The old setup command enabled sshd before importing a key, so an aborted
run left a password-only server exposed. Skipping that machine kept the
hole Omarchy opened; close it instead by disabling sshd. Omarchy is a
desktop distro, so the console remains, and the warning explains how to
set up key-based access or deliberately re-enable password logins.
With the stakes flipped from skip to disable, "no usable key" must not
false-positive: follow an authorized_keys symlink to its key (dotfiles
setups have working key auth), and treat an unreadable file as
unverifiable rather than keyless.
Amends the unreleased 1788124236 migration in place; no released install
has run it, so every machine still gets the new behavior in one pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Validate authorized_keys line by line with the question sshd actually
asks: ssh-keygen -lf on the whole file also fingerprints a private key
copied there by mistake, which sshd cannot use, so the migration would
have disabled the only working login path.
Tighten ~/.ssh and authorized_keys the way omarchy-setup-security-sshd
does, and back off from a group-writable home directory: StrictModes
makes sshd ignore the key either way, with the same lockout.
Complete with a notice instead of failing on conditions the migration
cannot repair (a broken or pre-Include sshd_config, an overriding admin
rule, a failed reload of a valid config), so those machines keep passwords
as they were without blocking every migration queued behind this one.
Only missing privileges stay pending, since a terminal rerun fixes that.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
pacman-rc.conf shipped with [omarchy] on pkgs.omarchy.org/edge — a
leftover from when release candidates published there. Candidates now
publish to a dedicated rc channel, so a machine switched to rc with
omarchy-refresh-pacman was pairing the rc Arch mirror with edge omarchy
packages, and omarchy-version-channel could not name the rc repository
at all (an rc install reported 'rc / unknown').
Point the conf at pkgs.omarchy.org/rc, teach omarchy-version-channel
the rc repository, and repoint existing rc-channel machines with a
migration. The migration only rewrites the shipped pairing (rc mirror +
edge [omarchy]); an administrator's deliberate combination is kept.
Apply the Omabot patch on Quattro, verify effective SSH hardening, prevent stored provisioning state from restoring the blanket input-group grant, and stop Omarchy from shipping asdcontrol authorization that belongs to the package.
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
install/post-install/first-run-mode.sh shipped on quattro between 53e26115 and 75cb4f71, and its final body writes `Cmnd_Alias FIRST_RUN_CLEANUP = /usr/bin/rm -f /etc/sudoers.d/first-run, /bin/rm -f /etc/sudoers.d/first-run`. The predicate's case listed only the two `/bin/rm` spellings, so that line fell through to the user-spec test, failed it, and the whole file read as hand-written. The migration then left it alone and wrote its machine marker, which is permanent: on an offline install from that window the account keeps passwordless `/usr/bin/systemctl` for good, and nothing looks at the file again.
Adding the string is the whole fix. The test now carries all nine bodies the installer wrote across both locations rather than the eight from install/preflight.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
test/shell.d/config-test.sh greps every file under migrations/ for `upgrade-to-quattro` and fails the suite when one matches, because pre-4 layout work belongs in the upgrade command rather than in a migration. The comment explaining why this particular cleanup is the exception named that command literally, so it matched the guard and config-test.sh failed on this branch while passing on quattro.
The comment now names the Omarchy 4 upgrade command without spelling the file, which leaves the guard able to catch a migration that actually reaches for it. agents/skills/migrations.md still names `bin/omarchy-upgrade-to-quattro` in full, and it is not under migrations/.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Running the migration on a real machine with no cached sudo credentials
printed sudo's "a terminal is required to read the password" and still
exited 0. bin/omarchy-migrate writes the completion marker on a zero exit,
so the cleanup would have been recorded as done on every install that runs
migrations without a terminal, and never tried again.
Probe for elevation before the combined existence check and exit non-zero
when it fails, so the marker stays unwritten and the next run retries. The
probe is skipped when the directory is readable as-is, which is the case
when migrations run as root.
Review of the previous commits turned up four places where the predicates
and their tests disagreed with the tools they are modelling, each checked
against udevadm verify, systemd-analyze verify and visudo -cf rather than
against reading of the sources.
An empty ExecStop= resets the list, so a unit an administrator neutralised
that way runs nothing at shutdown and is no longer ours to remove; the
predicate now tracks the last state instead of returning on the first home
path it sees. A file whose last line ends in a backslash still carries a
live directive for systemd, so the pending logical line is emitted at EOF;
udev ignores such a line and sudo rejects the file outright, so this costs
those two nothing. The scanner's taint pass now reads += appends, which its
own comment already promised: the value of an append is no use, but a name
that reaches a user root through one has to be judged on it.
Two regression guards passed against the implementations they were written
for. The udev continuation fixture put the whole RUN+= below the comment, so
it matched whether or not the pending half was carried across; the split now
falls inside the RUN+= value. The sudoers one kept its file on the strength
of a spec above the comment, so it could not fail either; the hand-written
spec now sits below. Both fail against a mutant that discards the pending
line. The comment above the second also claimed a continued comment stays a
comment, which visudo contradicts.
Three installers that no longer exist each left a root-owned file on
disk, and nothing in Omarchy has ever removed any of them.
