* Wait for the keypress ourselves instead of asking gum to
gum 2.0 runs a spun command without the terminal attached, so the
`gum spin -- read -n 1` that held the presentation terminal open returned
at once. Every menu command that ended in a failure took its window down
with it before the error could be read, which is how a failed update
looked like a terminal that just quit.
Read the key directly. gum's own terminal query replies are still sitting
on the tty when the spinner stops, so drain those first or they answer the
prompt on the user's behalf.
The green dot reads better than the globe did, so the provisioning notice
uses it too and drops its spinner along the way.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Ask the terminal for itself before prompting on it
The /dev/tty node is there whether or not a terminal is behind it, so the
existence check passed on a headless run and left both reads failing with
"No such device or address". Open it instead.
Prompt on the terminal too, rather than stdout: a caller that redirects us
was sending the prompt to a file while the read waited on the terminal,
which looks like a hang with no instruction on screen.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Group membership is fixed at login, so removing (or adding) the docker group
does not take effect in the running session. The existing-user migration and the
Setup > Security toggles now call `omarchy-state set reboot-required`, so
omarchy-update-restart prompts for the reboot that actually applies the change
(and the bar shows it pending). A plain log out and back in still works.
The migration test now exercises the real removal command and omarchy-state
rather than a stub, asserting the reboot flag is set on removal and left alone
when the user is already out of the group.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Don't put the user in the docker group; make it opt-in
The docker group is root-equivalent: anything in it can `docker run -v /:/host`
and rewrite the host as root with no password. On a single-user box that's not
an escalation (the owner is already a wheel/sudo user), but it hands any code
running as the user — a rogue plugin, a poisoned dependency — a silent, headless,
passwordless path to root that sudo's password prompt would otherwise gate.
Stop granting the docker group by default. The daemon still runs (docker.socket);
the Docker TUI and the Windows VM reach it through a polkit prompt, and the plain
`docker` CLI runs under sudo. Sudoless Docker is a warned opt-in via
Setup > Security (omarchy-setup-security-sudoless-docker).
No automatic path may re-grant it: install and first-boot provisioning never
record or apply the group (provisioning also filters a docker line left in an
older factory snapshot), and the Quattro upgrade no longer adds it.
The Windows VM keeps needing the root daemon for a privileged container (KVM,
NET_ADMIN), so it is reworked to run without the group and without becoming a new
way in:
- The compose lives in a root-owned dir and is only written by an elevated,
input-validated writer. A root-invoked bring-up must never consume a file a
user-process could rewrite to bind-mount / into the guest — the old
~/.config/windows compose was exactly that. Volume paths are rebuilt from
$HOME on migration rather than trusted from the (user-writable) legacy file,
path validation rejects traversal, and the privileged sub-action is checked
against an allowlist before dispatch (a slash in it would otherwise run as a
path).
- pkexec elevates a verified root-owned command path, not a PATH-resolved one,
so an authorized prompt can't be redirected to an attacker's binary.
- The guest password is kept in a private 0600 per-user file for RDP instead of
a world-readable compose, and a declined authorization is reported as such,
never as a completed stop.
Existing installs auto-migrate the VM (no redownload) and refresh the stale
Docker launcher entry.
🤖 Generated by Opus 4.8 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
* Migrate existing installs off the docker group
The default flip only reaches new installs; existing users keep their docker
group membership and stay exposed. Extend the migration that already refreshes
the Docker launcher to also remove the current user from the group when present,
reusing omarchy-remove-security-sudoless-docker so there is one source of truth
for the change and its notice. It takes effect at next login (the current
session keeps working), and passwordless docker can be turned back on from
Setup > Security > Sudoless Docker.
Migrations run with sudo available — during `omarchy update`, or in the terminal
the pending-migrations notification opens — so the privileged removal does not
prompt at an unattended login. The no-op path (already out of the group) needs
no privilege.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
* Refuse symlinked VM mount sources; correct the docker CLI docs
Review follow-ups.
valid_path keeps a traversal string (/./, //, ..) out of the compose, but it is
a string check: a symlink planted at ~/.windows or ~/Windows redirects the
privileged bind mount exactly as traversal would, because docker follows it. So
verify the mount sources as root immediately before bringing the VM up — refuse
a source that is a symlink or resolves through one — which is where the string
check cannot help. A missing source stays fine (docker creates a plain dir).
