Hard fork of xai-org/grok-build (Apache-2.0) re-targeted as Kigi, an
unofficial Kimi Code CLI community build.
Rename & identity
- 72 xai-*/xai-grok-* crates -> kigi-* (explicit: xai-grok-pager-bin ->
kigi-bin [binary `kigi`], xai-grok-pager -> kigi-tui; rest mechanical);
ptyctl, ptyctl-cli, third_party/ unchanged; proto package
xai.grok.tools.v1 -> kigi.tools.v1
- Config home ~/.kigi (KIGI_SHARE_DIR override), env prefix GROK_* ->
KIGI_*, `kigi --version` carries the unofficial-community-build notice
- clap identity, help text, startup banner, prompt templates rebranded
(templates re-encrypted)
Deletions (PRD removal list #5/#6/#7/#9/#10)
- voice input (xai-grok-voice) and all TUI wiring
- telemetry: Mixpanel client, external OTel stream, Sentry, OTLP layers,
trace/GCS/S3 upload queues (kigi-file-utils halved), workspace upload
module & dc_log, heap-profile uploader, auth-diagnostics uploader,
session-analytics halves of feedback; local zero-egress observability
preserved in new kigi-log crate (unified log, --debug firehose,
subsystem file logs, opt-in instrumentation)
- announcements (crate, remote-settings fields, TUI surfaces)
- plugin marketplace (crate, sources/browse/CTA/extensions-modal tab);
direct plugin install/uninstall/update via kigi-agent git_install kept
- relay/gateway/assets endpoints and features (agent relay, headless
relay transport, gateway bridge, LeaderEnvUrls); leader IPC socket now
~/.kigi/leader.sock + KIGI_LEADER_SOCKET, no ws-url derivation
- functional types rehomed instead of deleted: PermissionMode ->
kigi-config-types, McpInitStrategy -> kigi-mcp, PrCreationSource ->
session signals, TerminalDiagnostics -> kigi-pager-render, agent_id ->
shell util
Endpoints
- kigi-env rewritten: single production KigiEndpoints {coding_api_base_url
https://api.kimi.com/coding/v1 (KIGI_CODE_BASE_URL), oauth_host
https://auth.kimi.com (KIGI_OAUTH_HOST), update_base_url (GitHub
Releases API), upgrade_page_url}; GrokBuildEnvironment enum deleted
Toolchain & workspace hygiene
- Rust 1.97.0 pinned; edition 2024; full cargo update; git2 hoisted to
workspace at 0.21 (Option->Result API migration), quick-xml 0.41
- Root Cargo.toml hand-maintained (PRD §8.1): version 0.1.0 inherited by
all members, members sorted, unused deps pruned
- cargo-deny advisories gate (deny.toml with documented transitive
exceptions); CI workflow (check/clippy/fmt/deny/test, macOS+Linux)
- cross-crate test seams re-gated behind `test-support` cargo feature;
insta snapshot baselines renamed to the kigi_tui prefix
- clippy --workspace --all-targets: zero warnings; fmt clean
Fixes surfaced by the port
- updater probe/installer divergence (bin/kigi vs bin/grok symlink set)
- idle model-metadata refresh dead under KIGI_CODE_BASE_URL override
(new is_effective_coding_endpoint_url, loopback+override aware)
- macOS symlinked-TMPDIR fixture canonicalization (foreign_sessions,
fast-worktree); RSS measurement tests serialized via serial_test
Docs & legal (Apache §4)
- NOTICE added (upstream attribution + change statement); THIRD-PARTY
notices sustained; kigi-tools ported-code notices extended; README,
CONTRIBUTING, SECURITY, AGENTS.md rewritten
Out of scope for M0 (tracked): Kimi auth/inference (M1), search/fetch,
command parity, config import (M2), Computer Hub excision & final
brand-token sweep (M2), distribution & self-update rewrite (M3).
106 lines
3.6 KiB
Rust
106 lines
3.6 KiB
Rust
//! Integration tests for kigi-sandbox.
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//!
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//! Note: `Sandbox::apply()` is irreversible and process-wide, so we cannot
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//! test actual kernel enforcement in standard `#[test]` functions (they share
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//! a process). Use the `sandbox_smoke_test` example for enforcement testing.
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//! These tests verify the API contracts, config loading, and support detection.
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// `support_info` is only available with the `enforce` feature (it returns a
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// nono type), so gate this test the same way.
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#[test]
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#[cfg(all(feature = "enforce", unix))]
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fn test_support_info() {
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// Verify that nono can report platform support status without applying
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let support = kigi_sandbox::SandboxManager::support_info();
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// On macOS and Linux 5.13+, this should be supported
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// On other platforms, it gracefully reports unsupported
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println!(
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"Sandbox support: supported={}, details={}",
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support.is_supported, support.details
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);
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// We don't assert is_supported because CI may run on any platform
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}
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// `to_capability_set` is only available with the `enforce` feature.
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#[test]
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#[cfg(all(feature = "enforce", unix))]
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fn test_profile_capability_set_construction() {
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use kigi_sandbox::ProfileName;
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// Use CWD as workspace — guaranteed to exist
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let workspace = std::env::current_dir().expect("cwd");
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// All profiles should produce valid CapabilitySets without panicking
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for profile in [
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ProfileName::Workspace,
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ProfileName::ReadOnly,
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ProfileName::Strict,
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ProfileName::Off,
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] {
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let result = profile.to_capability_set(&workspace);
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assert!(
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result.is_ok(),
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"Profile {:?} failed to build CapabilitySet: {:?}",
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profile,
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result.err()
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);
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_sandbox_manager_lifecycle() {
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use kigi_sandbox::{ProfileName, SandboxManager};
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let workspace = std::env::current_dir().expect("cwd");
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// Off profile: apply should succeed without actually sandboxing
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let mut manager = SandboxManager::new(ProfileName::Off, &workspace);
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assert!(!manager.is_applied());
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assert!(!manager.restrict_child_network());
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let result = manager.apply(&workspace);
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assert!(result.is_ok());
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// Off profile doesn't actually apply
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assert!(!manager.is_applied());
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_sandbox_logger() {
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use kigi_sandbox::{SandboxEvent, SandboxLogger};
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let logger = SandboxLogger::new();
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// Log some events (use violation events — profile_applied requires a resolved profile)
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logger.log(SandboxEvent::fs_violation("workspace", "/tmp/test", "read"));
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logger.log(SandboxEvent::fs_violation(
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"workspace",
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"/etc/shadow",
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"write",
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));
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logger.log(SandboxEvent::net_violation("strict", "evil.com:443"));
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// Check metrics
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assert_eq!(logger.metrics().fs_violation_count(), 2);
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assert_eq!(logger.metrics().net_violation_count(), 1);
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// Take events drains the buffer
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let events = logger.take_events();
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assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
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// Buffer is now empty
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let events2 = logger.take_events();
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assert!(events2.is_empty());
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_should_restrict_child_network_default() {
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// Before any sandbox is applied, child network should not be restricted
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// Note: this test may interfere with other tests if they set the global.
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// In practice, the global is set once at process startup and never unset.
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// For testing, we just verify the default state.
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//
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// We can't meaningfully test the "set" path without applying a sandbox
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// (which is irreversible), so we verify the default is false.
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assert!(!kigi_sandbox::should_restrict_child_network());
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}
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