/etc/sudoers.d/first-run granted the installing account passwordless
sudo for the rest of the first boot, unrestricted /usr/bin/systemctl
included from 2025-10-14 on. omarchy-first-run clears its first-run.mode
guard before eight set -e steps and only deletes the grant after them,
so any failure in between strands it with nothing left to retry.
/etc/sudoers.d/tsui named whatever $(which tsui) resolved to for the
installing user, normally a binary under their own home that the vendor
script had just written without sudo.
/etc/systemd/system/omarchy-plymouth-shutdown.service ran an ExecStop
under the installing user's home as uid 0 on every shutdown.
Each file is judged against what the installer that wrote it actually
produced. The first-run grant was rewritten eight times and only the
last four carry both Cmnd_Alias lines, so rather than key on those, every
active line must be one the installer emitted and one of them must be
its own self-cleanup. The shutdown unit is disabled but never stopped:
stopping it is what would run the ExecStop being taken away.
Generalize the migrations.md exception, which framed itself around pre-4
layout transitions and so did not cover installers retired on their own.
Omarchy 3 wrote 99-power-profile.rules and 99-wifi-powersave.rules with
an unquoted heredoc, baking the installing user's home into a rule udev
runs as root. That path resolves through ~/.local/share/omarchy, a
symlink the unprivileged user owns, so replacing it and provoking a
power_supply event runs their code as root. HEAD points the rules at
/usr/bin under new names, but the one-shot cleanup for the old
filenames was dropped, leaving the file on every install that came up
through the 3.x line.
Remove a legacy file only when an active RUN+= really does run that
filename's binary out of a home directory, so a rule of the same name a
user wrote themselves stays, comments and all.
Quattro stopped making the Chromium managed-policy directory world-writable while this branch was open, and the block it deleted from the theme install leaf sat directly above the comment this branch rewrites, so the two edits landed in one hunk. The resolution keeps the hardening — the policy directory is set up through install/config/browser-policy.sh now — along with the first-run seed and the comment that names both things the seed does.
Checking a queue for jobs and then deleting it leaves a window in between, and the sudo that does the deleting can sit at a password prompt for as long as someone takes to type. A job submitted in that window was cancelled by a deletion that had already decided the queue was empty. cupsreject closes the queue to new work first, which also stops more jobs piling onto one that is being left behind and can no longer route them. It comes from the cups package, which stays.
What a queue with jobs on it means is now said rather than implied: whatever is already at the printer finishes, whatever is still waiting cannot be routed with the daemon gone, and the person who owns them has to cancel what is left.
A queue that another administrator removed while this was running is the outcome wanted, not a failure to keep the package installed for, so a deletion that fails is checked against whether the destination is still there.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
cups-browsed is the daemon that watches the network and creates print queues by itself. Hardening it took a root daemon with a predictable cache down to a confined service account, but a daemon that turns anything advertising itself on the network into a print queue is a lot of exposure for a convenience, so it comes out of the default install while that is reworked. Only the discovery half: CUPS itself stays and printing keeps working, with each printer added by hand in Print Settings.
The migration disables the unit before removing the package because that is the only order that works: pacman deletes the unit file but not the enable symlink, and once the unit is gone systemd can no longer resolve it by name to clean that up.
It then removes the queues discovery generated. cups-browsed keeps those when it stops, since KeepGeneratedQueuesOnShutdown defaults to Yes, and they route through its own implicitclass backend, which goes with the package, so they cannot print again. Idle ones go. A queue with jobs on it is left alone and named: implicitclass only needs cups-browsed to choose a destination, so a job already past that point finishes on its own, and deleting the queue would abort it. One printer's job does not hold up the removal. A printer added by hand has an ipp:// or usb:// device and is left where it is.
A queue whose jobs cannot be asked about is left alone rather than assumed idle, including one named so that lpstat would misread it -- "all" is its word for every destination, and a leading dash or a comma reads as another option or a list.
Where CUPS does not answer at all, or a queue will not delete, discovery is still stopped but the package stays and no marker is written. omarchy-migrate records a migration for the user as soon as it exits zero, so that is where the machine stays until someone removes the package by hand, and the message says so rather than implying a retry.
The queue list is read under LC_ALL=C because lpstat translates "device for", and captured rather than piped, so a cupsd it cannot reach is reported instead of reading like a machine with nothing to clean up.
It removes with plain pacman -R rather than omarchy-pkg-drop, which passes -n and would discard /etc/cups/cups-browsed.conf instead of keeping it as a .pacsave. A removal meant to be temporary should not delete the machine's copy of its own configuration. Without -s either, so it only ever removes the package it names: sweeping newly unneeded dependencies is nothing today, but it is not a promise a rolling dependency graph can keep.
Queue names come off the network, since cups-browsed names its queues after what the printer advertised. CUPS allows every printable character but space, tab, / and #, and lpstat and lpadmin take a destination as an option value, so a name with a leading dash or a comma is reported rather than passed to them and guessed at.
Migration state is per user, so a machine-wide marker records the one removal. Without it, an account whose first migration run came after someone deliberately reinstalled discovery would quietly take it back out again.
The install-time override for cups-browsed.conf now waits for cups-browsed rather than for CUPS. Guarding it on a file CUPS still ships would write a configuration file for a package nothing installed, and pacman would later land the package's own copy beside it as a .pacnew.