Also correct the development-tools manual: the CLI is not transparently elevated
(there is no docker wrapper and `d` is still plain docker), so say plainly that
docker on the command line takes `sudo` until sudoless Docker is enabled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Gb7x6poap4hGCndPx5qt5T
---------
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
* Add omarchy-ascii for drawing text in the logo font
Renders text as ASCII art in Delta Corps Priest 1, the FIGlet font the Omarchy wordmark itself is drawn in, so branding art can be words rather than a picture. The font is embedded in the script and the layout is done in awk, so the command adds nothing to the default package set.
The layout runs on one-byte stand-ins for the five block characters the font draws with. Column arithmetic over the characters themselves counts bytes in one locale and characters in another, and the stand-ins keep length() and substr() counting columns either way.
Delta Corps Priest 1 carries letters and spaces only, and every mirror of it ships the same file with the digit and punctuation glyphs empty. Anything else is dropped and named on stderr, and text with nothing drawable at all exits 1 rather than printing silence.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code.
* Correct what the renderer did with input it could not draw
The route never ran on piped text. The metadata declared `<text...>` as required, so `omarchy ascii` with nothing on the command line resolved to the router's help while `omarchy-ascii` run directly worked, which is why the tests missed it: they all called the binary. The argument is optional now, and a test goes through the route.
Text reached awk as a command-line variable, where awk reads backslash escapes of its own, so `omarchy ascii 'A\nB'` drew two blocks instead of naming the backslash as a character the font lacks. A text longer than the argument list could not be passed at all. It arrives as awk's input now, with the font on a descriptor of its own.
A line with nothing drawable printed nothing at all, so a blank line between two words closed the gap up rather than keeping it. Every line draws its block now, blank ones included, which is what figlet does with a newline.
Placing a glyph scanned and copied the whole width of the art so far, costing the square of the line's length: four thousand characters took forty-six seconds. A row is now held without its trailing blanks, counted separately instead, so a glyph costs its own width and those four thousand characters take a tenth of a second.
A skipped control character was named on stderr by writing it out, which sends it to the terminal as a control character; those are named by code now. An unknown option was drawn as art rather than refused, so a mistyped `--width 40` quietly rendered the word "width".
figlet.c trims the column of blanks that every row of an `M` shares when it is the first glyph on a line, and figlet.js keeps it. asciiart.eu runs figlet.js, so the rendering follows figlet.js and a test pins that `M`, because the wordmark alone does not catch the difference and the next reader would have no way to tell the choice from an oversight.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
Nothing in the repository called omarchy-sudo-reset, and its one line interpolated an environment-supplied $USER into a string handed to a root shell: `su -c "faillock --reset --user $USER"`. $USER is an environment variable rather than a kernel-supplied identity, so whatever set it before the command ran chose the rest of what root's shell executed. That is not a way past PAM on its own — su still has to authenticate — but the installer sets root's password to the user's own, so the prompt this raises is one the user answers by habit.
It bought little for that. Omarchy sets `deny=10 unlock_time=120` in /etc/pam.d/system-auth and in the lock screen's PAM stack, so a lockout takes ten wrong passwords to reach and clears itself two minutes later, and the manual documents the root-TTY reset for anyone who would rather not wait.
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
* Stop a psmouse quirk from failing every install
install/hardware/fix-synaptic-touchpad.sh calls modprobe against the running
kernel. Under 4.0 the only thing that runs it is the ISO finalizer, inside
arch-chroot, where uname -r still names the live ISO's kernel while /lib/modules
holds the target's. The live ISO always boots linux-t2 and the configurator
gives every machine that is not a T2 Mac stock linux, so those two never match:
modprobe exits 1 with "Module psmouse not found in directory /lib/modules/<live
kernel>". run_logged returns that status and omarchy-apply-hardware runs under
set -euo pipefail, so a fresh install stops on the first machine with a device
named "synaptics" and no psmouse loaded -- reported from a ThinkPad in #6985,
but nothing about it is Lenovo-specific.
