authorize the re-key."
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local current
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while true; do
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current=$(gum input --password --placeholder "Current disk encryption passphrase" --prompt "Passphrase> ") || exit 1
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if cryptsetup open --test-passphrase --key-file <(printf '%s' "$current") "$device" 2>/dev/null; then
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break
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fi
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gum style --foreground 1 "That passphrase does not unlock $device. Try again."
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done
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passphrase=$(generate_passphrase)
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cryptsetup luksAddKey --key-file <(printf '%s' "$current") "$device" <(printf '%s' "$passphrase")
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install -d -m 755 "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR"
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printf '%s' "$passphrase" >"$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/luks-key"
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chmod 600 "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/luks-key"
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install -d -m 755 "$next/etc/omarchy"
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printf '%s' "$passphrase" >"$next/etc/omarchy/provisioning.key"
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chmod 600 "$next/etc/omarchy/provisioning.key"
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install -d "$next/etc/limine-entry-tool.d" "$next/etc/mkinitcpio.conf.d"
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echo 'KERNEL_CMDLINE[default]+=" cryptkey=rootfs:/etc/omarchy/provisioning.key"' \
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>"$next/etc/limine-entry-tool.d/99-omarchy-provisioning-unlock.conf"
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echo 'FILES+=(/etc/omarchy/provisioning.key)' \
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>"$next/etc/mkinitcpio.conf.d/99-omarchy-provisioning-key.conf"
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}
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install_provisioning_units() {
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local next="$1" unit_src="$2"
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install -Dm644 "$unit_src/omarchy-provision-owner.service" \
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"$next/etc/systemd/system/omarchy-provision-owner.service"
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install -Dm644 "$unit_src/omarchy-system-factory-reset-finish.service" \
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"$next/etc/systemd/system/omarchy-system-factory-reset-finish.service"
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install -d "$next/etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants" \
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"$next/etc/systemd/system/sysinit.target.wants"
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ln -sf /etc/systemd/system/omarchy-provision-owner.service \
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"$next/etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/omarchy-provision-owner.service"
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ln -sf /etc/systemd/system/omarchy-system-factory-reset-finish.service \
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"$next/etc/systemd/system/sysinit.target.wants/omarchy-system-factory-reset-finish.service"
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}
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# Start the ESP's limine.conf over from the shipped template and drop the
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# previous Omarchy identity's state. limine-entry-tool keys OS entries by
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# machine-id, so after a reset gives the machine a fresh identity, the
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# previous system's entry (with the now-stale UKI hash) would survive, sort
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# first, and make Limine refuse the rebuilt UKI with a hash-mismatch warning.
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# Only machine-ids the old limine.conf referenced are removed — a shared ESP
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# may hold other installations' machine-id directories.
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reset_limine_config() {
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local root="$1" esp="$2" template found=""
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local old_ids=""
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if [[ -f $root$esp/limine.conf ]]; then
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old_ids=$(grep -o 'machine-id=[0-9a-f]\{32\}' "$root$esp/limine.conf" | cut -d= -f2 | sort -u)
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fi
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for template in "$root/usr/share/omarchy/install/assets/limine/limine.conf" \
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"$root/usr/share/omarchy/default/limine/limine.conf"; do
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if [[ -f $template ]]; then
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cp "$template" "$root$esp/limine.conf"
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found=1
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break
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fi
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done
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[[ -n $found ]] || fail "no limine.conf template in $root/usr/share/omarchy"
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local machine_id old_id
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machine_id=$(cat "$root/etc/machine-id" 2>/dev/null || true)
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for old_id in $old_ids; do
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[[ $old_id == "$machine_id" ]] && continue
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rm -rf "${root:?}$esp/$old_id"
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done
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}
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# Every UKI entry in limine.conf carries a #blake2b hash of the file it
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# points at; a mismatch makes Limine stop at a scary warning. Never hand over
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# a staged reset in that state.