The hardened configuration stays in the tree. omarchy-settings still ships the cups-browsed.conf override, the sysusers account and the service drop-in, so they are what discovery returns onto.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
Chromium 151 flipped MasterPrefs::eula_required from false to true, so a first run with no seed now stops on a blank terms-of-service dialog before the browser opens. The opt-out is written in two places that each run exactly once: the install leaf that runs during ISO finalization, and the one-time 3.x upgrade. A machine already on Quattro runs neither again, so it keeps the old seed and still meets the dialog the first time anyone launches Chromium, including from every user account created after the install.
The migration writes the same seed those two paths write. It compares before writing so the second user on a shared machine no-ops rather than repeating a machine-wide repair, and the literal is duplicated rather than sourced because a migration repairs the state of its own moment and must not drift when the seed later changes.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
The migration recomputed whether cups-browsed was active at the start of every run, after an earlier run may already have stopped it. A run interrupted between that stop and the completion marker left the service down, and the retry that followed read it as inactive, skipped the restart, and wrote the marker anyway: printer discovery stayed off until the next reboot with no migration left to bring it back. Keying the restart to whether the unit is enabled survives the interruption, and reports not-enabled for a unit the user masked or disabled, which restarting would fail on and abort the migration short of its marker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
Run cups-browsed as a locked service account with a dedicated cache and a focused systemd sandbox. Restrict automatic queues to driverless IPP printers, remove wheel from passwordless CUPS administration, replace cups-pdf with Polkit-backed setup, and migrate existing systems safely.
Reported-By: Erik Hunstad (Bad Sector Labs)
Co-Authored-By: Daybreak Blue <noreply@openai.com>
The Dell XPS 13 DX13260 drives its two CS35L56 sidecar speaker amplifiers through a quirk that Linux only gains in 7.2, so until Arch ships that kernel the machine plays through one amplifier with no bass. The dell-xps13-sidecar-amps package selects the same driver path with a module override; this installs it on that exact machine and nowhere else.
The detector requires both the DX13260 product name and SKU 0E53, because the override forces a quirk value rather than merging into one, and a machine that gets it wrong loses whatever quirk the kernel would have chosen for itself.
Pacman registers a package even when its post_install scriptlet fails, so the leaf calls dell-xps13-sidecar-amps-apply itself instead of trusting the install to have applied: a failed cleanup or boot-image rebuild has to reach the caller rather than hide behind a package pacman considers installed. That is also why the migration marks reboot-required only after the apply succeeds — a migration that exits non-zero keeps no completion marker and retries the apply on the next run, even though pacman already has the package.
The leaf runs after intel/ptl-kernel.sh rather than beside the other Dell leaf at the top of install/hardware/all.sh, so its boot-image rebuild sees the Panther Lake kernel that step swaps in rather than the stock one it removes.
Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
Managed policy dirs are enterprise trust roots, so they stay 0755 root:root. The menu path takes root for that one write through a sudoers glob of six hex digits, the same shape as omarchy-dns, and falls back to pkexec where the grant is not installed. Drop omarchy-browser-policy; a group member could plant any JSON, not just a colour.
install -d follows a managed or distribution symlink and would chmod the target. Unlink those paths first, and treat a dangling symlink as a directory the migration still has to repair.
install -d follows a planted ancestor symlink, and a writable parent can rename the managed leaf aside. chromium.theme is user-installed, so only a 0-255 RGB triple becomes a colour.
Chromium managed policy is mandatory for every profile. World-writable
dirs let any local uid plant policy, including force-installed
extensions. Write goes through the omarchy-browser-policy group at 2775
so theme colour still works without other-write.
* [Security] Stop the FIDO2 setup staging its authfile at a predictable /tmp path
pamu2fcfg wrote to /tmp/fido2 and the registration was then moved into place
with `sudo mv`. Any other local user can pre-create /tmp/fido2, and rename(2)
does not dereference the final component, so the privileged move installed the
attacker's symlink itself as pam_u2f's global authfile -- a file consulted by
`sufficient` lines in /etc/pam.d/sudo and /etc/pam.d/polkit-1.
The same move also carried the staged file's ownership into /etc, so on every
install to date /etc/fido2/fido2 is owned by the invoking user at mode 0644.
That needs no attacker: anything running as that uid can add its own credential
and satisfy the machine's sudo prompt without root.
Stage under mktemp and hand the bytes to `install` instead, so the authfile is
always a fresh root-owned regular file rather than an inode a non-root user
still controls. Guard the already-registered check with -L, which -f would
otherwise follow, and reject a symlinked /etc/fido2 in the remove path for the
same reason. A migration takes ownership of authfiles left behind by the old
code; it reports a symlink rather than repairing one, since chown would follow
it and removing it would strip sudo from anyone whose only credential is the
token.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012e6WagC5iUigCGoK1tQeFz
* Install the FIDO2 authfile with -T and refuse a non-regular path
`install SRC DEST` without -T treats an existing directory at DEST as a
destination directory: it drops the credential inside as
/etc/fido2/fido2/tmp.XXXX, exits 0, and setup reports a successful registration
while PAM goes on reading a path that is not a file. -T makes that an error.
The already-registered check has the same blind spot from the other side. -f
follows symlinks, so it reads a symlinked authfile as a registration and leaves
it in place, and is false for a directory, so it tries to register over one.