Skip the load when the running kernel's modules are not reachable, and warn
instead of failing when modprobe declines for any other reason. An optional
touchpad improvement should never be able to halt an install.
This does not make InterTouch reach the installed system: a module loaded into
the live kernel is gone at reboot, so on 4.0 this script has never applied
anything to an installed machine. Persisting it means writing options psmouse
synaptics_intertouch=1 to /etc/modprobe.d, which forces the SMBus transport past
the kernel's own allowlist on any touchpad merely named "synaptics" in
/proc/bus/input/devices. That is a hardware-behaviour change on a wide class of
machines, so it is left for a maintainer to decide separately.
Fixes#6985
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Ask modprobe whether psmouse resolves rather than guessing at /lib/modules
The reachability check ran through OMARCHY_SYNAPTIC_MODULES_DIR, an override
modprobe itself never saw: it decided whether the load was attempted but could
not change where modprobe looked, so the guard and the load consulted different
places and the seam read as though it configured module lookup. modprobe -qn
answers the same question directly -- it resolves psmouse against the running
kernel without loading it -- so the guard and the load now agree by
construction and the override goes away. The arch-chroot case that broke
installs is still skipped silently, for the same reason it always was: the live
kernel's modules are not the ones on disk.
Inline the remaining /proc/bus/input/devices override at its only use. These
leaves are sourced one after another into a single shell, so a variable left at
the top level outlives the script that set it.
Pin the wiring assertion to the run_logged call instead of any mention of the
path. A commented-out line satisfied the old grep, so the test could pass with
the quirk no longer running at all.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013L5zwTiZ2CsgazyxXBiPa8
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
omarchy-mise-install gained --quiet on its `mise use -g` line so a wrapper
no longer prints mise's "tools: pkg@version" ahead of the tool's own
output. That only changes wrappers written from then on, and the migration
that installed the current ones is already marked complete, so every
wrapper already on disk keeps polluting stdout: `claude --version` still
answers with two lines, and a wrapper for a protocol-speaking command
answers with a line its caller cannot parse.
Rewrite them through omarchy-mise-install so the template stays in one
place. Wrappers were written by four different generated forms over time
and only the ones a later migration happened to regenerate moved forward,
so all four are recognized. The whole file has to match one of them
exactly, which leaves a wrapper someone has added a line to alone and
makes a second run a no-op.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Mv1FyKG2VGZRdtknQ7YjU8
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The direct-Notify rewrite dropped notify-send options that callers rely on, which
the momus review caught: omarchy-display-text-size uses -r/-p to refresh one
toast in place, and the acceptance suite uses the --expire-time=15000 equals
form. Re-add -r/--replace-id (replaces_id), -p/--print-id (emit the returned id),
and the --flag=value form for every long option; a dash-leading description like
"-50% off" is now kept as body text rather than erroring, and --exec "" is
rejected.
Add a fixture proving the deliberate upgrade behavior: a popup persisted by a
pre-upgrade shell with a legacy `exec` shell string restores with an inert click
(execArgv empty, the old string never run) rather than executing it.
omarchy-notification-send now calls org.freedesktop.Notifications.Notify
directly with `busctl --user`, instead of shelling out to notify-send. Each
value is one typed D-Bus parameter, so there is no argv/option layer that could
reinterpret a relayed headline like `--hint=…` or `-rf` as an option or a hint:
the summary and body are strings, and omarchy-exec-argv is built only from
--exec. A leading `--` keeps busctl's own getopt from reading a dash-leading
value as a busctl option.
Map -i to app_icon, -t to expire_timeout, and urgency to the byte hint; unknown
options are now a hard error rather than a silent pass-through. Route the unused
hypr o.notify helper and the sample hooks through the wrapper too, and tighten
the bin-style test so nothing under bin/ may call notify-send. The test stubs
busctl and trips if notify-send is invoked.