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verify_limine_hashes() {
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local root="$1" esp="$2" line path hash file
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while IFS= read -r line; do
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path=${line#*boot():}
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path=${path%%#*}
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hash=${line##*#}
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file="$root$esp$path"
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[[ -f $file ]] || fail "limine.conf points at missing $path"
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[[ $(b2sum "$file" | cut -d' ' -f1) == "$hash" ]] ||
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fail "limine.conf hash for $path does not match the rebuilt file"
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done < <(grep -o 'boot():/EFI/Linux/[^#]*#[0-9a-f]*' "$root$esp/limine.conf")
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}
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# Rebuild the UKI from inside the next root so the deployed kernel/initramfs
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# match the factory root's modules (the seller may have updated kernels since
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# install) and embed the auto-unlock keyfile on encrypted machines.
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rebuild_next_boot() {
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local next="$1"
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local esp_source esp_mount
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esp_mount=$(awk '$3 == "vfat" && $2 ~ /^\/(boot|efi)/ { print $2; exit }' "$next/etc/fstab")
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esp_source=$(awk '$3 == "vfat" && $2 ~ /^\/(boot|efi)/ { print $1; exit }' "$next/etc/fstab")
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[[ -n $esp_mount && -n $esp_source ]] || fail "could not find the ESP in $next/etc/fstab"
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local esp_device=$esp_source
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if [[ $esp_source == UUID=* ]]; then
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esp_device="/dev/disk/by-uuid/${esp_source#UUID=}"
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fi
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[[ -e $esp_device ]] || fail "ESP device $esp_device not found"
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mount "$esp_device" "$next$esp_mount"
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local dir
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for dir in proc sys dev run; do
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mount --rbind "/$dir" "$next/$dir"
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mount --make-rslave "$next/$dir"
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done
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# Btrfs snapshots do not recurse into nested subvolumes, so the factory
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# root carries only an empty /swap directory where the hibernation swapfile
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# lived. Recreate it and refresh the resume offset before the UKI build
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# bakes the cmdline; the empty placeholder directory has to go first so the
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# subvolume can be recreated.
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if [[ -x $next/usr/bin/omarchy-hibernation-setup ]] && grep -q "/swap/swapfile" "$next/etc/fstab"; then
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log "Recreating the hibernation swapfile in the factory system"
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if [[ -d $next/swap ]] && ! btrfs subvolume show "$next/swap" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
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rmdir "$next/swap" 2>/dev/null || true
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fi
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# The factory root still carries the resume drop-ins from install, which
|
|
# make hibernation-setup conclude it has nothing to do; with the swapfile
|
|
# gone they must go so it reconfigures from scratch. The resume-offset
|
|
# drop-in especially: hibernation-setup only recomputes the physical
|
|
# offset when it is absent, so a surviving one bakes the old swapfile's
|
|
# offset into the rebuilt UKI and breaks resume.
|
|
if [[ ! -f $next/swap/swapfile ]]; then
|
|
rm -f "$next/etc/mkinitcpio.conf.d/omarchy_resume.conf" \
|
|
"$next/etc/limine-entry-tool.d/resume.conf"
|
|
fi
|
|
if ! chroot "$next" env OMARCHY_PATH=/usr/share/omarchy \
|
|
/usr/bin/omarchy-hibernation-setup --force --no-rebuild >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; then
|
|
fail "hibernation setup failed in the factory root (see $LOG_FILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
[[ -f $next/swap/swapfile ]] ||
|
|
fail "hibernation setup did not recreate $next/swap/swapfile (see $LOG_FILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
reset_limine_config "$next" "$esp_mount"
|
|
|
|
log "Rebuilding boot files from the factory system (this can take a minute)"
|
|
if ! chroot "$next" /usr/bin/limine-update >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; then
|
|
fail "limine-update failed in the factory root (see $LOG_FILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
verify_limine_hashes "$next" "$esp_mount"
|
|
|
|
for dir in run dev sys proc; do
|
|
umount -R "$next/$dir" 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
done
|
|
umount "$next$esp_mount"
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Remove the seller's account material and machine identity from the retained