Only a regular file is a pam_u2f authfile; anything else is now refused with the
same advice to remove it and set FIDO2 up again.
The test deleted every staged path that fell outside its scratch directory,
taking the path from the script under test and already resolved through any
symlink -- so a script staging through one would have named a file of the user's
and had it unlinked. It now unlinks only a file its own stub wrote into.
On a machine that already has /etc/fido2/fido2 the staging assertions cannot run
at all, and the file used to pass without exercising one of them. That branch now
asserts what the host state promises instead: a regular authfile still has to be
recognised as a registration and left alone, and anything else has to be refused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
* Replace the FIDO2 authfile inode rather than chowning it in place
Permission is checked at open(2), not at write(2), so a descriptor the
registering user opened on the authfile while it was still theirs stays writable
through chown and chmod alike. pam_u2f resolves /etc/fido2/fido2 to that same
inode, so the repair left the account it authenticates able to append a
credential it controls -- the exact state the migration exists to end, now
recorded as migrated and never revisited.
Installing a fresh root-owned copy and renaming it over the path leaves any such
descriptor writing to a file nothing reads. Credit to #7703, which reached the
same conclusion independently. An interrupted run heals: the staged copy is
root-owned 600 and inert, no marker is written, and the next run replaces it.
A directory or device at the authfile path is no more ours to rewrite than a
symlink is, and chmod 600 on a directory would only make it untraversable, so
both are now reported rather than repaired.
The repair had no test, because it names an absolute path no unprivileged suite
can write. It is exercised through a scratch copy with that one literal
retargeted, rather than by reading the path from the environment: the migration
hands `install` and `mv` root, and an operand the caller can choose is a
privileged write to anywhere. The copy is only as honest as the substitution, so
the test fails if the migration stops naming the path exactly once.
Covered: the no-op on a machine that never registered a key, which must not cost
a password prompt; the repair itself; the new inode; the absence of a staged copy
afterwards; a second account finding it done; and the symlink and non-regular
cases. Each assertion was checked against a mutation that defeats it -- notably a
repair with the right install call, mode, content and cleanup that writes through
the old inode, which only the inode assertion catches.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
* Finish hardening FIDO2 authfile installation
* Guard the FIDO2 directory and the stage path the setup writes through
install -d follows a symlink at /etc/fido2 and applies the mode and ownership to whatever it points at, so the credential would be staged and published inside the link target and that directory silently reopened to root:root 755. The leaf guard above it only covered fido2 itself, and this is the same threat omarchy-remove-security-fido2 already names on its side.
mktemp's output is an operand for a privileged tee, chmod, mv and rm. The migration validates it before any of them run; the setup did not, so take only the name it asked for there too.
The suite was guarded on the host's own /etc/fido2/fido2 and exited early when one existed, which meant the staging assertions asserted nothing on exactly the machines that use FIDO2. Drive a retargeted copy the way the migration suite already does, so every branch is a fixture and all of them run everywhere.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Stop the FIDO2 migration recording a repair it never made
omarchy-migrate writes the per-user completion marker on any zero exit, so the two states this migration cannot repair got one line in the update terminal and were then silenced for good: no login notice, no re-run, the migration recorded as done having repaired nothing. Those are precisely the machines where the authfile may already be under someone else's control, so raise them through omarchy-notification-send as well, where they outlive the scrollback. Delivery is best-effort: a machine with no user bus or no notification server must not abort the migration and take every later one with it.
The early exit had the same shape of problem. It read the authfile unprivileged, and the old setup created /etc/fido2 with `sudo mkdir -p`, which took the union of the caller's umask and sudoers' 0022 — so registering under `umask 077` left the directory mode 0700 with the user-owned authfile still inside. Absence and "cannot look" are the same answer to those tests, and the migration exited 0 and marked itself complete. Ask root whether a registration is actually behind an untraversable directory before reopening it, so an aborted setup that left an empty directory, or one an administrator keeps private, does not have its mode widened and its group and special bits discarded for a repair it does not need. A machine that never set FIDO2 up has no directory here and still reaches exit 0 without a password prompt.
The notification assertion checks argument shape rather than a substring of the command line. The glyph is a private-use codepoint, and losing it shifts every argument left: -g swallows the headline, the body becomes the title, and the message goes out with no description — which a substring match reads as a pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
* Cover the FIDO2 removal's symlink guard
The -d to -e || -L change is load-bearing for the threat its own comment names — a dangling link at /etc/fido2 that -d reads as absent, left for the next setup to install an authfile through — and it was the one part of this work with no test behind it. Name the directory once so the suite can retarget a copy, the same seam the setup and migration suites use, and assert both halves: the link goes, and the directory it pointed at does not.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
* Stop device names from being executed as Hyprland Lua
Hyprland input-device and monitor names come from USB descriptors and
hyprctl output, so they are attacker-influenceable, yet the toggle and
monitor commands interpolated them straight into hyprctl eval and into
generated Lua that Hyprland re-executes on every reload. The input-device
toggle keys are bound with locked = true, so a malicious USB name reached
Lua code execution from the lock screen; a persisted disable made it run
on every start. This closes that class everywhere it appeared.