The comment claimed the validation kept a hostile hint from reaching a shell,
but it is purely structural: a well-formed ["bash","-c",…] passes. Say so,
and point at the separate sender-trust boundary.
* Let a received Taildrop file wait to be answered
A delivery can land hours after it was sent, and the toast announcing it was expiring after five seconds -- so a file that arrived while nobody was at the machine was gone from the screen before anyone could click it open. Critical urgency is what the shell reads as a popup that lives until it is clicked or dismissed, the same thing omarchy-crash-watch uses to keep its click-to-diagnose toast around.
The wrapper takes options after the headline and description as well as before, which is how this argument list is built. That path had no test, and it fails quietly rather than loudly: the wrapper appends its own default urgency last, so an urgency it stopped parsing would reach notify-send as `-u critical ... -u low` and the toast would go back to expiring.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
* Say it in the commit message, not above the code
`-u critical` next to a line that builds a notification says what it does, and the five lines explaining why it is there were a recap of the change rather than something the code could not say. The reasoning stays where it belongs, in the commit that made the change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: David Heinemeier Hansson <david@hey.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
The argv click command closed injection through the hint's value, but the
sender still handed the headline and description to notify-send bare. A
value beginning with a dash is parsed there as flags, and one shaped like
`--hint=string:omarchy-exec-argv:[...]` is read as a hint of its own --
libnotify keys hints in a hash table, so the later of two replaces the
earlier and a forged headline outranks the vector --exec built.
That is reachable without any --exec in sight: omarchy-tailscale-send
passes a single file's basename verbatim as the description, so a file
named like the hint gives its click action to whoever chose the name.
Put the headline and description behind a `--` so notify-send reads them
as text, and refuse any pass-through word carrying omarchy-exec-argv --
--exec is the only thing that may build a click command.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <noreply@openai.com>
A greedy pre-scan matched the first --exec token anywhere on the line, so an
untrusted headline or description literally equal to "--exec" could be mistaken
for the delimiter. It always failed closed (the following token became a
dash-option argv[0] that parseExecArgv rejects), but it was a latent footgun
surfaced by an adversarial review.
Detect --exec only in the trailing-option loop, after the headline/description
positionals are captured. A headline that is the string "--exec" is now kept as
text and the real trailing --exec still wins. The residual — a description
exactly equal to "--exec" losing its click action — is an inherent, harmless CLI
ambiguity for a value identical to the delimiter.
Replace --exec-arg with an ergonomic --exec that consumes the rest of the line
as the click command. The caller's shell tokenizes the words into discrete
arguments before the tool sees them, and the shell runs them as positional
parameters (never a re-parsed string), so safety is identical to the argv form
while the call sites read naturally: `--exec omarchy toggle something`.
Crucially the tool never splits a string itself — a single quoted whole-command
argument is rejected and points at the unquoted form, because whitespace-
splitting a string hands argument boundaries to whoever controls its content
(the injection we are avoiding). --exec must come last; migrate every caller.
A free-form shell-string --exec sitting next to the safe --exec-arg is a
standing invitation for the next caller to interpolate untrusted data and
reintroduce the RCE. Remove it: omarchy-notification-send --exec now errors and
points at --exec-arg, and the shell drops the omarchy-exec string hint and its
bash -lc execution path, leaving only the argv path.
Migrate the remaining string callers (the first-run invitation hooks, wifi and
welcome prompts) to --exec-arg, and update their notification mocks. Trim the
verbose security comments added along the way.
Quickshell.execDetached(argv) ran the click target with only the shell
process's stripped environment, so GUI actions like the screenshot editor
(tensaku-edit) — resolved on the login-shell PATH the old `bash -lc` string
exec provided — stopped launching on click.
Run the argv through `bash -lc 'exec "$@"'` instead: the script text is a
constant and the arguments are passed as positional parameters, which bash
expands without re-tokenizing or re-evaluating, so injection safety is intact
while PATH and session env match the old behavior exactly.