|
|
# @factory baseline so it can neither be mounted for recovery nor restore the
|
|
# seller's account on a future reset. Idempotent (a scrubbed baseline has no
|
|
# uid>=1000 accounts left to remove).
|
|
sanitize_factory_baseline() {
|
|
local factory="$1" user
|
|
btrfs property set -ts "$factory" ro false
|
|
|
|
for user in $(awk -F: '$3 >= 1000 && $3 < 60000 { print $1 }' "$factory/etc/passwd"); do
|
|
userdel --root "$factory" "$user" 2>>"$LOG_FILE" || true
|
|
rm -rf "${factory:?}/home/$user"
|
|
done
|
|
passwd --root "$factory" --lock root >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true
|
|
rm -f "$factory"/etc/ssh/ssh_host_*
|
|
rm -f "$factory"/etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/*
|
|
rm -rf "$factory"/var/lib/NetworkManager/* "$factory/var/lib/tailscale" "$factory/var/lib/iwd"
|
|
rm -f "$factory/var/lib/sddm/state.conf" "$factory/etc/sddm.conf.d/autologin.conf"
|
|
: >"$factory/etc/machine-id"
|
|
|
|
btrfs property set -ts "$factory" ro true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
stage_full_reset() {
|
|
local top="$TOP_MNT" next="$TOP_MNT/$NEXT_NAME"
|
|
|
|
log "Cloning the factory snapshot"
|
|
[[ -d $next ]] && btrfs subvolume delete --recursive "$next" >/dev/null
|
|
btrfs subvolume snapshot "$top/@factory" "$next" >>"$LOG_FILE"
|
|
|
|
local unit_src="$next/usr/share/omarchy/install/provisioning"
|
|
[[ -f $unit_src/omarchy-provision-owner.service && -x $next/usr/bin/omarchy-provision-owner ]] ||
|
|
fail "the factory snapshot predates provisioning support; cannot reset from it"
|
|
|
|
log "Scrubbing machine identity from the factory system"
|
|
systemd-id128 new >"$next/etc/machine-id"
|
|
rm -f "$next"/etc/ssh/ssh_host_*
|
|
rm -f "$next"/etc/NetworkManager/system-connections/*
|
|
rm -rf "$next"/var/lib/NetworkManager/* "$next/var/lib/tailscale" "$next/var/lib/iwd"
|
|
rm -f "$next/var/lib/sddm/state.conf" "$next/etc/sddm.conf.d/autologin.conf"
|
|
|
|
# A factory snapshot from a normal (normal) install contains the original
|
|
# user account; first-boot setup must start from none. A leftover account
|
|
# would keep its password hash and group memberships (including wheel), so
|
|
# failure here has to abort the reset, not be shrugged off.
|
|
local user
|
|
for user in $(awk -F: '$3 >= 1000 && $3 < 60000 { print $1 }' "$next/etc/passwd"); do
|
|
log "Removing user $user from the factory system"
|
|
userdel --root "$next" "$user" 2>>"$LOG_FILE" ||
|
|
fail "could not remove user $user from the factory system (see $LOG_FILE)"
|
|
done
|
|
passwd --root "$next" --lock root >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true
|
|
|
|
# @factory itself survives the wipe as the baseline for future resets. If it
|
|
# came from a normal install it still holds the seller's account and
|
|
# /etc/shadow, which the new wheel user could mount and read — and a second
|
|
# reset would restore that account. Scrub it once, in place.
|
|
sanitize_factory_baseline "$top/@factory"