- The touchpad/touchscreen disable is now the device name in a plain-text
sidecar file, read back by a packaged Lua module on reload, never a
generated Lua file. hyprctl eval Lua-quotes the name and control
characters are rejected outright.
- Dropped the shipped *-disabled.lua templates so nothing seeds a
disabled state to /etc/skel, making the name file the single source of
truth read from a hardcoded ~/.local/state to match the sibling tools.
- The reload loader excludes those two legacy filenames, so a leftover
generated *-disabled.lua on a not-yet-migrated install can never be
sourced as code again; a migration then recovers the device name from
it and deletes it, sanitizing installs that ran the vulnerable version.
- All four monitor scripts (internal, mirror, clamshell, scaling) now
validate an output name against a plain-connector-name pattern before
writing it as Lua, closing the same latent pattern in the siblings.
- paths.lua treats a set-but-empty XDG_STATE_HOME as unset, matching the
bash side so state is never read from the filesystem root.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0144ZDt44vtxjyF8j9Y88NrM
* Let a failing Lua assertion fail the test
lua discards the status of a chunk read from stdin, so a blown assert printed its traceback and still exited 0: the surrounding `set -euo pipefail` never fired and the following `pass` printed `ok`. Every Lua block in these two files was unenforced, including the assertion that a quoted `hyprctl eval` cannot reach `os.execute` and the negative control that proves the test can detect the injection at all. Passing the chunk as a script argument makes lua report the failure.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Re-apply a recovered input-device disable to the running session
The package hook reloads Hyprland during `omarchy-update-system-pkgs`, before `omarchy-migrate` runs, and at that reload the generated Lua is already excluded while the name file does not exist yet — so a touchpad or touchscreen the user had switched off comes back on, and stays on until their next login. Reload once more once the name has been recovered, which is the same path a login already takes to read it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Omarchybot <omabot@omarchy.org>
Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
* Offer to reboot when toggling sudoless Docker; show only the relevant menu entry
Group membership only takes effect on a fresh session, and in practice a logout
or newgrp isn't enough — only a reboot reliably applies it. So the setup/remove
commands now flag the reboot and offer to do it now with a gum confirm (like the
GPU toggle), and the notices say "after a reboot" instead of pointing at logout
or newgrp. The existing-user migration passes OMARCHY_DEFER_REBOOT so it does not
prompt mid-update — omarchy-update-restart still handles the reboot once the whole
update finishes.
The Setup > Security menu also showed Sudoless Docker under both Setup and
Remove. Condition the Setup entry on the group being absent (Remove already
conditions on it being present), so only the applicable one appears.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
* Ask omarchy-sudo-docker whether Docker needs sudo
Every place that chooses between talking to Docker directly and elevating was
testing group membership by hand, and the menu guards tested the wrong thing:
they read the running session's groups, which do not change until the reboot,
so after enabling sudoless Docker the menu still offered Setup — the one action
that could no longer do anything — while Remove stayed hidden.
Add omarchy-sudo-docker as the single answer, with the two questions that
actually differ in that window. By default it asks whether this session can
reach the socket, which is what decides if a command must elevate: lazydocker
and the Windows VM keep prompting until the reboot lands. With --configured it
asks whether the account is set up for sudoless Docker, which is what the menu
and the toggles need, so the menu switches to the action that can change state
as soon as the group is written.
Also correct a comment: nothing surfaces reboot-required in the bar; it is
omarchy-update-restart that reads it during a later update.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
---------
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Don't put the user in the docker group; make it opt-in
The docker group is root-equivalent: anything in it can `docker run -v /:/host`
and rewrite the host as root with no password. On a single-user box that's not
an escalation (the owner is already a wheel/sudo user), but it hands any code
running as the user — a rogue plugin, a poisoned dependency — a silent, headless,
passwordless path to root that sudo's password prompt would otherwise gate.
Stop granting the docker group by default. The daemon still runs (docker.socket);
the Docker TUI and the Windows VM reach it through a polkit prompt, and the plain
`docker` CLI runs under sudo. Sudoless Docker is a warned opt-in via
Setup > Security (omarchy-setup-security-sudoless-docker).
No automatic path may re-grant it: install and first-boot provisioning never
record or apply the group (provisioning also filters a docker line left in an
older factory snapshot), and the Quattro upgrade no longer adds it.
The Windows VM keeps needing the root daemon for a privileged container (KVM,
NET_ADMIN), so it is reworked to run without the group and without becoming a new
way in:
- The compose lives in a root-owned dir and is only written by an elevated,
input-validated writer. A root-invoked bring-up must never consume a file a
user-process could rewrite to bind-mount / into the guest — the old
~/.config/windows compose was exactly that. Volume paths are rebuilt from
$HOME on migration rather than trusted from the (user-writable) legacy file,
path validation rejects traversal, and the privileged sub-action is checked
against an allowlist before dispatch (a slash in it would otherwise run as a
path).
- pkexec elevates a verified root-owned command path, not a PATH-resolved one,
so an authorized prompt can't be redirected to an attacker's binary.
- The guest password is kept in a private 0600 per-user file for RDP instead of
a world-readable compose, and a declined authorization is reported as such,
never as a completed stop.
Existing installs auto-migrate the VM (no redownload) and refresh the stale
Docker launcher entry.