The click action of a notification was a free-form shell string run through
`bash -lc`, safe only when every sender shell-quoted every interpolated value
perfectly. One slip is RCE: a hostile yt-dlp video title forged an output
record and injected an mpv option into the click command (mehmetince.net RCE,
partially addressed by #7847).
Add a parameterized transport: omarchy-notification-send gains --exec-arg
(repeatable), encoding a JSON argv into the omarchy-exec-argv hint. The shell
runs it with Quickshell.execDetached(argv) and no shell, so data an attacker
controls is only ever one argument and can never be reparsed as a command. The
shell fails closed on a malformed argv hint.
The legacy free-form --exec string is retained but honored only from Omarchy's
own omarchy-action toasts, and deprecated. Migrate all in-repo callers
(screenshot, screen recording, taildrop receive, migrate-notify, crash-watch,
yt-dlp host) to --exec-arg. Update docs and tests.
* Stop an installed theme from shipping code
`omarchy theme install <url>` clones a stranger's git repository into ~/.config/omarchy/themes, and omarchy-theme-set then copied that whole directory into the staged theme. Most of the files in a staged theme are code rather than colour: Hyprland requires hyprland.lua and gum_env.lua from it at login, Neovim loads neovim.lua at startup, and alacritty.toml, kitty.conf, foot.ini and ghostty.conf each name the program the terminal launches. Installing a theme was the same act as running its author's code, and nothing on disk distinguishes an installed theme from one the user wrote.
Stage only what a theme needs in order to be a theme: colors.toml, light.mode, the preview and unlock images, and image files under backgrounds/. Everything else is ignored, named on stderr, and generated from default/themed/*.tpl instead. Symlinks are never followed, because in an untrusted theme they point wherever the author chose. A theme older than colors.toml keeps its palette: its alacritty.toml is read for colours in a scratch directory and only the resulting colors.toml is staged, so the terminal config never lands.
The filter belongs in omarchy-theme-set rather than in omarchy-theme-install because staging is the choke point. It also covers themes installed before this change, themes copied in by hand, and files a theme gains later through `omarchy theme update`.
First-party themes under $OMARCHY_PATH/themes are unaffected. Per-theme overrides of a generated file are no longer available to user themes; the template at ~/.config/omarchy/themed/<file>.tpl replaces that, and icons.theme is the one setting with no replacement.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code.
* Stop a theme URL or name being read as an option or a path
Three paths in the theme commands took an attacker-shaped string straight into git, into basename, or into rm.
`git clone "$REPO_URL"` passes the URL as the first positional argument, so a URL beginning with a dash is parsed as an option instead and the destination path becomes what git tries to clone. Pass `--` before the URL so a URL is always a URL. git also treats `<helper>::<address>` as a remote helper to run; git's own protocol.allow default already refuses `ext::`, so rejecting that shape here is a second line rather than the fix, and it keeps holding if that default ever moves. The helper name is a bare word at the very start of the URL, which is what the guard matches: an scp-style IPv6 host such as git@[2001:db8::1]:org/repo.git carries `::` of its own and still clones.
`basename "$REPO_PATH" .git` has the same problem one step later, after the scp-style prefix has been stripped: `host:-s/foo.git` leaves basename reading `-s` as an option and returning `.git` as the theme name. Take the name with `--`.
That name is then joined into a path that is about to be `rm -rf`'d, so a repo whose basename came out as `..` would take ~/.config/omarchy with it. omarchy-theme-remove had the same shape from its own argument, and omarchy-theme-set's sed/tr normalization does not stop a name containing a slash. Reject empty, anything starting with a dot, and anything containing `/` in all three, before the name reaches a path.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
* Re-stage the current theme for installs that already applied one
Dropping a theme's code at staging time only takes effect the next time a theme is staged. An install that already applied an extra theme keeps that theme's hyprland.lua, gum_env.lua, neovim.lua and terminal configs in ~/.local/state/omarchy/current/theme, which Hyprland requires at login and the terminals include at launch, and nothing forces a theme change — so for those installs the fix would arrive whenever the user next happened to switch themes, which may be never.