|
|
|
|
# Keep the Node tarball reachable for offline first-boot finalization.
|
|
if ! compgen -G "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/packages/node-v*.tar.gz" >/dev/null; then
|
|
if compgen -G "$PROVISIONING_DIR/packages/node-v*.tar.gz" >/dev/null; then
|
|
install -d -m 755 "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/packages"
|
|
cp "$PROVISIONING_DIR"/packages/node-v*.tar.gz "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/packages/"
|
|
fi
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
install -d -m 755 "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR"
|
|
touch "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/pending" "$next$PROVISIONING_DIR/wipe-pending"
|
|
|
|
install_provisioning_units "$next" "$unit_src"
|
|
|
|
if encrypted_install; then
|
|
stage_luks_rekey "$next"
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
rebuild_next_boot "$next"
|
|
|
|
log "Activating the factory system"
|
|
local old="@omarchy-old-$(date +%s)"
|
|
mv "$top/@" "$top/$old"
|
|
mv "$next" "$top/@"
|
|
swap_done=1
|
|
sync
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
stage_degraded_reset() {
|
|
local unit_src="$OMARCHY_PATH/install/provisioning"
|
|
[[ -f $unit_src/omarchy-provision-owner.service && -x /usr/bin/omarchy-provision-owner ]] ||
|
|
fail "this Omarchy version does not ship provisioning; update first"
|
|
|
|
# Fallible staging (re-key, boot rebuild) happens before the wipe is armed:
|
|
# a failure must leave the machine untouched, not schedule a wipe for a
|
|
# reset that never finished staging. The degraded path stages into the LIVE
|
|
# root, so a mid-staging failure must also undo the auto-unlock material it
|
|
# already wrote — otherwise a later boot rebuild would silently embed it.
|
|
install -d -m 755 "$PROVISIONING_DIR"
|
|
if encrypted_install; then
|
|
degraded_rekey_staged=1
|
|
stage_luks_rekey ""
|
|
log "Rebuilding boot files with the provisioning unlock key"
|
|
if ! limine-update >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1; then
|
|
fail "limine-update failed (see $LOG_FILE)"
|
|
fi
|
|
degraded_rekey_staged=0
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
install_provisioning_units "" "$unit_src"
|
|
touch "$PROVISIONING_DIR/pending" "$PROVISIONING_DIR/wipe-pending" "$PROVISIONING_DIR/wipe-degraded"
|
|
|
|
swap_done=1
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Undo the live-root auto-unlock material a failed degraded rekey left behind.
|
|
rollback_degraded_rekey() {
|
|
(( ${degraded_rekey_staged:-0} )) || return 0
|
|
rm -f /etc/omarchy/provisioning.key "$PROVISIONING_DIR/luks-key" \
|
|
/etc/limine-entry-tool.d/99-omarchy-provisioning-unlock.conf \
|
|
/etc/mkinitcpio.conf.d/99-omarchy-provisioning-key.conf
|
|
limine-update >>"$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
main() {
|
|
command -v gum >/dev/null || { echo "Error: gum is required" >&2; exit 1; }
|
|
command -v btrfs >/dev/null || { echo "Error: btrfs-progs is required" >&2; exit 1; }
|
|
|
|
root_is_btrfs_at || fail "reset requires the standard Omarchy Btrfs layout (subvol=@)"
|
|
|
|
touch "$LOG_FILE"
|
|
chmod 600 "$LOG_FILE"
|
|
swap_done=0
|
|
|
|
local device
|
|
device=$(root_device)
|
|
[[ -n $device ]] || fail "could not determine the root device"
|
|
|
|
mkdir -p "$TOP_MNT"
|
|
mountpoint -q "$TOP_MNT" || mount -o subvolid=5 "$device" "$TOP_MNT"
|
|
|
|
local degraded=false
|
|
[[ -d $TOP_MNT/@factory ]] || degraded=true
|
|
|
|
confirm_reset "$degraded"
|
|
|
|
# The running system's limine-snapper-sync must not rewrite the ESP's
|
|
# limine.conf behind the staged rebuild (subvolume changes below can
|
|
# trigger it). The runtime mask evaporates on the reboot that follows.
|
|
systemctl mask --runtime --now limine-snapper-sync.service >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
|
systemctl mask --runtime --now limine-snapper-sync.path >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
|
|
|
|
if [[ $degraded == true ]]; then
|
|
stage_degraded_reset
|
|
else
|
|
stage_full_reset
|
|
fi
|
|
|
|
umount -R "$TOP_MNT" 2>/dev/null || true
|
|
|
|
echo
|
|
gum style --bold "Reset staged. The wipe finishes on the next boot."
|
|
if gum confirm --affirmative "Reboot now" --negative "Reboot later" "Reboot to complete the reset?"; then
|
|
systemctl reboot
|
|
else
|
|
gum style --foreground 3 "Do not keep using this machine — changes made now will be lost."
|
|
fi
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
main "$@"
|