🤖 Generated by Opus 4.8 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
* Migrate existing installs off the docker group
The default flip only reaches new installs; existing users keep their docker
group membership and stay exposed. Extend the migration that already refreshes
the Docker launcher to also remove the current user from the group when present,
reusing omarchy-remove-security-sudoless-docker so there is one source of truth
for the change and its notice. It takes effect at next login (the current
session keeps working), and passwordless docker can be turned back on from
Setup > Security > Sudoless Docker.
Migrations run with sudo available — during `omarchy update`, or in the terminal
the pending-migrations notification opens — so the privileged removal does not
prompt at an unattended login. The no-op path (already out of the group) needs
no privilege.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
* Refuse symlinked VM mount sources; correct the docker CLI docs
Review follow-ups.
valid_path keeps a traversal string (/./, //, ..) out of the compose, but it is
a string check: a symlink planted at ~/.windows or ~/Windows redirects the
privileged bind mount exactly as traversal would, because docker follows it. So
verify the mount sources as root immediately before bringing the VM up — refuse
a source that is a symlink or resolves through one — which is where the string
check cannot help. A missing source stays fine (docker creates a plain dir).
Also correct the development-tools manual: the CLI is not transparently elevated
(there is no docker wrapper and `d` is still plain docker), so say plainly that
docker on the command line takes `sudo` until sudoless Docker is enabled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
---------
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
omarchy-mise-install gained --quiet on its `mise use -g` line so a wrapper
no longer prints mise's "tools: pkg@version" ahead of the tool's own
output. That only changes wrappers written from then on, and the migration
that installed the current ones is already marked complete, so every
wrapper already on disk keeps polluting stdout: `claude --version` still
answers with two lines, and a wrapper for a protocol-speaking command
answers with a line its caller cannot parse.
Rewrite them through omarchy-mise-install so the template stays in one
place. Wrappers were written by four different generated forms over time
and only the ones a later migration happened to regenerate moved forward,
so all four are recognized. The whole file has to match one of them
exactly, which leaves a wrapper someone has added a line to alone and
makes a second run a no-op.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Mv1FyKG2VGZRdtknQ7YjU8
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Stop an installed theme from shipping code
`omarchy theme install <url>` clones a stranger's git repository into ~/.config/omarchy/themes, and omarchy-theme-set then copied that whole directory into the staged theme. Most of the files in a staged theme are code rather than colour: Hyprland requires hyprland.lua and gum_env.lua from it at login, Neovim loads neovim.lua at startup, and alacritty.toml, kitty.conf, foot.ini and ghostty.conf each name the program the terminal launches. Installing a theme was the same act as running its author's code, and nothing on disk distinguishes an installed theme from one the user wrote.
Stage only what a theme needs in order to be a theme: colors.toml, light.mode, the preview and unlock images, and image files under backgrounds/. Everything else is ignored, named on stderr, and generated from default/themed/*.tpl instead. Symlinks are never followed, because in an untrusted theme they point wherever the author chose. A theme older than colors.toml keeps its palette: its alacritty.toml is read for colours in a scratch directory and only the resulting colors.toml is staged, so the terminal config never lands.
The filter belongs in omarchy-theme-set rather than in omarchy-theme-install because staging is the choke point. It also covers themes installed before this change, themes copied in by hand, and files a theme gains later through `omarchy theme update`.
First-party themes under $OMARCHY_PATH/themes are unaffected. Per-theme overrides of a generated file are no longer available to user themes; the template at ~/.config/omarchy/themed/<file>.tpl replaces that, and icons.theme is the one setting with no replacement.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code.
* Stop a theme URL or name being read as an option or a path
Three paths in the theme commands took an attacker-shaped string straight into git, into basename, or into rm.
`git clone "$REPO_URL"` passes the URL as the first positional argument, so a URL beginning with a dash is parsed as an option instead and the destination path becomes what git tries to clone. Pass `--` before the URL so a URL is always a URL. git also treats `<helper>::<address>` as a remote helper to run; git's own protocol.allow default already refuses `ext::`, so rejecting that shape here is a second line rather than the fix, and it keeps holding if that default ever moves. The helper name is a bare word at the very start of the URL, which is what the guard matches: an scp-style IPv6 host such as git@[2001:db8::1]:org/repo.git carries `::` of its own and still clones.
`basename "$REPO_PATH" .git` has the same problem one step later, after the scp-style prefix has been stripped: `host:-s/foo.git` leaves basename reading `-s` as an option and returning `.git` as the theme name. Take the name with `--`.
That name is then joined into a path that is about to be `rm -rf`'d, so a repo whose basename came out as `..` would take ~/.config/omarchy with it. omarchy-theme-remove had the same shape from its own argument, and omarchy-theme-set's sed/tr normalization does not stop a name containing a slash. Reject empty, anything starting with a dot, and anything containing `/` in all three, before the name reaches a path.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
* Re-stage the current theme for installs that already applied one
Dropping a theme's code at staging time only takes effect the next time a theme is staged. An install that already applied an extra theme keeps that theme's hyprland.lua, gum_env.lua, neovim.lua and terminal configs in ~/.local/state/omarchy/current/theme, which Hyprland requires at login and the terminals include at launch, and nothing forces a theme change — so for those installs the fix would arrive whenever the user next happened to switch themes, which may be never.