Re-stage once through omarchy-theme-refresh. First-party themes stage identically, so the cost for everyone else is a single retint during an update they are already running.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
* Stop a theme's unlock image republishing a file it points at
omarchy-plymouth-set-by-theme reads unlock.png straight out of ~/.config/omarchy/themes, which is an installed theme's own directory and outside the staging filter, and hands the path to omarchy-plymouth-set. That path was copied twice into world-readable /usr/share — once by the user into the Plymouth theme, and once by `sudo cp` into the SDDM theme. A symlink there was followed both times, so a theme could name a file it cannot read and have root publish it.
Refuse a symlinked logo, and copy the staged logo to SDDM instead of rereading the caller's path as root. The staged copy is made by the user, so nothing privileged opens a path the caller chose.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh.
Co-Authored-By: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
* Limit only what an installed theme could run
Two corrections to the rule this branch introduced, both narrowing it to what it was actually for.
It applied to every theme under ~/.config/omarchy/themes, which swept up themes the user wrote themselves. Their machine, their file: a theme they wrote is theirs to fill however they like, and Omarchy's own themes were never in scope. Only a theme that came from someone else needs limiting, and the repo already knows which those are — omarchy-theme-extras calls a theme with a `.git` directory an extra and a symlink someone's working copy, because that is what `omarchy theme install` leaves behind when it clones. Use the same test.
It was also an allowlist, which dropped files that carry nothing but colour and left theme authors worse off for no gain. Drop only what can run: any `*.lua`, since Hyprland requires a theme's hyprland.lua and gum_env.lua at login and Neovim loads neovim.lua at startup; the four terminal configs, since each names the program the terminal launches; and vscode.json, whose extension field reaches `code --install-extension` and a VS Code extension is arbitrary JavaScript. Everything else an installed theme ships is kept, so btop.theme, chromium.theme, helix.toml, icons.theme, keyboard.rgb and shell.toml go back to being the theme's to set.
Symlinks are still dropped, now at any depth rather than only where an allowlist happened to look.
A denylist is wrong the moment someone adds a template and does not think about it, so the decision is forced rather than remembered: the test fails on any default/themed/*.tpl whose output is recorded as neither code nor colour, and a new terminal or a new Lua-loading editor cannot be added without classifying it.
What this does not cover, and is written down in docs/theming.md rather than implied: a theme shipped as an archive and unpacked by hand looks exactly like one the user wrote. `omarchy theme install` only takes git URLs, so the supported path is always filtered, but this marks where a theme came from and is not a sandbox.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code.
* Fix what the review found
Four things, all confirmed against the source before changing anything.
The migration failed permanently when the active theme had been removed. `omarchy theme remove` deletes the directory without repointing theme.name, so the name survives, the staged copy survives, and omarchy-theme-refresh exits 1 because neither source directory exists — leaving the migration pending forever and the stale staged Lua exactly where it was, which is the one thing it existed to remove. Seed the default theme in that case: there is nothing to re-stage from, and the removal should have left a working theme behind anyway.
The staging test skipped the strict-mode header that docs/testing.md makes the contract for every shell test. Adding it means the patterns that fail on purpose have to stop being bare `cmd && fail` compounds, which errexit reads as the script itself failing; the mutations were re-run afterwards to confirm the assertions still fire rather than the run dying early and looking like something else.
The guards in omarchy-theme-install and omarchy-theme-remove had no coverage — they were checked by hand and left that way. theme-install-guards-test.sh stubs git and the themes directory and proves an option-shaped URL, a transport helper, and a name that would climb out all stop before git or rm runs, that a dash inside the path no longer becomes a basename option, and that an ordinary URL still clones and applies.
The new docs/theming.md prose was hard-wrapped, which AGENTS.md forbids for docs/. Unwrapped. The rest of that file is wrapped from before and is left alone rather than churned through this change.
🤖 Generated by Opus 5 in Claude Code. Reviewed by Codex XHigh and Copilot.
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Co-authored-by: Codex XHigh <codex@openai.com>
ZacharyZhang-NYandClaude Fable 5