Re-stage once through omarchy-theme-refresh. First-party themes stage identically, so the cost for everyone else is a single retint during an update they are already running.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
* Stop a theme's unlock image republishing a file it points at
omarchy-plymouth-set-by-theme reads unlock.png straight out of ~/.config/omarchy/themes, which is an installed theme's own directory and outside the staging filter, and hands the path to omarchy-plymouth-set. That path was copied twice into world-readable /usr/share — once by the user into the Plymouth theme, and once by `sudo cp` into the SDDM theme. A symlink there was followed both times, so a theme could name a file it cannot read and have root publish it.
Refuse a symlinked logo, and copy the staged logo to SDDM instead of rereading the caller's path as root. The staged copy is made by the user, so nothing privileged opens a path the caller chose.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
* Limit only what an installed theme could run
Two corrections to the rule this branch introduced, both narrowing it to what it was actually for.
It applied to every theme under ~/.config/omarchy/themes, which swept up themes the user wrote themselves. Their machine, their file: a theme they wrote is theirs to fill however they like, and Omarchy's own themes were never in scope. Only a theme that came from someone else needs limiting, and the repo already knows which those are — omarchy-theme-extras calls a theme with a `.git` directory an extra and a symlink someone's working copy, because that is what `omarchy theme install` leaves behind when it clones. Use the same test.
It was also an allowlist, which dropped files that carry nothing but colour and left theme authors worse off for no gain. Drop only what can run: any `*.lua`, since Hyprland requires a theme's hyprland.lua and gum_env.lua at login and Neovim loads neovim.lua at startup; the four terminal configs, since each names the program the terminal launches; and vscode.json, whose extension field reaches `code --install-extension` and a VS Code extension is arbitrary JavaScript. Everything else an installed theme ships is kept, so btop.theme, chromium.theme, helix.toml, icons.theme, keyboard.rgb and shell.toml go back to being the theme's to set.
Symlinks are still dropped, now at any depth rather than only where an allowlist happened to look.
A denylist is wrong the moment someone adds a template and does not think about it, so the decision is forced rather than remembered: the test fails on any default/themed/*.tpl whose output is recorded as neither code nor colour, and a new terminal or a new Lua-loading editor cannot be added without classifying it.
What this does not cover, and is written down in docs/theming.md rather than implied: a theme shipped as an archive and unpacked by hand looks exactly like one the user wrote. `omarchy theme install` only takes git URLs, so the supported path is always filtered, but this marks where a theme came from and is not a sandbox.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code.
* Fix what the review found
Four things, all confirmed against the source before changing anything.
The migration failed permanently when the active theme had been removed. `omarchy theme remove` deletes the directory without repointing theme.name, so the name survives, the staged copy survives, and omarchy-theme-refresh exits 1 because neither source directory exists — leaving the migration pending forever and the stale staged Lua exactly where it was, which is the one thing it existed to remove. Seed the default theme in that case: there is nothing to re-stage from, and the removal should have left a working theme behind anyway.
The staging test skipped the strict-mode header that docs/testing.md makes the contract for every shell test. Adding it means the patterns that fail on purpose have to stop being bare `cmd && fail` compounds, which errexit reads as the script itself failing; the mutations were re-run afterwards to confirm the assertions still fire rather than the run dying early and looking like something else.
The guards in omarchy-theme-install and omarchy-theme-remove had no coverage — they were checked by hand and left that way. theme-install-guards-test.sh stubs git and the themes directory and proves an option-shaped URL, a transport helper, and a name that would climb out all stop before git or rm runs, that a dash inside the path no longer becomes a basename option, and that an ordinary URL still clones and applies.
The new docs/theming.md prose was hard-wrapped, which AGENTS.md forbids for docs/. Unwrapped. The rest of that file is wrapped from before and is left alone rather than churned through this change.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh and Copilot.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
Ori is OpenRouter's harness: `ori claude`, `ori codex` and `ori opencode` start those agents against OpenRouter's model catalogue, and `ori code` is Ori's own agent. That last one is what the default-agent entry launches, bare — Ori has no approval prompt to skip, so there is no "don't stop to ask" flag to pass it the way the other agents get one.
The package is `github:OpenRouterLabs/ori-releases`, because upstream ships prebuilt binaries as release assets and publishes nothing to npm. mise's `github` backend picks the right asset per platform and verifies GitHub's artifact attestations on the way in; `ubi` resolves the same release but is deprecated for removal in mise 2027.1.
The menu glyph at U+E909 is OpenRouter's own mark. Ori publishes no logo of its own and its product page renders that one, so there was no Ori-specific mark to prefer over it.
Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
* Switch back to the packaged quickshell now that 0.3.1 kills synchronously
Omarchy shipped the quickshell-git build for a single fix: 0.3.0's `kill` returned before the instance had exited, so the kill loop in omarchy-restart-shell could race a dying shell. Upstream 0.3.1 ships that fix, which makes extra/quickshell the better package to be on again — signed, versioned, and not rebuilt from a moving branch on every update.
The migration swaps unconditionally instead of first checking which version the mirror offers. A machine left holding quickshell-git while the shipped package list names quickshell has no way to reconcile the two: omarchy-reinstall-pkgs installs that list with --needed, which does not skip a name that is not installed, and the conflict it then walks into has no answer under --noconfirm. A mirror that is briefly behind installs 0.3.0 instead and the next upgrade carries it to 0.3.1, which is much the cheaper way to be wrong.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
* Drop the quickshell version note from the shell restart loop
The comment qualified the kill loop as needing 0.3.1 or newer, but omarchy-restart-shell ships in the same package upgrade that brings quickshell along, so a machine running this code already has the version the loop depends on. The caveat could never be false where it was read, which left it as version archaeology rather than something the code could not say for itself.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
* Replace Gemini coding agent with Antigravity
* Potential fix for pull request finding
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* Remove the dead Gemini mise wrapper in the Antigravity migration
Remove Preinstalls no longer lists gemini, so the wrapper Omarchy created
would have stayed in ~/.local/bin with nothing left to clean it up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Install Antigravity when it is the default a Gemini user is migrated onto
The opt-out check skipped the install but the rewrite ran anyway, so anyone
who had removed the preinstalls was left with a default agent naming a
command that is not there.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix Antigravity skill provisioning and Gemini wrapper migration
- Wires Omarchy's default skills into Antigravity by linking them to ~/.gemini/config/skills/ in bin/omarchy-provision-user and migrations/1786719479.sh.
- Fixes the Gemini wrapper migration in migrations/1786719479.sh to recognize and remove wrappers containing either `mise use -g "gemini"` or `mise use -g --quiet "gemini"`, while leaving hand-written wrappers intact.
- Adds regression tests for both skill provisioning and wrapper removal in test/shell.d/default-agent-test.sh and test/shell.d/provision-user-test.sh.
* Stop the provisioning test from retheming the session it runs in
The test ran the real omarchy-provision-user, which sources install/user/all.sh and so reached omarchy-theme-set: hyprctl reload against the live compositor, gsettings against the live desktop, and a global Node install, none of which the skill symlinks it asserts need. Its mocks for omarchy-done and omarchy-refresh-applications were shadowed anyway, because provisioning prepends $OMARCHY_PATH/bin ahead of them, so stubbing the install suite at its own path is what a mock cannot do here. The exit status is checked rather than discarded: the assertion held even when provisioning died outright, because the symlinks are made twenty lines before the suite runs.
* Match the Gemini default and wrapper the way Omarchy writes them
The migration decided both questions differently from the code that owns them. It read the default agent with grep -qxF, while omarchy-default-agent takes the first line through read, so a padded " gemini " that the launcher still resolves was left naming an agent the launcher no longer supports. The wrapper it deletes was matched anywhere in the file, so a hand-written one that only mentions the installer's line in a comment went with Omarchy's own. Reading it the launcher's way and anchoring the match settles both against whoever wrote the file. The skills loop guards its glob the way migrations/1786539345.sh does, so an empty source cannot leave a symlink named "*" behind a migration already marked complete.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <noreply@anthropic.com>
* List Antigravity among the skill directories
The manual named Claude Code, Codex, Pi and the generic location; provisioning now links ~/.gemini/config/skills too.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Omabot <omabot@omarchy.org>
* Decode webp in the shell
The background and the lock screen are drawn by Quickshell, so they
decode through Qt, which ships handlers for png, jpeg and gif but not
webp. QImageReader answers "Unsupported image format" and the layer
comes up blank. Any third-party theme shipping a .webp background hits
this today, even though every path that goes looking for a background
already globs the extension.
qt6-imageformats supplies the missing plugin for 71 KB downloaded. Its
one new dependency of substance, libwebp, is already on every machine
by way of libvips.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Store theme backgrounds as webp
WebP codes both of the things these backgrounds are made of better than
the formats they were in: the photographs, where its lossy mode is worth
a third or more over JPEG at matched quality, and the flat art and dot
patterns, where its lossless mode undercuts an oxipng-packed PNG.
28 of them become lossless webp and decode bit-for-bit identically
(AE=0), so the dot patterns and flat-shaded pieces carry no quality
question at all. That includes 0-launch, whose alpha channel comes
through intact. The other 51 are photographs held to the same 38 dB
PSNR floor as the JPEG pass, landing between 38.0 and 54.6 dB. Every
image keeps its exact pixel dimensions, for 29.8 MB.
Each one is encoded from the original as it stands in quattro rather
than from the file the earlier commits produced, so nothing picks up a
second generation of loss on the way here.
13 stay JPEG. WebP is plainly larger for most of them, and three are
grainy enough that its filter smooths the grain instead of coding it:
PSNR plateaus near 34 dB however high the quality goes, well under the
floor.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Switch to the mise-bin package
mise-bin carries mise's own release artifacts from the Omarchy repo --
PGO+BOLT-optimized on x86_64, glibc-native on both arches -- instead of
Arch's mise, and tracks jdx/mise releases directly.
Existing installs need a migration because the two packages conflict, and
omarchy-pkg-add cannot make the swap: pacman answers its own conflict
question with No under --noconfirm and fails the transaction. --ask=4
answers that one question, so mise-bin replaces mise in a single
transaction -- which is also what keeps omarchy-zsh and omarchy-fish, both
of which depend on mise, satisfied through the swap by its provides.
* Guard the swap with a conditional instead of an early exit
Two-path control flow takes an if, per the style guide; the early exit only made the swap line unreachable from a distance.
